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ABSTRACT 
 
RITA F. COLISTRA:  Reporter Perceptions of Influences on Media Content:  A Structural 
Equation Model of the Agenda- and Frame-Building and Agenda-Cutting Processes  
in the Television Industry 
(Under the direction of Dr. Donald L. Shaw) 
 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to examine through what forces and under what 
conditions the media are most likely to be influenced, and with what effect on news content.  
Specifically, this study asks how, how often, and under what conditions do external and 
internal forces attempt to influence the television media and their coverage, and to what 
effect are they successful at doing so?  To answer this question, this dissertation uses a multi-
level research approach to examine how extramedia, organizational, and within-media forces 
influence television news content and coverage decisions.  The first stage uses structural 
equation modeling to test a comprehensive model of media influences and outcomes using 
original data from a national Web survey of television reporters.   Findings suggest that, 
based on reporters’ perceptions, forces outside the media have a direct influence on 
organizational-level pressures.  These pressures are then passed down to forces within the 
news organization, which then influence news content and coverage decisions.  
Organizational influences, including owners and top-level executives, affect coverage 
decisions both indirectly, as mediated through decision-makers working within the station 
itself, and directly.  Both relationships were positive, suggesting that more reports of pressure 
from these sources result in higher levels of influence on content and coverage decisions.  
Market size also affects reporters’ perceptions of influences, as respondents from smaller 
iv 
markets perceive more instances of pressures from Extramedia sources, as well as more 
accounts of Organizational and Within-Media pressures.  These relationships ultimately 
result in more instances of overall influences on content. 
 The second stage of the study examines the strength of the three indicators of 
extramedia influences (advertising, public relations, and political) and the three measures of 
organizational influences (owner/executive, economic, and staff) in predicting both 
influences on news coverage decisions and instances of agenda cutting.  The findings offer 
insight for scholars, journalists, advertising and public relations professionals, media 
policymakers, and those involved in media ownership and economics.  The study also 
attempts to advance theory with the development and expansion of agenda cutting, and by 
updating agenda- and frame-building and social control of the newsroom literature. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 The mass media are an integral part of our everyday lives.  With the advent and 
proliferation of new technologies that make information more accessible, such as portable 
Internet and e-mail devices, the media have become ingrained into our daily routines.  In fact, 
Americans spend more time using media, such as reading newspapers, listening to the radio, 
surfing the Internet, and watching television, than any other activity except for breathing. 1  
And media use is projected to increase in 2008.2   
 Although new media technologies have surfaced over the years, none is as prevalent 
as television.  TV has been a popular medium among audiences since its official debut in the 
late 1940s and 1950s.  Since then, the number of people using it as their primary media 
source has increased dramatically, and figures remain strong today.  Data from the U.S. 
Census Bureau’s Statistical Abstract indicate that, in 2008, Americans are expected to spend 
approximately 1,704 hours watching TV, which averages to almost five hours a day.  This 
figure is up from 1,502 TV hours at the beginning of the millennium.3  Television is also the 
                                                 
 
1Stephen Ohlemacher, “Report: Americans Media Use Rising,” Guardian (London) Unlimited, 
December 15, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uslatest/story/0,,-6282121,00.html (accessed December 16, 
2006).  Note: These findings were reported in a December 2006 Guardian article citing data released by the 
U.S. Census Bureau’s Statistical Abstracts during the same period.   
 
 
2Statistical Abstract of the United States, “Table 1098. Media Usage and Consumer Spending: 2000 to 
2010,” U.S. Census Bureau, January 10, 2008, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/tables/08s1098.pdf 
(accessed March 1, 2008). 
 
 
3Ibid.  
 
2 
most popular medium for obtaining the news of the day.  A Harris Poll conducted in January 
2006 revealed that 77% of adults reported watching local broadcast news several times a 
week or daily.  The figure for network broadcast or cable news was only slightly lower with 
71%.4 
 With audiences devoting so much of their attention to television news, it is important 
to examine what is being aired on these broadcasts. Perhaps more significant, however, is 
how these news topics and stories came to be chosen, or not chosen, for broadcast in the first 
place. What forces, both internal and external, were involved in the news-decision process?  
Did owners or top-level executives suggest a particular story to cover or emphasize?  Were 
public relations practitioners involved in the particular “spin” or angle taken on a certain 
topic?  Did newsroom management influence a reporter’s decision of if and how he/she 
would cover that event?  Or, did advertisers exert pressure on the news organization to avoid 
covering a particular story because the coverage could be harmful to its company’s image or 
profits? All are important questions that should be asked regarding news coverage.  This is 
especially true in today’s media world, as news workers are continually faced with 
competing loyalties from both within and outside their organizations.  With increased 
bottom-line pressures, these types of potential influences on news content decisions are even 
more evident—especially in the broadcast industry where most stations’ revenues derive 
from advertising.5 
                                                 
 
4
“Seven in 10 U.S. Adults Say They Watch Broadcast News at Least Several Times a Week,” Harris 
Interactive, February 24, 2006, http://harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/printerfriend/index.asp?PID=644 
(accessed on November 27, 2006). 
 
 
5Pamela J. Shoemaker and Stephen D. Reese, Mediating the Message: Theories of Influences on Mass 
Media Content, 2d ed. (White Plains, NY: Longman Publishers, 1996), 267. 
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 While many studies have centered on how media content may affect audiences, fewer 
have taken a step back to consider who or what is influencing the media’s decisions.  
Influences on news content and coverage decisions may consist of three main processes: 
agenda building, frame building, and agenda cutting.  Briefly, agenda building concerns what 
forces are attempting to influence the news agenda.  Shoemaker and Reese proposed their 
hierarchical model of influences depicting how the media’s content may be influenced on 
different levels, ranging from micro to macro, from forces both within and outside of news 
organizations.6  These forces of influence may also attempt to affect how a story, topic, issue, 
or event is covered.  That is, they may try to influence the “spin” or angle of the story or the 
stance on an issue.  Thus, these forces also attempt to influence how a news story is framed 
(frame building).   Finally, journalists may also be pressured to not cover, or avoid covering, 
a particular story or issue.  This little-studied process is known as agenda cutting and is 
further discussed in the chapter that follows.  
 Some researchers have pointed out that more knowledge is needed on how and by 
whom the media agenda is set.7 Others have called for more evidence to increase our 
understanding of how and through what forces media frames are constructed.8 Furthermore, 
few researchers have even delved into the area of how and why certain news items are simply 
kept off, or cut out of, the media agenda.  Thus, the purpose of this study is to examine 
through what forces and under what conditions the media are most likely to be influenced 
and to what effect on news content.  That is, how and under what conditions do external and 
                                                 
 
6Pamela J. Shoemaker and Stephen D. Reese, Mediating the Message: Theories of Influences on Mass 
Media Content (New York: Longman Publishing Group, 1991). 
 
 
7Everett M. Rogers, James W. Dearing, and Dorine Bregman, “The Anatomy of Agenda-Setting 
Research,” The Journal of Communication 43, no. 2 (spring 1993): 73.   
 
 
8For example, see Dietram A. Scheufele, “Framing as a Theory of Media Effects,” Journal of 
Communication 49 (winter 1999): 109. 
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Extramedia
Influences
Organizational
Influences
Within-Media
Influences
Content Influence/
Outcome
internal forces attempt to influence the media and their coverage, and to what effect are they 
successful at doing so?  Specifically, this research measured the potential outcomes of 
attempts at influencing coverage decisions and news content.  Using aspects from Shoemaker 
and Reese’s hierarchical model of influences, along with research and examples from 
agenda-building and framing literature, a comprehensive model of media influences and 
outcomes was tested using a survey of television reporters (See Figure 1.1—Theoretical 
Model of Influences on Media Content (IOMC)).  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 This study’s overall goal was to examine extramedia, organizational, and within-
media forces that may influence news media content.  As indicated in the IOMC model, this 
study proposed that extramedia and organizational influences on content decision 
effects/outcomes are mediated through within-media organization pressures.   
 In one part of the model, this study evaluated whether extramedia forces, such as 
advertiser, public relations, and political pressures, influence television news workers and 
their content decisions.  Ample evidence of attempts and successes of extramedia forces 
influencing the media abound, especially in the area of advertising.  For instance, Camel 
Figure 1.1  Theoretical Model of Influences on Media Content 
5 
cigarettes sponsored the “Camel News Caravan” on NBC in the 1950s.  As a part of the 
agreement, NBC was not permitted to film any newscasts with shots of cigars or where a “No 
Smoking” sign was visible.9 According to former NBC News President Reuven Frank in his 
book Out of Thin Air, “What Camel wanted Camel got.”10  Decades later, Mother Jones, a 
liberal magazine, published articles that linked cigarette smoking and cancer, although the 
staff thought it might lead to repercussions from their tobacco advertisers.  Their concerns 
were well-founded, as the companies pulled their ads from the magazine.11  Ms. magazine 
suffered similar consequences from Clairol after publishing a report on congressional 
hearings concerning hair dyes and their chemicals being absorbed through the skin, which 
may be carcinogenic.  The company eventually changed its formulas but also pulled ads from 
the publication as a result of the reports.12 
 The study also examined organizational pressures, including ownership/executive and 
economic pressures, and their influence on content as mediated through the news 
organization (within-news organization influence).  Organizational pressures, namely 
stemming from ownership issues, have attracted much attention from both professionals and 
academics.  For example, NBC’s Saturday Night Live ran a cartoon skit that criticized media 
ownership concentration and its effects on news content—including stories about General 
Electric (GE), the network’s parent company.  When NBC reran the episode months later, the 
                                                 
 
9Deborah Potter, “For Sale: Advertisers Make More Inroads on News,” American Journalism Review 
28, no. 2 (April/May 2006): 72.  
 
 
10Reuvan Frank, Out of Thin Air: The Brief and Wonderful Life of Network News (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1991), as cited in Potter, “For Sale: Advertisers Make More Inroads on News,” 72. 
 
 
11David Croteau and William Hoynes, The Business of Media: Corporate Media and the Public 
Interest (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 2001), 180. 
 
 
12Gloria Steinem, “Sex, Lies & Advertising,” Ms. 1, no. 1 (July/August 1990): 18, http://www. 
uwc.edu/dept/wmsts/Faculty/steinem.htm (accessed Nov. 13, 2006). 
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cartoon segment was cut reportedly because it lacked comedic value.13 According to an 
editorial in The Nation, however, a source from the network reported that both NBC’s 
president and GE executives were displeased with the material.14  Those writing and 
producing entertainment pieces may not be the only group under pressure from owners and 
top executives, as news workers may be feeling the heat as well.  A 2000 survey conducted 
by Pew Research Center and Columbia Journalism Review (CJR) found that 51% of local 
journalists felt that corporate owners influence news organizations’ decisions about which 
stories to cover or emphasize “a great deal” or “a fair amount.”15 
The relationship between the extramedia and organizational levels of influence was 
considered.  Given the paucity of literature directly regarding the relationships between these 
two levels within the context of the current study, the IOMC model simply implied that 
changes at the extramedia level resulted in changes at the organizational level, and vice 
versa. That is, no direct effects between these two independent variables were initially 
proposed. 
The hypothesized model additionally posited that the extramedia and organizational 
influences on media content were mediated by pressures within media organizations.  The 
possible influences at this level included direct and indirect management pressures.  For 
example, newsroom managers may directly tell their staff to nix a certain story or to cover it 
from a particular angle.  Others may simply provide overt instructions of what types of 
content should and should not be covered.  These preferences, however, are not always so 
                                                 
 
13David Corn, “Saturday Night Censored,” The Nation, 13 July 1998, 6; Croteau and Hoynes, The 
Business of Media, 175-176. 
 
 
14Corn, “Saturday Night Censored,” 6. 
 
 
15
“Self Censorship: How Often and Why,” The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 
(April 30, 2000), http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=39 (accessed on April 5, 2006). 
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obvious, and content decisions may be made due to more subtle pressures exerted on news 
workers by management, owners, or top-level executives.16  These subtle directions may 
come in the form of indirect management signals, such as yawning at or making fun of a 
story idea or simply not running or airing a reporter’s story.  Soon, these news workers are 
socialized into the proper news routines with little or no direct form of correction, reprimand, 
or instruction.17 
To examine the type of influences just discussed, this study used a multistage 
research approach of testing the overall model with its respective components, in addition to 
evaluating specific relationships and outcomes within the model. Multiple techniques were 
used at different stages to examine the influences and potential effects on media content 
proposed in the study.   First, an advanced multivariate statistical technique, Structural 
Equation Modeling (SEM), was used to test the hypothesized model of influences and 
outcomes.  Specifically, the study evaluated extramedia and organizational influences with 
(1) each other, as indicated by the double-headed arrows, (2) within-media influences, such 
as direct and indirect management pressures, and (3) influences/effects on content, such as 
levels of agenda building, frame building, and agenda cutting, as mediated through “within-
media influences.”    
The second phase of the study involved the use of correlation analysis and multiple 
regression to assess the plausibility, strength, and direction of specific relationships between 
variables that were not directly presented in the model.  Separate analyses were used for this 
                                                 
 
16For example, see Theodore L. Glasser, David S. Allen, and S. Elizabeth Blanks, “The Influence of 
Chain Ownership on News Play: A Case Study,” Journalism Quarterly 66 (autumn 1989):  613. 
 
 
17For example, see Warren Breed, “Social Control in the Newsroom: A Functional Analysis,” Social 
Forces 33, no. 4 (May 1955): 326-335. 
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stage because the SEM technique in the first phase of the study provides an overall 
evaluation of the proposed model, but it does not assess relationships that are unspecified.   
 This research should be useful to both media scholars and journalists alike because it 
will help them to better recognize how and under what conditions influences on news content 
are likely to occur.   Findings from this study could also serve as the starting point for 
creating innovative newsroom policy and guidelines on how to deal with such situations of 
attempted influence when they arise.  At the very least, they should facilitate newsroom 
discussions about these issues.  Influences on news content has sparked ethical debates 
regarding competing loyalties to readers/viewers, advertisers, and stockholders, to name a 
few.  These discussions are especially important today with even more concern over the 
bottom line due to increased competition and advanced technology.   
 On the other side of the coin, this study may be valuable to those working in public 
relations, advertising, and the government. Findings shed light on the effectiveness of their 
efforts and under what conditions (e.g., market size, smaller staffs) their endeavors are more 
likely to prove fruitful.  Thus, this research may help professionals in these areas alter their 
communication strategies accordingly to ensure that they are using their resources most 
efficiently. 
 The findings from this project also provide valuable information to policymakers in 
their decisions concerning issues such as ownership (de)regulation, political involvement, 
and advertising.  With the major deregulation from the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and 
the debates that surrounded the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) reevaluation of 
the proposed relaxation of ownership rules in 2003, a comprehensive model of potential 
9 
influences on media content may be useful in making decisions about industry regulation 
guidelines. 
 Finally, this study helps to advance agenda-building and frame-building literature, 
and, more importantly, it aids in the development and expansion of agenda cutting, which has 
been afforded little to no attention from scholars beyond an abundance of anecdotal examples 
of its occurrence.  This area, in particular, should be of interest to those studying political 
communication, propaganda, advertising, public relations and strategic communication, and 
beyond. 
In the next chapter, literature involving sources of extramedia influences is reviewed, 
followed by a fairly detailed examination of pressures at the organizational level.  Influences 
within news organizations are then discussed, and examples from academic studies and 
surveys are incorporated to provide a better understanding of the forces involved at this level.  
Although this stage is not explicitly outlined in Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model, 
this construct draws upon ideas from the “media routines” level but offers more personalized 
newsroom information, which is explained in greater detail in its respective section.  Finally, 
a detailed explanation of the potential influences and outcomes on content and coverage 
decisions, the main dependent variable of the study, is provided.  The potential influences on 
content are instances of agenda building, frame building, and agenda cutting.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 Shoemaker and Reese have pointed out that media content can be influenced on 
different levels.  Gatekeepers exist at each level, and they allow certain news items to pass 
through to the next stage toward broadcast or publication while others are filtered out of 
consideration.  The idea of gatekeeping has it roots in the field of psychology.  German 
psychologist Kurt Lewin first coined the term during his research on social change in times 
of food shortage after World War II.18  He found that food passed through gates using 
different channels with gatekeepers selecting or rejecting the items that were then delivered 
to the table.19  Lewin later suggested that this “gatekeeping” theory could be applied to news 
items moving through different paths of communication.20 
 David Manning White took this advice and was the first researcher to apply this 
theory of gates and channels to the media.21 His research focused on “Mr. Gates,” a 
newspaper wire editor, and the forces that led to his selection of stories.  White found that 
                                                 
 
18Kurt Lewin, “Frontiers in Group Dynamics: Concept, Method and Reality in Science; Social 
Equilibria and Social Change,” Human Relations 1 (June 1947): 5-40; Kurt Lewin, “Frontiers in Group 
Dynamics: Channels of Group Life; Social Planning and Action Research,” Human Relations 1 (November 
1947): 143-53. 
 
 
19Kurt Lewin, Field Theory in Social Science: Selected Theoretical Papers, ed. Dorwin Cartwright 
(NY: Harper & Brothers, 1951), 176. 
 
 
20Ibid, 187. 
 
 
21David Manning White, “The ‘Gate Keeper’: A Case Study in the Selection of News,” Journalism 
Quarterly 27 (fall 1950): 383-90. 
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“Mr. Gates’” decisions to select and reject stories were affected by his personal beliefs and 
by newsroom routines.   
 With these studies of gatekeeping and the “control” of news flow in mind, Shoemaker 
and Reese developed the hierarchical model of influences, as briefly outlined earlier.  They 
argue that media choice of the presentation of news items operate on different levels, ranging 
from macro to micro, to influence the content that is eventually received by the audience.  
The levels of influence are ideological, extramedia, organizational, media routines, and 
individual.22  The current study and proposed model draw from particular levels of 
Shoemaker and Reese’s study, along with aspects from agenda building, framing, and agenda 
cutting.  Only those influence levels and potential effects on content assessed in the current 
study are addressed in the review of literature that follows in order to provide justification for 
the specific goals of this project.  The pressure sources included in this study are extramedia, 
organizational, and within-media influences.  The potential influences/outcomes on content 
are levels of agenda building, frame building, and agenda cutting.  The following sections 
explain each of the influence levels and the possible effects on news media content.  
 
Extramedia Influences 
 
 Potential extramedia levels of influence include advertisers, public relations efforts, 
government and political, and interest groups.  Studies have relied on this level of analysis in 
an attempt to get to the first step in the gatekeeping and agenda-building processes.23 
Berkowitz argued that the relationship between journalists and news sources should be 
                                                 
 
22Shoemaker and Reese, Mediating the Message, 54; Shoemaker and Reese, Mediating the Message, 
2d ed., 64. 
 
 
23Dan Berkowitz, “TV News Sources and News Channels: A Study in Agenda-Building,” Journalism 
Quarterly 64 (autumn 1987):  508-13; Judy VanSlyke Turk, “Information Subsidies and Influence,” Public 
Relations Review 11, no. 3 (1985):  10-25. 
 
12 
examined in addition to the practice of newsgathering when considering the agenda-building 
process.24  The term “sources” not only refers to individuals associated with an event or 
issue, such as a witness of an accident or a prosecutor associated with a legal case, but may 
also include organization-based information, such as press releases, press conferences, video 
news releases (VNRs), and official proceedings.  Gandy referred to these latter sources as 
“information subsidies” and stressed their importance in the agenda-building process.25  The 
media may use these sources verbatim or incorporate them into their own coverage.  Without 
proper fact checking and other journalistic measures to ensure accuracy and balance, the 
media may be helping these sources build and set their own agendas with the public, either 
inadvertently or intentionally.  Thus, the relationship between journalists and different 
extramedia organizational sources is important to examine because researchers can then 
determine if they are simply affiliated to build one another’s agenda.26  That is, in exchange 
for the source providing information to the media organization, especially if the news entity 
is understaffed or if there is a lull in newsworthy issues or events, the journalist agrees to 
report on topics that the source deems important—in other words, items provided by these 
information subsidies and the organizations that prepare them.  To further examine 
extramedia influences, three specific sources of pressure are considered:  advertiser, public 
relations, and political/government. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
24Berkowitz, “TV News Sources and News Channels,” 513. 
 
 
25Oscar H. Gandy, Beyond Agenda Setting: Information Subsidies and Public Policy (Norwood, N.J.: 
Ablex Publishing, 1982). 
 
 
26Rita F. Counts-Colistra, “Media Concentration of Ownership and its Effects on Editorial Page Vigor 
of West Virginia Daily Newspapers,” (Master’s thesis, West Virginia University, 2004), 8.  
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Advertiser Pressures 
 
 Gloria Steinem, editor of Ms. magazine, reported that she once attended a press lunch 
for a Soviet official.  After much banter, the official asked the group how to control the 
media more subtly.  Steinem simply replied, “Advertising.”27  Based on the evidence in both 
trade and academic literature, she may not be exaggerating.  
 A number of examples concerning advertiser influences on the media have emerged 
over the years.  A 1992 study found that more than 89% of the 150 newspaper editors 
surveyed said “advertisers had pulled ads or tried to influence stories,” with most of the 
pressure appearing to come from automobile dealers.28 One year before, an American 
Journalism Review article reported that angry auto dealers pulled television ads after the 
station aired stories concerning dangerous vehicles, an unhappy customer, and tips on saving 
money when buying a new car.29  
 Because advertisers know that the media rely on them for revenue, they may 
sometimes assume that they have special access to the news30 or may lay out guidelines of 
what type of content that is to be run (or not run) in the same issue/segment of their 
advertisements.31  Several examples of these privileged guidelines have surfaced in the 
magazine industry.  According to Croteau and Hoynes, Chrysler Corporation expressed that 
“each and every issue [of the magazines in which it advertised] that carries Chrysler 
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advertising requires a written summary outlining major themes/articles appearing in 
upcoming issues.”32  Furthermore, the company was to be informed in advance if any content 
covered “sexual, political, social issues or any editorial that might be construed as 
provocative or offensive.”33  Steinem also spoke about advertiser demands at Ms.  Proctor & 
Gamble, for example, insisted that its products’ advertisements should not run in “any issue 
that included any material on gun control, abortion, the occult, cults, or the disparagement of 
religion. Caution was also demanded in any issue covering sex or drugs, even for educational 
purposes.”34   
 In addition to the anecdotal evidence, scholars have also found support for instances 
of advertiser influence on content.  Media critics, such as Ben Bagdikian and Robert 
McChesney, argue that audiences are gathered not to be informed, but to be sold to 
advertisers.  Therefore, Bagdikian contends, a few large corporations win while the public 
loses.35  Edwin Baker also discussed how media organizations sell audiences to advertisers 
(instead of news products to audiences) in Media, Markets, and Democracy. 36  In the current 
media market, managers are faced with multiple loyalties, such as to viewers, stockholders, 
and advertisers.  Baker, however, asserted that influence or favor tends to go toward (1) the 
larger purchaser; (2) the purchaser with the most knowledge as to how the media can serve 
its needs; and (3) the purchaser most sensitive to how the media can affects its interests.  In 
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other words, the advertiser—not the audience. As Altschull put it, “The press is the piper, 
and the tune the piper plays is composed by those who pay the piper.”37  
 According to Croteau and Hoynes, advertisers have “substantial influence over what 
is and is not emphasized in the media,” and traditionally, this influence is “fairly subtle and 
indirect.”38  The authors give examples of how the media alert entities, such as airlines and 
oil companies, if the news content could potentially present them in an unfavorable light.  
For instance, if there is an oil-spill story or an airplane crash, the companies may be offered 
the chance to reschedule ads.39 On the other hand, pressure from advertisers may be more 
direct, especially in recent years.   
 Soley and Craig surveyed editors at daily newspapers concerning advertiser 
pressures.  They found that almost 90% claimed that advertisers had tried to influence the 
types of stories being covered while 90% reported that advertisers attempted to influence 
content through economic pressure.  Meanwhile, 70% said that “advertisers tried to kill” 
stories at their papers. 40  According to the authors, these findings suggest that “advertiser 
pressure on newspapers is much greater than most textbooks suggest.”41  Although the high 
amount of pressure is evident from the findings, 85% of these editors claimed that their 
newspapers still carried stories that are critical of advertisers, while a fairly high number 
(37%) reported that they have actually bowed to advertiser pressures.  Despite these findings, 
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Colistra found that editors representing 44% of daily newspaper readership said that 
newsroom ethical discussions concerning pressures from advertisers, such as “blurbs,” 
“business-office musts,” or pressure to run or keep things out of the paper, occurred “less 
than once a year or never.”42 
 Falling in line with Soley and Craig’s work, Hays and Reisner uncovered 
similar instances of advertiser pressures in their survey of farm magazine journalists.  
They found that 62% of those surveyed reported “receiving threats to withdraw 
advertising from advertisers displeased by editorial copy” while 48% said that 
advertisers had actually withdrawn advertising from their publications.43  Moreover, 
65% claimed to have received phone calls from advertising and public relations 
representatives “pushing products or copy” and reported that they deemed such 
pressures as effective.44  Although the study is limited because it deals with niche 
publications from a controlled sample of American Agricultural Editors Association 
(AAEA) members, it still has merit because studies involving more generalist media 
have produced similar findings.45   
 Shoemaker and Reese have pointed out that radio and television stations are 
more susceptible to advertiser pressures than print media because they are more 
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sensitive to profit needs and rely on advertising sources for revenue.46  Despite this 
claim, Price’s study of ownership and advertising suggested that advertiser pressures 
on television may not be as extensive as one might think—at least on the national 
level.  She surveyed all correspondents working at the three network news station, 
CNN, and PBS and asked about ownership and advertiser pressures.  Price found that 
only 7% of the respondents mentioned even a rare influence.47  This figure may be 
low, however, because only national news correspondents were surveyed.   
 Still, other research supporting Shoemaker and Reese’s contentions suggests 
otherwise, especially with regard to local stations.  A study by the Project for 
Excellence in Journalism, an organization affiliated with the Columbia School of 
Journalism, surveyed local television news directors and found that more than 30% 
reported “being pressured to kill negative stories or do positive ones about 
advertisers.”48  In the same vein, Just, Levine, and Regan found that 53% of the 118 
local news directors surveyed alleged the exact same types of pressures.  This figure 
reflects an increase from a smaller-scale survey the authors conducted just a year 
earlier, suggesting the problem may be getting worse.  Just and her colleagues noted 
that “the findings and comments [from the survey] raise questions about the 
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journalistic independence of local television news.”49  Tuchman made a similar point 
in 1978 when she asserted that news workers in the television industry occasionally 
link advertiser preferences to their own news judgments based on organizational 
directives.50   
 Additional research provides further support for these claims.  A 1999 Pew 
survey found that just over one-third of staffers in local media were concerned with 
advertiser pressures a “great deal” or a “fair amount.”51  A 2000 survey, however, 
showed an increase in concerns about advertisers, as 43% of local journalists thought 
that advertising concerns influenced news organizations’ decisions about what stories 
to cover or emphasize “a great deal” or “a fair amount.”52    
 Such findings appear to indicate a growing problem, particularly in the television 
industry.  One anchor-producer from Price’s study noted:  
  Our advertisers pretty much run our 30-minute newscasts….we have a 
  sponsored health package that must run every Monday, Wednesday, and  
  Friday…. What ends up happening is we give the two minutes to the  
  sponsored package and cut time from our lead stories…. We are sacrificing  
  content for cash.53 
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Audiences may be catching on, as a 1998 Radio and Television News Directors Foundation 
(RTNDA) survey showed that more than 80% of the public respondents believed that 
advertisers have an “undue influence” on editorial content.54    
 
Public Relations Pressures 
 
Another potential source of outside influence on the media is public relations 
pressures.  One of the main goals of public relations practitioners is to create and maintain a 
positive image in the eyes of the public over time.  To accomplish this goal, those in the field 
use the media to communicate their messages to the masses.  If they are successful in getting 
their messages placed in the media, “they influence the media agenda, which can in turn 
influence public opinion and the public agenda.”55  This process of influencing the media 
agenda is known as agenda building.  The messages take the form of what Gandy called 
“information subsidies” and consist of communication pieces such as press releases, public 
service announcements (PSAs), video news releases (VNRs), press conferences, and official 
proceedings, to name a few.56  Practitioners provide information subsidies to the media in an 
attempt to garner media coverage on behalf of their clients in order to reach their target 
audiences.57  In other words, they attempt to build the media agenda to, in turn, influence the 
public agenda.  
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Information subsidies from public relations practitioners are provided at no cost to the 
media.  Typical news stories produced by news organizations involve expenses, including 
equipment costs and worker salaries.  Thus, media entities facing budget cuts and bottom-
line pressures, or simply those with a small number of staff, may be more willing to use these 
subsidies to fill their news holes at a low cost.58  Regardless, news organizations tend to use 
information subsidies, even if solely for generating story ideas.   
In his 1976 study of public relations influence on environmental coverage, Sachsman 
found that more than 50% of the stories about the environment at the newspapers under study 
were from news releases.59  A decade later, Turk’s findings were similar and indicated that 
newspapers used 51% of information subsidies received by government public information 
officers.  Of those used, 48% resulted in the publication of separate news stories, thus 
providing support for the agenda-building hypothesis.60  Another project around the same 
time found that 90% of assignment editors reported using news releases to develop stories.61  
Furthermore, Sallot and Johnson’s more recent study in 2006 found that journalists estimated 
that 44% of media content is influenced by public relations practitioners.62 
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While the previously mentioned studies concern public relations material used by 
newspapers, some evidence suggests that information subsidy use may be even more 
prevalent in the television industry63 because of more severe economic constraints.64 In their 
1989 study comparing decisions on news releases by television and newspaper gatekeepers, 
Abbott and Brassfield found that small TV stations were more likely to use releases, with a 
59% acceptance rate, while both small and large newspapers rejected the most (33.5% and 
24%, respectively).65  This finding was somewhat surprising since, according to the authors, 
previous research indicated that newspaper gatekeepers were more likely to accept releases 
because of larger news holes.  A year later, Berkowitz and Adams’ study involving only a 
TV station found that fewer than 25% of the information subsidies were retained.  Those that 
were used at this local station were mainly from nonprofit organizations and interest groups, 
despite the higher numbers received from government and business sources.66 
Although studies indicate that subsidies are indeed accepted, albeit at different rates, 
literature suggests a strained relationship among public relations practitioners and journalists 
that may lead some news workers to exhibit reluctance at using pieces provided by these 
sources.67 This relationship may be due to journalists’ suspicions of public relations 
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professionals’ practices, as they may view them as simply trying to promote their own 
agendas by only presenting their client in a positive light while withholding other pertinent 
information.  In their 1984 study of how public relations professionals and editors view each 
other, Kopenhaver, Martinson, and Ryan found that practitioners gave a fairly accurate view 
of editors.  Editors, on the other hand, portrayed practitioners more negatively.  Yet, the 
authors found that practitioners and journalists shared many of the opinions on news values.68  
Evidence, however, suggests that this relationship may be changing—at least a little.  Sallot 
and Johnson examined interviews of journalists regarding public relations practitioners 
conducted from 1991 to 2004.69  They found that 45% viewed their relationships as positive 
or very positive.  Moreover, journalists valued public relations more in 2002-2004 than in the 
previous years under study.  Still, a small percentage, 18%, of the journalist-practitioner 
relationship interviews were coded as a “love/hate” relationship or a “necessary evil,” and 
findings suggested that these sentiments remained fairly constant in the 1991-1996 and the 
2002-2004 time periods.70 
Some of this animosity may be attributed to the controversy that has surfaced 
regarding the use and misuse of VNRs by media organizations.  They have been the subject 
of major debates in the media world, especially in the United States.  Similar to print 
releases, VNRs are public relations tools typically aimed at promoting products, companies, 
services, agendas, viewpoints, or people/groups.  These releases are created to look like 
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actual news stories and are distributed to television stations for broadcast at no charge.  They 
are typically created and provided by public relations firms, government or corporate 
agencies, or interest groups with the hopes of garnering media coverage and, thus, 
influencing the audience.  In some instances, stations run them without revealing that the 
video segments are produced by outside sponsors, agencies, or corporations. Thus, the public 
may not be able to distinguish between a VNR and a “real” news story put together by a 
station’s news team. So what is the problem with TV stations using these pieces without 
disclosing their origins?  A whole lot, according to an extensive study completed by the 
Center for Media and Democracy (CMD).   
 First, and most obviously, “viewers have a right to know where their news comes 
from.”71  Generally speaking, the audience tends to tune in to news sources that they can trust 
and depend on.  For example, Walter Cronkite was considered the most trusted man in 
America, and viewers knew what to expect when they watched his newscast.  According to 
Hamilton, this reliance on a particular brand of news has led to an increased value of, and 
higher salaries for, top television news anchors.72  In fact, top anchor salaries in 1999 ranged 
from $7 million for Tom Brokaw and Dan Rather to $8.75 million for Peter Jennings, a 
figure much higher than famed anchor Harry Reasoner’s 1970 salary of $859,000 (in the 
equivalent of 1999 dollars).  News magazine anchor and talk show host Barbara Walters 
                                                 
 
71Diane Farsetta and Daniel Price, “Fake TV News: Widespread and Undisclosed--A Multimedia 
Report on Television Newsrooms’ Use of Material Provided by PR Firms on Behalf of Paying Clients,” Center 
for Media and Democracy (April 6, 2006), 33, http://www.prwatch.org/pdfs/NFNPDFExt6.pdf (accessed 
November 1, 2006). 
 
 
72James T. Hamilton, All the News that’s Fit to Sell:  How the Market Transforms Information into 
News (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), 215-234.  This chapter offers an excellent account of 
the top TV news anchor as a branding mechanism for stations and the increase in salaries over the years. 
 
24 
outranked them all in 2000 with a salary of $10 million.73  If viewers trust these particular 
anchors and their respective programs, they are more likely to trust most segments that are 
aired within them, including VNRs.  If the sources of these pieces are not disclosed, the 
audience may not be able to determine that the piece has been produced by another entity, 
such as a corporation or government agency.74  Thus, viewers may automatically trust this 
information without the scrutiny that they might normally apply to “paid” materials simply 
because they are accustomed to trusting the content broadcast by their particular program. 
 Second, Farsetta and Price point out that nondisclosure is clearly against the ethical 
guidelines set forth by the RTNDA.  The guidelines for the use of non-editorial video and 
audio state: “News managers and producers should clearly disclose the origin of information 
and label all material provided by corporate or other non-editorial sources.”75  The guidelines 
give disclosure examples of using a logo image of the organization that is responsible for the 
piece or a providing a simple acknowledgment from the anchor, such as “This video was 
provided by….”  In Farsetta and Price’s project for the CMD, however, all 77 stations under 
study “actively disguised the sponsored content to make it appear to be their own 
reporting.”76  The RTNDA guidelines also indicate that executives should ask themselves 
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“whether more than one side is included, if there is a financial agenda to releasing the story, 
and if the viewers…would believe this is work done locally by [their] team.”77  Furthermore, 
station executives should determine whether they are able “to shoot this video or capture this 
audio itself, or get it through regular editorial channels, such as its network feed service.”78  
Farsetta and Price’s study, however, showed that “stations failed to balance the clients’ 
messages with independently gathered footage or basic journalistic research” in a majority of 
the cases.79 
 The increased attention on the TV industry for the reported misuse of VNRs may 
leave television journalists and executives somewhat chagrined with the very firms, agencies, 
and people who create and provide these pieces to their stations—perhaps because they have 
been “busted” for running this information without disclosing the source.  These feelings of 
animosity may exist despite the fact that these outside professionals are simply doing their 
jobs of promoting their clients, and, in most cases, the source of the VNRs is clearly 
indicated when given to the station.  In fact, Farsetta and Price’s study for the CMD found 
that the broadcast public relations firms “clearly and accurately disclosed the client and 
funding information each time” out of the hundreds of pieces analyzed for the project.80 Still, 
the researchers point out that some of the information “may not be relayed to local stations 
when a network-distributed or syndicated segment incorporates a VNR.”81  In some cases, 
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the journalists themselves may not be aware that they are running these pieces or, in at least 
one instance, participating in their very production.   
 In May 2003, the New York Times uncovered a deal between two respected journalists 
and WJMK, a video production company based out of Florida.82  Walter Cronkite and CNN’s 
Aaron Brown both signed up to host a video series titled “American Medical Review,” which 
ran on PBS. The problem was that the show was disguised as a newscast and was sponsored 
by corporations, such as drug manufacturers and health-care companies.  The corporate 
sponsors, who paid around $15,000 to have their products featured in the videos, were trying 
to make their series more credible by hiring trusted journalists to host the show.  And they 
succeeded for several years with 60 Minutes’ Morley Safer as their host. Once the New York 
Times caught wind of the situation, both journalists called off the deal, and Safer sent letters 
to WJMK demanding that the company stop using videotapes of his appearances.83 
 As the literature shows, VNRs are public relations tools used to garner media 
coverage to promote a client’s agenda, services, or products, among other things.  As 
evidenced from Farsetta and Price’s extensive study, the broadcast public relations firms and 
other sources have been successful at getting their pieces run in the media.  In fact, the 77 
stations under study aired the VNRs “as is” more than 30% of the time, and in 100% of the 
cases, the stations made the pieces appear like it was their own reporting.84  Thus, the 
organizations that provided the information, and the clients that they represent, were 
reasonably successful in influencing the media’s news agenda. 
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Political/Government Pressures 
 
 In addition to advertising and public relations pressures, political influences on the 
media also exist.  Although most people tend to think of political and government influence 
specifically around election time—especially with regard to campaign advertising—other 
types of pressure may also occur, although perhaps in a more subtle and indirect manner.  
This somewhat hidden type of pressure may help explain the dearth of academic literature 
covering instances of politicians and government officials attempting to influence news 
coverage.   
 Those in the government can influence media content through interviews that are off 
the record, backgrounders, or news leaks85—all information sources that Berkowitz has 
referred to as “informal” news channels.86 Like the public relations materials previously 
discussed, these sources are considered information subsidies. According to Shoemaker and 
Reese, these channels “can be used very effectively to set the agenda for the news media—
something that U.S. presidents do not fail to attempt.”87  For example, Ponder’s study of the 
first presidential press corps found that President William McKinley achieved favorable 
press coverage by holding press briefings on a regular basis and by providing reporters with 
advanced copies of his statements and speeches, thus making their work easier by subsidizing 
the information.88  Therefore, the President and the White House were able to build the 
media’s news agenda by simplifying the news-gathering process.  Furthermore, they were 
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more able to “easily win the framing contest”89 by making certain that the subsidies provided 
contained the main messages and frames that they wanted relayed to the public while leaving 
out and drawing attention away from those that they did not want brought to light.90  
According to Pan and Kosicki, “framing an issue is more a strategic means to attract more 
supporters, to mobilize collections, to expand actors’ realm of influences, and to increase 
their chances of winning.”91 This “winning” can be thought of as winning a desired amount, 
type, and frame of media coverage; public support; or support from others in government.  
Berkowitz provided support for McKinley’s type of strategy, as he found that 71% of 
network and 75% of local news stories relied upon “routine news channels” such as press 
conferences, official proceedings, and press releases.92  Moreover, television news used these 
types of channels more often than newspapers. 
 Instead of simply accommodating the press to influence coverage, sometimes 
pressures can be more direct.93  According to Reeves, President Kennedy addressed 
newspaper publishers at an American Newspaper Publishers Association meeting in 1961 
just as the U.S. was going to war with Viet Nam.  During his speech, Kennedy stressed 
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national interests and security, and he encouraged the publishers to censor their own 
content.94                               
 Additional literature suggests that other levels of government, not just the 
Commander in Chief, are also successful at influencing media coverage, namely because 
journalists tend to rely on official sources and official government opinion for their news 
stories.95  In fact, Berkowitz found that approximately 49% of local and national television 
news sources in his study were affiliated with local, state, U.S., or foreign government.  
Similarly, Bennett examined the New York Times’ op-ed coverage of U.S. policy toward 
Nicaragua as compared to congressional opinion on the administration’s policy.  He found 
that the paper indexed its coverage to the government elites’ opinions—in this case, members 
of Congress.96  Zaller and Chiu further tested Bennett’s indexing hypothesis in their study of 
U.S. news magazine coverage of foreign policy crises occurring from 1945-1991.  
Specifically, the authors examined the rules by which reporters “slant” news coverage.  They 
found that Time and Newsweek journalists tended to “index” the slant of their coverage of 
these crises to echo governmental opinion.97   
 Although it may seem that the media actively seek out official government views, as 
indicated in the aforementioned cases, the government and politicians both seek to influence 
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the press coverage as well. Gandy noted that “at every level of government, in every agency, 
there are information specialists whose responsibility it is to ensure that the nation’s public 
media carry the desired message forward.”98  In many cases, those working for politicians 
and government officials use prepackaged news such as VNRs and print releases, the same 
communication tools used by public relations practitioners.  In fact, political figures and the 
specialized departments in government typically have their own public affairs units or 
information officers to ensure that their messages are relayed to the public via the media.  For 
instance, a New York Times article reported that “the Bush administration spent $254 million 
in its first term on public relations contracts, nearly double what the last Clinton 
administration spent.”99  Thus, political figures’ use of prepackaged news can be a more 
covert process that is not as easily recognizable by the public because of the indirect means 
by which they deliver their messages.  The same Times article reported that “at least 20 
federal agencies, including the Defense Department and the Census Bureau, have made and 
distributed hundreds of television news segments” from about 2001-2005.100 As found with 
Farsetta and Price’s study, however, many of these prepackaged news items were broadcast 
throughout the country without stations acknowledging the government’s production role.101  
 As with any other successful communication strategy, the government knows to 
create a specific message and distribute it when it will have the most impact.  This was the 
case when the government had a VNR created dealing with Medicare.  The “interview” with 
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a health and human services secretary was scripted and included a suggested lead-in stating 
that President Bush had just signed the first prescription drug plan for people using Medicare. 
Strategically, the report was “distributed in January 2004, not long before Mr. Bush hit the 
campaign trail and cited the drug benefit as one of his major accomplishments,” according to 
the New York Times.102 
 Instead of simply creating and distributing prepackaged news programs, the 
government has also garnered favorable discussion of its policies and issues through other 
means.  In approximately one month’s time in 2005, three syndicated conservative 
columnists were paid thousands of dollars to promote the Bush Administration’s agendas.  In 
early January, USA Today reported that the Bush administration paid nationally syndicated 
commentator Armstrong Williams $240,000 to promote its No Child Left Behind Act 
through regular mentions in his column and on his broadcasts. 103  Williams contended that 
he had already supported the act numerous times in his newspaper column distributed by 
Tribune Media Services (TMS) and on his nationally syndicated television show, “The Right 
Side.” 104  TMS dropped the column, which was distributed to about 50 newspapers 
nationwide, as a result of the controversy. 105   
Later that month, the Washington Post exposed syndicated columnist Maggie 
Gallagher for working under a $21,500 contract for the Department of Health and Human 
                                                 
 
102Ibid. 
 
 
103Greg Toppo, “Education Dept. Paid Commentator to Promote Law,” USA Today, January 7, 2005, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-01-06-williams-whitehouse_x.htm?POE=click-refer 
(accessed January 7, 2005).   
 
 
104Armstrong Williams, “My Apology,” January 10, 2005, www.townhall.com/columnists/ 
Armstrongwilliams/printaw20050110.shtml (accessed February 3, 2005); Dave Astor, “Armstrong Williams’ 
Column Axed by TMS,” Editor and Publisher, January 7, 2005, http://www.editorandpublisher. 
com/eandp/news/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1000749251 (accessed January 30, 2005). 
 
 
105Astor, “Armstrong Williams’ Column Axed by TMS.” 
 
32 
Services (HHS) and promoting the Bush Administration’s Healthy Marriage initiative. 
Gallagher apologized to her readers for failing to disclose her government contract while she 
continued to write about the program.  One of her pieces even referred to “Bush’s 
‘genius.’”106  In this case, however, Gallagher’s syndication service, Universal Press 
Syndicate (UPS), chose to keep her.  Executive Vice President and Editor Lee Salem told 
Editor and Publisher magazine that this case was different from Williams’ because Gallagher 
was completing assigned projects rather than promoting a certain stance or issue in her 
column.107    
A day later, a similar example emerged when self-syndicated columnist Michael 
McManus admitted in an online column, ironically titled “Ethics & Religion,” to receiving 
funds from HHS to meet with local organizers of the healthy marriage initiatives.  McManus, 
who is president and co-founder of Marriage Savers, also confessed to writing columns that 
praised the Bush administration for the same initiatives without disclosing that his 
organization received a consulting fee. 108 
Although the aforementioned instances of government payment occurred in news 
media, the administration has also worked its way into prime-time programming.  In 2000, 
U.S. News & World Report described how the White House Office of National Drug Control 
Policy had a concealed financial agreement with ABC, NBC, CBS, FOX, and WB to include 
                                                 
 
106Howard Kurtz, “Bush Urges End to Contracts with Commentators,” Washington Post, January 27, 
2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A39872-2005Jan26 (accessed January 27, 2005). 
 
 
107Dave Astor, “Universal: Why We’re Keeping Maggie Gallagher,” Editor and Publisher, January 26, 
2005, http://www.editorandpublisher.com/eandp/departments/syndicates/article_display.jsp?vnu_ 
content_id=1000777943 (accessed March 20, 2005). 
   
 
108Dave Astor, “Columnist McManus Apologizes for Not Disclosing Federal Funding,” Editor and 
Publisher, February 3, 2005,  http:// www.editorandpublisher.com/eandp/news/article_display.jsp?vnu_ 
content_id=1000788577 (accessed February 3, 2005); Michael McManus, “Anatomy of and Ethical Lapse,” 
Marriage Savers, February 5, 2005, http://marriagesavers.com/Columns/C1223.htm (accessed February 5, 
2005). 
 
33 
anti-drug subject matter in their programming.  The networks permitted the White House 
Office to review approximately 100 scripts for programs such as Beverly Hills 90210, 
Chicago Hope, and ER.  Although the networks all admitted that they allowed the White 
House Office to do so, they “insist that they never made any changes because of government 
pressure.”109 Using popular shows to advance political messages, however, is not a new 
strategy and can be traced back to the 1980s when Nancy Reagan promoted her “Just Say 
No” campaign on “Diff’rent Strokes” and “Punky Brewster.” 
 
Organizational Influences 
 
 In addition to external forces, pressures on the media can also come from people and 
factors at the organizational level.  Influences at the organizational level seem to largely 
depend on the structure, size, and ownership of the media entity. Economic pressures can 
also derive from this level of influence and often result from increased bottom-line worries.  
These economic concerns can constrain work in the media organization and may, in turn, 
influence decisions about content.110   Constraints and pressures at the organizational level 
are largely communicated by owners and top executives.  Thus, economic and 
owner/executive pressures are first discussed, followed by ownership concentration and its 
possible effects on content. 
 
Economic pressures 
  
 Since many media organizations today are publicly traded companies, frontline 
management and journalists are not only accountable to higher executives, but to 
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stockholders as well.  In discussing market-driven journalism, McManus noted that media 
organizations are a part of a “market-based economy,” and they compete in four different 
markets:  investors, advertisers, sources of news, and consumers.111  He argued that these 
investors are the most influential in the production of news because they are a part of the 
corporate structure while the other three markets—advertisers, consumers, and sources—
must exert their influence from outside the corporation.  Since the investors, or owners, 
appear to have the strongest influence in media organizations, according to McManus’ 
model, news workers may feel economic and bottom-line pressures from them or from top-
level executives who are likely relaying the messages.  And, research suggests that they are 
indeed noticing the effects of these economic concerns in both the newspaper and television 
industries. 
 In the newspaper industry, chains are often perceived as forcing profit-driven 
material.  At least one study supports the notion that they are only interested in “all the news 
that makes a profit.”112  This view suggests that corporate executives act as a sieve, allowing 
only profit-driven news items to seep through.  That is, they are serving as gatekeepers 
controlling the flow of information received by the audience with a motive primarily of 
financial self-interest.  
 Non-independent newspapers have often been viewed as placing profits and financial 
expectations above journalistic quality.113  For example, Lacy, Shaver, and St. Cyr conducted 
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a study concerning publicly owned newspaper groups and their effects on financial 
performance and competition.114  Since publicly owned newspapers, as the study points out, 
have more constituencies than privately owned papers, they are more bound to profit 
concerns.  Instead of just answering to employees, readers, and advertisers, the publicly 
traded newspapers must answer to stockholders and financial analysts as well.115 A separate 
study by Coulson, however, found that journalists from both group- and individually owned 
newspapers did not see the newspapers’ profit-seeking goals as negatively affecting coverage 
or information diversity.  Still, it is important to point out that just because journalists from 
these two ownership categories did not differ much on their opinions, a “sizeable minority” 
of those responding recognized negative effects due to the profit goals.116   
 A more recent 2004 survey reported in Quill suggested that economic pressures and 
concerns may have increased since Coulson’s study.  The survey of journalists conducted by 
four major media-workers unions, including TV and newspapers, found that 83% of the 
respondents cited “too much emphasis on the bottom line” as the media industry’s most 
serious problem.117  The same article referred to a separate survey that found 57% of 
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journalists in local newsrooms and 66% in national newsrooms felt that “bottom-line 
pressure is seriously hurting the quality of news coverage.”118  
 Meyer examined ethical issues in newspaper newsrooms in his 1985 ASNE survey, 
including financial conflicts of interests and economic concerns at U.S. dailies.119  This 
research was reprised in 2005, and results were compared to track changes across time.  One 
survey question asked respondents how often their publishers asked for special handling of 
an article about a company or organization with economic clout over their papers.  The 
results were promising, as both editors and staff members reported significantly fewer 
instances of this type of executive request.120   
 While many of the aforementioned examples deal mainly with economic pressures at 
newspapers, other research suggests that economic goals and their influence on content are 
even more evident in the television industry.121  The findings from the surveys in the Quill 
article provide some support for this argument.  This claim and evidence by other scholars, 
such as McManus, suggest that television content may be more susceptible to influence 
because economic pressures are more severe in broadcasting.   Shoemaker and Reese 
hypothesized that radio and TV are more sensitive to the need to make a profit than print 
media because nearly all of their income originates from advertising.122  And, “unlike most 
daily newspapers, television stations compete head to head with comparable organizations 
offering a very similar product.  The inflexible time within which to program commercials 
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translates every programming decision into an economic trade-off.”123  Findings from the 
Pew Research Center show support for these claims. 
 A 1999 Pew survey found that 53% of national television journalists believed that 
bottom-line pressures were seriously hurting the quality of news coverage.  This finding 
translates into a 16 percentage-point increase from those who were surveyed just four years 
earlier.  The change over time was even more apparent on the local level, as 46% responded 
that increasing bottom-line pressures were having a negative impact on quality.  This figure 
represents a 22 percentage-point jump from local TV journalists who were surveyed in 
1995.124  Pew asked journalists the same question in 2004 and found that views of economic 
pressure on content quality have worsened.  Sixty-three percent of national and 60% of the 
local radio and TV executives and journalists surveyed claimed that increased bottom-line 
pressures were hurting news coverage.  Again, this large jump indicates that the negative 
effects of financial pressures have increased over time.  
 
Owner/Executive Pressures 
 
 As mentioned, constraints and pressures at the organizational level are largely 
communicated by owners and top executives.  The owners or the head executives, according 
to Shoemaker and Reese, are the ultimate authority figures in determining the goals and 
policies of the media organization.  As a result, all people working in the organization must 
answer to them and follow their guidelines if they expect to keep their jobs. They argue that 
“media owners have an unmistakable impact on media content because they [establish] 
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policy for the entire organization.”125 As media organizations grow larger and become more 
complex as a result of ownership concentration, top-level executives become more connected 
to outside organizations.  And, as McManus points out, “management has a legal 
responsibility to serve the economic interest of owners.”126  As a result, top-level executives 
may exert demands on journalists to uphold these economic interests, as well as others.  
Evidence in literature supports these assertions of executive and owner pressures and 
influences on content. 
Busterna’s 1989 study on types of managerial ownership and their effects on profit 
goals found that newspaper managers who were not owners placed more emphasis on 
building profits than owner managers. This finding contrasts economic theory, which holds 
that owner managers place higher emphasis on profits, but supports many journalists’ 
contentions. Results also suggest that local newspaper owners seem to be in business for 
reasons beyond maximizing profits. 127  In contrast, Olien, Tichenor, and Donohue surveyed 
Minnesota editors for their 1988 study and found that editors of locally owned, individual 
newspapers were more concerned with profits than their group-owned counterparts. The 
authors maintain that this concern most likely stems from the fact that editors at individual 
papers often have to serve two separate roles of editor and owner. 128 
Other research has focused on how executive and owner pressures affect content 
choices.  In a 30 year-old study measuring political news bias, Coffey analyzed eight 
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Colorado daily newspapers beginning the day before the 1974 general election.  He also 
determined political orientation of the editors and publishers either by reviewing editorial 
page recommendations before the election or by a written inquiry to the editors.  Coffey 
found a strong probability that management attitudes affected political coverage.129  It is 
important to point out, however, that editors are not typically considered top-level executives 
in the structure at this organizational level. Publishers, on the other hand, are sometimes 
considered top executives, depending on the newspaper’s organizational structure.130 As a 
result, some of the publishers in Coffey’s study could have had the ability to exert an 
organizational level of influence on the news organization.  
In a more recent study, Price examined influences on news content and pressures at 
the ownership level in her survey of national television news correspondents.  She found that 
approximately 21% of those survey said that they had felt pressured to report a story because 
of their owners, while almost the same percentage, 20.6%, reported owner pressure not to 
report a story.131  
 Pew studies have reported even more instances of owner pressures. A 2000 survey 
found that 51% of local journalists felt that corporate owners influence news organizations’ 
decisions about which stories to cover or emphasize “a great deal” or “a fair amount.”132  The 
same question was asked in 2004 and yielded similar results, although responses were also 
segmented by medium in this survey.  Results indicate that 48% of local journalists felt the 
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same influence from owners.  The responses were comparable within both the print and 
broadcast industries, but the pressure was especially clear in the latter, as 40% of local TV 
and radio journalists reported “a great deal” or “a fair amount” owner influence on content 
decisions.133 
 
Ownership Concentration & Content 
 
 Type of ownership also plays a role in the organizational level gatekeeping function.  
More concentrated media are usually charged with having an influence on their 
organizations’ content.  In the newspaper industry, for example, non-independent papers 
have been known to duplicate news content throughout their chain, which, in turn, leads to 
uniformity in both editorial views and spins taken on certain issues.  The same has been said 
about cross-ownership situations between television stations and newspapers, as some have 
been found to duplicate content and provide only a limited range of content and views. 
Several studies have taken on the issue of news standardization finding different results.  
 Hicks and Featherston’s 1978 study found no significant opinion or feature content 
duplication among Louisiana newspapers under different forms of ownership.134 
Additionally, Wagenberg and Soderland discovered no theme selection or partisanship 
standardization throughout chain newspapers in the 1972 Canadian Federal election.135 In 
contrast, Akhavan-Majid, Rife, and Gopinath examined Gannett versus similar non-Gannett 
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papers in their study of ownership involving national political issues in 1989.  They 
compared editorial positions taken on three predetermined public issues by 56 Gannett 
newspapers and 155 other newspapers. Findings suggested that chain ownership causes 
standardization on policy issues and editorial positions, although the Gannett papers were 
more likely to take positions.136  
Additional concerns have also surfaced with regard to ownership and the amount of 
local news coverage.  A recent FCC study on TV ownership structure’s effects on local news 
coverage found that locally owned stations gave more time to local news—almost six 
minutes more—per each half-hour newscast than their nationally owned, corporate brethren.  
The research occurred in the midst of the Commission’s review of media ownership rules, 
but according to a story and interviews on NPR’s All Things Considered, the study was 
ordered to be stopped by FCC superiors, and staff who had received copies were advised to 
return them.137 
Another highly examined area of research is the effect of ownership on content 
quality.  Coulson and Hansen analyzed the news content of the Louisville Courier-Journal 
after purchase by Gannett. They found that when measured against the increased size of the 
news hole, hard news coverage actually decreased. Hard news coverage, the authors contend, 
is valuable because it offers readers a better chance to inform themselves on topics that affect 
their lives.138  In contrast, Demers’ study tested a theory of corporate newspaper effects, 
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which included product quality.  He found that newspapers possessing more corporate 
characteristics actually placed greater emphasis on product quality than those papers 
exhibiting fewer corporate traits. 139  
Concerns about possible coverage bias are also a common area of scholarly research 
in which ownership and potential owner influences are concerned.  Kenney and Simpson 
examined content about the 1988 presidential race from two Washington dailies operating 
under different types of ownership:  the Washington Times, owned by a conglomerate funded 
by the Unification Church; and the Washington Post, a publicly traded company.  They found 
that the Times exerted a conservative bias, as it devoted more than 30% of its coverage to and 
in favor of the Republicans. Conversely, the Post presented more balanced and neutral 
coverage of the race.  As a result, the authors suggested that their findings support the 
argument that financers and owners determine content.140 
 Financial conflicts may not be the only force for owners and media entities when 
making news and editorial decisions.  Instead, ideological or politically charged factors may 
come into play.  For example, in Hasen’s Texas Law Review article, he suggested that 
political influence may be a strong motivator to own media organizations and that those 
owners could use the companies to influence public opinion for their own self-interests.141  
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Such self-interests may include political favors, gaining or maintaining access to candidates, 
or influencing principled decision-making.142     
 Gilens and Hertzman examined newspaper coverage of the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996 in relation to corporate ownership.  For their analysis, they identified the country's 
100 largest media companies by revenue and placed them into three categories:  those with 
no television holdings, those that owned five or fewer stations, and those that owned nine or 
more.  They found that newspapers that did not stand to gain from the Act, those without 
television holdings, covered the ownership caps only slightly more than the other two groups.  
Other findings, however, suggested that the financial interests of the owners influenced both 
editorials and hard news reporting.  Newspapers that stood to gain from the loosening of 
television ownership rules offered more favorable coverage, while those that were not likely 
to gain provided “overwhelmingly unfavorable” coverage of the Act.143   
 Similarly, Colistra’s study focused on how different types of media groups covered 
the FCC’s more recent relaxation of ownership rules. She found that newspapers without 
television holdings published more editorials about the issue than those owning a substantial 
number of stations.  Findings also showed that the tone of editorials between the two types of 
media groups also differed significantly, as 100% of the editorials running in the newspapers 
with substantial television holdings presented the issue in a positive light.144   
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 In another policy study, Snider and Page examined newspaper coverage of one aspect 
of the Telecommunications Act involving the FCC giving broadcasters free use of the 
airwaves to ease the transition into digital transmission.  They found a strong, significant, 
contrasting relationship among the different ownership groups.  Those newspapers with 
substantial television ownership, defined as those with at least 20% of revenues from this 
area, published editorials that were in favor of the airwaves “giveaway,” while those that 
received little or no revenue from broadcasting ran editorials opposing the issue.145   
 Colistra also addressed the digital spectrum “giveaway” and found that media entities 
that stood to gain from it, the network television stations, ignored the issue completely over 
the nine-year period of study.146  She also found that when the newspapers covered the issue, 
more than 44% of their hard-news coverage was either “negative” or “very negative,” 
compared to only 4% of “positive” coverage.  Similarly, Price’s 1998 study of network news 
coverage of the Telecommunications Act found that only 16% of the big three networks’ 
broadcasts over a three-year period dealt with the Act’s potential role in increasing 
ownership concentration in the television news industry.147  The lack of coverage came as no 
surprise to one politician.  The now-defunct Brill’s Content, a media watchdog magazine, 
reported that John McCain spoke about the issue in the Senate claiming, “You will not see 
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this story on any television or hear it on any radio broadcast because it affects them.”148  
These findings suggest that media organizations that stand to benefit from policy issues may 
not necessarily like to bring attention to themselves, while those that do not stand to benefit 
not only provide more coverage, in most cases, but more negative coverage as well.149  
 In summary, the literature strongly suggests that forces at the organizational level 
appear to influence coverage decisions and content. As evidenced by this review, overall 
organizational pressures seem to be more obvious and severe in the broadcast industry, 
especially at the local level of television, thus supporting Shoemaker and Reese’s hypothesis.  
More research, however, is needed to examine each area of organizational influence outlined 
in this section, especially scholarship involving all three types simultaneously. 
 
Influences Within the Media Organization 
 
 Along with external forces and broader organizational pressures, influences on media 
content may also derive from the very place in which it is created:  the media organization 
itself.  While Shoemaker and Reese did not specifically name this “within-media 
organization” level of influence in their onion diagram, they did refer to two other related 
sources, individual and media routines, which include (1) pressures from possible traits 
within the journalists themselves or (2) other constraints such as time, staff, and resources.  
As it is conceptualized and explained here, within-media influences incorporate facets from 
the two levels from the hierarchical model that were just mentioned.  What is different, 
however, is that the “within-media organization” factor focuses more on forces within the 
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news entity that may affect how journalists produce content and cover (or not cover) certain 
topics.  That is, it centers on possible pressure from management, such as assignment editors 
or other superiors, working within the news organization, along with smaller-scale 
organizational types of restraints, such as staff size.  These potential influences from within 
the media entity are briefly discussed in the sections that follow. 
 
Staff Size Pressure 
 The size of a media organization’s staff has been linked to studies regarding 
ownership,150 competition,151 news quality,152 and overall industry performance,153 to name a 
few.  Although the research focuses on different media and areas, findings typically indicate 
that a larger staff size is most desirable.  For example, Underwood and Stamm examined 
staff size, among other factors, in their study of newsroom management policies at 12 West 
coast newspapers.  They found that changes in staff size, which were generally reductions, 
most often occurred at smaller, family-owned newspapers.  During the on-site interviews, the 
researchers also found that respondents commonly associated a decline in quality with 
changes in coverage and cutbacks.  Thus, a reduction in staff size was viewed as a negative 
change while increases in staff size were viewed positively by the staff members.154  
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 Research also suggests that staff size is related to industry factors other than 
employee opinions of the issue.  In his 1978 study of ownership, CATV, and local TV news 
quality, Busterna found that the control variables for the study—penetration of cable TV, 
household income, UHF/VHF, and number of TV stations and households in the market 
under study—were all related to staff size.  Two other main variables in the study, both 
ownership variables, were not found to affect the size of the news staff.155  
 In a separate project 10 years later, Busterna pointed out that a larger news budget 
and a larger staff size should generally correspond to the quality of local television news 
programming.156  The same appeared to be true for newspapers, as Lacy, Fico, and Simon 
found that industry performance was positively correlated with the size of the news staff.157  
Still, the positive implications of a larger staff may not be enough to encourage those in the 
industry to implement research findings, as evidenced by the subsequent examples.   
 Bernstein, Lacy, Cassara, and Lau’s examination of geographic coverage of local TV 
news found that larger stations devoted a smaller percentage of news space to local news 
than smaller stations, despite the fact that newscasts were lengthier.  The authors proposed 
that “stations expanding their newscast length do not increase their staff enough to fill the 
added space with an equivalent amount of local news.”158  In a later study, Powers examined 
ratings, competition, and conduct in local television news.  She found that news programs 
added more news time per day when they were in intense competition.  This competition, 
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however, did not directly affect staff size, which led Powers to argue that “increasing hours 
of news may initially be seen as a less expensive means of competition than adding staff 
members.”159 
 With empirical evidence connecting staff size to performance and quality 
programming, it seems that media owners and executives would want to increase, or at least 
maintain, the size of their staffs, despite economic hardships and increased bottom-line 
pressures that have faced the industry.  But how have the number of staffers fared in recent 
years?  According to a 2004 Pew survey, 31% of local TV journalists reported that newsroom 
staff size has decreased over the past three years, while about the same percentage reported 
that it had either increased (30%) or stayed the same (32%).  Print journalists, however, noted 
more marked decreases in staff with 54%, and a mere 16% reported staff size increases; 29% 
said that their newsrooms remained unchanged.160  In contrast, a survey conducted by 
RTNDA and Ball State University just two years earlier indicated that TV staff numbers had 
increased across the board from 2001 with the exception of full-time employee decreases 
among independent stations.161  Thus, a comparison of the two surveys shows conflicting 
results, as the Pew survey questioned journalists about staff size changes over the past three 
years—a time period that included 2002, the year in which the RTNDA/Ball State study was 
conducted.   
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Direct & Indirect Management Pressures 
 Instead of smaller scale, organizational types of constraints, such as staff-size 
limitations, influences within a media entity may also derive from management pressures.  
Demands from superiors who work in the news organization on a day-to-day basis can be 
either direct or indirect.   
 Direct pressures are more obvious and may consist of a manager specifically telling a 
journalist not to cover a story.  Or, they may provide clear instructions about what topics to 
cover (or not cover) and how to cover them.  A 2000 survey by Pew Research Center asked 
print and broadcast journalists about whether journalists sometimes purposely avoid covering 
certain stories that they believe are truly newsworthy.  While more than half, 57%, answered 
no, 42% reported that journalists do sometimes avoid stories.162  Although this figure shows 
that less than half of the journalists surveyed thought this was a problem, it is large enough to 
rouse concern.  Of those who believed that journalists sometime purposely avoid newsworthy 
stories, an average of 30% (28% national and 31% local) answered that news workers get 
signals from their bosses to avoid them.  Furthermore, 35% (33% national and 37% local) 
reported direct signals, such as their superiors specifically telling them not to cover it, clear 
instructions about what types of stories were acceptable/unacceptable, or that it was simply 
“pretty clear.”163 
 As Warren Breed noted in the classic study “Social Control in the Newsroom,” 
management direction is not typically overt or directly stated.  Instead, pressure from 
superiors is usually relayed in a more subtle, indirect manner.  As one staffer in the study put 
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it, news routines and policies about what to cover (or not cover) and how to cover it are 
learned “by osmosis.”164  That is, journalists are socialized over time by methods such as 
reprimand or editing to learn what type of stories are acceptable.  This socialization is also 
learned through indirect signals, such as “a nod of the head, as if to say, ‘Please don’t rock 
the boat.’”165  The aforementioned Pew survey addressed these unspoken, hidden norms and 
indirect signals.  Of those journalists who believed that news workers sometimes purposely 
avoid newsworthy stories, an average of 24% (35% national and 17% local) said that 
journalists decide to avoid these stories based on how they believe their bosses would 
respond.166  This is an example of newsroom routines and socialization within the news 
organization.  As mentioned earlier, 30% said that journalists avoid stories because they get 
signals from their superiors to do so.  Of those, 32% (25% national and 37% local) claimed 
that this was a result of “indirect” signals, such as yawning at or poking fun of a story idea, 
or showing a lack of interest by simply not airing or publishing the story once it is created.167  
If this is repeated over time, journalists learn, or become socialized, to avoid these stories on 
their own if they want to get rewarded by their superiors.  Breed contended that a journalist 
eventually “learns to anticipate what is expected of him so as to win rewards and avoid 
punishments.”168 
 While these hidden norms and routines appear to be powerful in the newsroom 
culture, they are not afforded as much attention as more direct means of communicating 
                                                 
 
164Breed, “Social Control in the Newsroom: A Functional Analysis,” 328. 
 
 
165Ibid, 329. 
 
 
166
“Self Censorship: How Often and Why,” http://people-press.org/reports/print.php3?PageID=220, 4. 
 
 
167Ibid. 
 
 
168Breed, “Social Control of the Newsroom,” 328. 
 
51 
policy.  This inattention may be because they are more difficult to define, measure, and 
analyze.  In discussing journalism ethics and codes, newspaperman and media scholar Philip 
Meyer suggested that, instead of the written formal ethics codes that are found in newsrooms 
throughout the country, unwritten codes are more often involved in ethical decision making 
in the newsroom.  He explained that these rules become so “deeply embedded in the 
newsroom culture that they need never be made explicit to be enforced, but can exist simply 
as a set of reflexes.”169  These “reflexes” are the equivalent of the socialization process in the 
newsroom to which Breed referred.  Perhaps partly because these unspoken codes and 
“proper” behavior are more difficult to analyze, more direct forms of management 
communication, such as spoken or written policy, have been more prevalent in scholarship.   
 
Influences on Media Content:  Different Theoretical Approaches 
 
 As discussed throughout this chapter, extramedia, organizational, and within-media 
forces may attempt to influence news content, and they aim to do so through different means 
for various reasons.  These sources may shape coverage by (1) affecting/influencing the 
topics, stories, or issues the media actually cover (building the media’s agenda); (2) 
influencing the way a story, issue, or topic is covered; that is, the angle or tone taken when 
discussing the topic (building the media’s frames); or by (3) convincing the media to give an 
issue, story, or topic little attention or to not cover it at all (cutting the item from the media’s 
agenda).   Each theoretical approach is discussed in more detail in the pages that follow.  
Special attention is paid to the elucidation of agenda cutting, the third type of influence 
mentioned, as it is a largely ignored phenomenon that has been afforded little attention by 
                                                 
 
169Meyer, Ethical Journalism, 24-25. 
 
52 
researchers.  Thus, this project aims to develop and expand this important area of media 
scholarship.  
 
Agenda Building 
 
 The mass media’s influence on audiences has been a common area of study ever since 
the advent of the magic bullet theory in the 1920s and 1930s.  This line of scholarship was 
sparked by such research and events as the Payne Fund studies of motion pictures’ effects on 
children and Orson Welles’ “War of the Worlds” radio broadcast in 1938.170  Many years 
later, McCombs and Shaw made significant strides in media effects and public opinion 
research.  Their initial agenda-setting study of undecided voters in the 1968 election found 
that the objects that are emphasized most in the media come to be deemed as most important 
(by rank order) by the public.171  This led them cite Cohen’s claim that the press “may not be 
successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in 
telling its readers what to think about.”172  Since then, media effects research exploded, 
including more than 130 agenda-setting studies alone examining the effects of the media 
agenda on the public agenda.173 
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 While many studies have focused on how media content influences audience 
cognition, attitudes, and opinion, research concerning how the media is influenced in the first 
place has been afforded less attention.  Although Rogers, Dearing, and Bregman referred to 
this process as media agenda setting,174 it is more generally known as agenda building, a 
term that helps distinguish its application from the media-effects approach of agenda setting.  
Essentially, while agenda-setting theory suggests that the media tell people “what to think 
about,” the agenda-building process focuses on the internal and external forces that tell the 
media what to think (and write) about.  
 
Agenda Building and Agenda Setting:  Terms Worth Distinction? 
 
 This area of research has often been identified as evolving from agenda-setting 
theory, and McCombs has even classified it as the fourth phase of agenda setting.175  In 
actuality, agenda-building research was published in the realm of political science a year 
before the famous agenda-setting study was introduced to those in mass media and public 
opinion.176  Thus, technically, it is not possible that this area of scholarship emerged from 
agenda setting—at least in the mass media sense.  Instead, both can be thought of distinct 
processes in the same line of research.   
 McCombs has also argued that “there is no need for a separate term,” and both should 
be labeled as agenda-setting studies for the sake of parsimony because both involve the 
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transfer of salience from one agenda to another.177  An independent term, however, is 
necessary, as these are two distinct stages in which the foci and variables are different.  In 
agenda setting, for example, the media agenda is the independent variable.  With agenda 
building, on the other hand, the media agenda is considered the dependent variable.  This is 
represented in Figure 2.1 below, which was partially adapted from Scheufele’s work.178  As 
the pictorial depiction suggests, agenda building actually comes before agenda setting, but 
the processes are connected. That is, external, and possibly internal, forces attempt to set the 
media agenda (agenda building) so they can, in turn, influence the audience agenda (agenda 
setting). Thus, discrete names are essential to prevent the two areas of studies and their 
operationalizations from getting muddled. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Emergence of Agenda Building  
 The importance of such research of who or what is building the media’s agenda was 
noted in the late 1940s by Lazarsfeld and Merton.  In Mass Communication, Popular Taste, 
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and Organized Social Action, the authors argued that the media are controlled by powerful 
businesses and organizations and suggested that these groups set the agenda for the media, 
and in turn the audience, by influencing the content relayed to the public.179  Cobb and Elder 
defined agenda building in the political arena as the study “concerned with the identification 
and specification of the types of issue conflicts that receive the attention and action of 
governmental decision-makers.”180  In other words, they were “concerned with how issues 
are created and why some controversies or…issues come to command the attention…of 
decision makers, while others fail.”181 
 Years later, Gandy stressed the role of information subsidies, such as press releases 
and advertiser-produced pieces, as potential agenda-building mechanisms and sparked a 
greater interest in this line of scholarship.182  By 1991, Shoemaker and Reese had developed 
their hierarchical model of influences, which was discussed earlier in this chapter. 183  This 
“onion diagram” depicts the levels through which media content can be influenced prior to 
reaching the audience and, thus, has been an essential tool for scholars interested in agenda 
building.  However, while the diagram allows for an easier classification system of where 
these influences are coming from, it does not provide a comprehensive model that can 
actually test the pressures and potential effects on the media and news content.  Furthermore, 
as mentioned earlier, few researchers have examined how the media agenda is developed or 
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“set.”184  In fact, in a 1993 article, Rogers, Dearing, and Bregman uncovered only 15 
publications specifically dealing with building the media’s agenda.185  Even though there 
have been many more studies since then, research in this area still warrants further 
investigation because, according to the authors, “we need to better understand how the media 
agenda is set, and by whom.”186  
 
Frame Building 
 In addition to building the media’s agenda, external and internal sources may also 
attempt to control or influence the way story is covered.  That is, they may attempt to frame a 
story in a light that is more favorable or beneficial to their company, organization, or boss.  
This process is frame building, and it suggests that internal and external forces tell the media 
how to think (or write) about an issue, story, or topic.  Frames, as Neuman, Just, and Crigler 
pointed out, involve how the media “spin” the story and should take “into account their 
organizational and modality constraints, professional judgments, and certain judgments about 
the audience.”187  According to Maher, framing focuses on environments and relationships.  
Specifically, framing research not only emphasizes the relationships of frames, words, and 
sentences within a given text, but it also calls attention to the environments in which they 
were conceived, such as the source of the frame (e.g., an advertiser) and the intentions of the  
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communicator (e.g., to talk about the positives of a product while leaving out undesirable 
reviews).188 
 As some researchers have noted, framing is difficult to study and measure because of 
vague definitions and the misuse of terms.189  Scheufele has attempted to clarify certain 
aspects and processes of the approach to aid scholars in this important area of media studies.  
In his 1999 research, he argued that concepts of framing need to be specified “because 
frames have to be considered schemes for both presenting and comprehending the news.”190  
The two types of frames are media frames and audience frames, and it is important for 
researchers to distinguish between them in order to determine the best methods and measures 
for examination in different types of studies.  A media frame has been defined by Gamson 
and Modigliani as “a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an 
unfolding strip of events….The frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of 
the issue.”191  The conceptualization of media frames can also consist of the inadvertent or 
deliberate intentions of the internal or external source sending the message.192  The second 
type of frame, the audience frame, Scheufele notes, is defined by Entman as “mentally stored 
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clusters of ideas that guide an individuals’ processing of information.”193  That is, this type of 
frame focuses on the individual level of the process.   
 According to Entman, “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and 
make them more salient in a communicating test, in such a way as to promote a particular 
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation.”194  In other words, framing not only assigns importance to an issue, but it 
also presents the issue in such a way as to communicate a certain type of message.  The 
media may frame a message in a particular way, based on extramedia, organizational, or 
within-media sources.   
 In addition to distinguishing between the types of frames, Scheufele also explained 
that frames need to be classified by independent and dependent variables.195  When frames 
are considered independent variables in media research, the study is concerned with framing 
effects.  For example, a researcher might be interested in how frames presented in the media 
(media frames) influence how the audience understands an issue (audience frame).  “The 
most promising approach” to do this, according to Scheufele, is the use of both content 
analysis and survey data.196  When the media frame is the dependent variable, the study is 
concerned with extramedia, organizational, and within-media sources that attempt to 
influence the way the media frame an issue, topic, or story.  Regarding frame building, 
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Scheufele remarked, “No evidence has yet been systematically collected about how various 
[intrinsic and extrinsic] factors impact the structural qualities of news in terms of framing.”197 
Therefore, this much-ignored area of scholarship warrants further investigation.  This 
classification of framing research is the focus of the current study.  A partial representation of 
Scheufele’s explication of framing research is presented in Figure 2.2 to provide a clearer 
picture of this area of the process. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Agenda Cutting 
 
 While the idea of placing an idea on the news agenda by giving it more salience has 
been studied for many years, it is interesting that the reverse phenomenon, keeping an item 
off the agenda, has largely been ignored in scholarly research.  This concept is known as 
agenda cutting.   
 Although not specifically discussing this phenomenon, McCombs and Shaw alluded 
to the process in 1984 when explaining that newspaper items are “not treated equally when 
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presented to the audience.  Some are used at length, some are severely cut.”198  Still, Wober 
and Gunter made perhaps the first mention of the term agenda cutting in their 1988 book, 
Television and Social Control.  In relation to agenda setting, they described agenda cutting as 
“the reverse process whereby problems or issues have attention directed away from them by 
receiving little or no media coverage.”199  Thus, it is proposed that agenda cutting may occur 
in three ways: (1) by placing an item low on the news agenda (burying it); (2) by removing it 
from agenda once it is there; or (3) by completely ignoring it by never placing it on the 
agenda in the first place.     
 The process of agenda cutting has been mentioned by few scholars and researched by 
even fewer. According to Wober, this is largely due to its lack of identification and 
documentation.200  He provided a notable American example that took place in 1864 when 
General Meade humiliated a news reporter.  In return, the northern press apparently ignored 
(cut) all stories about Meade except those associated with defeat.  Surely stories about the 
general were deemed newsworthy by the press.  But because of his harsh action against the 
reporter, they cut complimentary stories about him out of the public’s attention.  As a result, 
Wober suggested, Meade was reduced to a “non-person.” 201  
 Although the above example deals with a case in the 19th century, evidence indicates 
agenda cutting has occurred in more modern times. In his 1991 study of television coverage 
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of the conflict with Iraq and its effects on British public opinion, Wober found two instances 
in which the broadcast media cut an important issue from its news agenda: (1) Syria’s defeat 
of Prime Minister General Aoun’s position in Lebanon, and (2) the evacuation of nearly one 
million Yemenis from Saudi Arabia. Of the latter item, Wober commented:  
  The size and nature of such an exodus cannot have been painless; yet,  
  in the context of Saudi Arabia as the base for the coalition overthrow of  
  Iraq’s invasion, it can be understood how, or why, the matter was lacking 
  in prominence or even absent from most news.202 
 
This statement suggests that prominence of a story may also play into agenda cutting.   
 
 Project Censored, a media group based out of Sonoma State University, has 
investigated instances of “news stories of social significance” that did not run in the 
mainstream media.203  Each year, the organization compiles a list of 25 stories obtained from 
independent news sources that were ignored, for the most part, by national media.  Although 
the Project does not explicitly examine possible reasons why these items were cut or the 
effects on audience cognition, it does provide useful examples on which to base agenda-
cutting scholarship. 
 Media Tenor has been perhaps the only organization specifically researching the area 
of agenda cutting.  The international institute specializes in detailed and continuous content 
analysis of the media, mainly examining agenda setting.204  In 2003, Media Tenor published 
a study examining the agenda-setting and agenda-cutting effects of German television news 
coverage of mad cow disease from 1997 to 2002.  The first official case of the disease was 
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announced in late 2000 and received substantial television coverage.  During this time, the 
broadcast media appeared to set the agenda as 73% of respondents in an unaffiliated opinion 
poll “felt threatened” by the disease while 58% altered their consumption of beef.205  The 
extensive coverage also coincided with a sharp dip in German beef consumption figures.   
 According to the study, the media had substantially decreased the amount of mad-
cow coverage by 2001, which coincided with a 26 percentage-point decrease in the number 
of polled German respondents feeling endangered by the disease.  By 2002, however, 
television coverage was placed so low on the news agenda that it was almost nonexistent.  To 
test the cutting effects, Media Tenor correlated the scant TV coverage with German beef 
consumption figures.  They found that a decrease in news about the disease correlated with a 
slow increase in consumption, despite the fact there were nearly as many confirmed cases 
(106) as when the first official case was confirmed in 2001 (125).206  As this example 
illustrates, cutting an important item from the news agenda may lead to an uninformed 
public.   
 Although Wober began mentioning agenda cutting in the late 1980s, he did not 
discuss the phenomenon in much detail until 2001. While he did not actually test the 
function, he did provide several examples of cut news that suggested agenda cutting does, 
indeed, exist, which is similar to Project Censored’s approach.  More importantly, he 
proposed three main reasons why agenda cutting occurs, which essentially deal with 
logistical constraints, internal and external influences, and journalists’ own prejudices.207   
                                                 
 
205
“Media and Mad Cow Disease: As Low as it Gets,” Media Tenor Quarterly Journal no. 2 (2003): 
72, http://www.mediatenor.com/show_all.php?keywords=agenda%20cutting (accessed June 5, 2005).   
  
 
206Ibid, 72-73. 
 
 
207Wober, “Agenda Cutting,” 1. 
 
63 
Logistical Constraints 
 
 Agenda cutting may occur because of logistical constraints, such as size of the news 
hole and reporting staff.  First, and most obvious, news organizations can only report on a 
certain number of topics at a time, which results in the elimination of others.  Selecting 
topics, however, may not be a deliberate process.  In discussing agenda setting, McCombs 
argued that the selection of objects usually occurs fortuitously, at least for media in 
democratic cultures. He explained that, “because agenda-setting is an inadvertent outcome of 
reporting the news, this is a role that cannot be abdicated or sidestepped.”208  The same is 
likely true for agenda cutting. 
 
Internal and External Influences 
 
 Agenda cutting may also occur when people within or outside the news organization 
“do their best to hide or camouflage stories.”209  The current study investigates this possible 
reason for the occurrence of agenda cutting, and it is, therefore, explained in more detail.   
 Wober gave an example of an internal e-mail that was circulated by an executive for 
the British Transport Ministry immediately following the New York terrorist attacks.   The 
message read: "It's now a very good day to get out anything we want to bury. Councillors' 
expenses?"210  The story was leaked to the press nearly a month later when it was confirmed 
that the department in question had, in fact, released the unfavorable information on 
September 12.    
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 In her 1998 study of network news coverage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Price found that only 16% of the big three networks’ broadcasts over a three-year period 
dealt with the Act’s potential role in increasing ownership concentration in the television 
news industry.211 Similarly, Colistra’s study examined the FCC’s digital spectrum “loan” to 
broadcasters and specifically tried to develop and find empirical support for the agenda-
cutting phenomenon.  She examined coverage from the three major networks, CNN, and two 
national newspapers, the New York Times and the Washington Post.  Colistra found strong 
evidence for her agenda-cutting hypothesis, as the media entities that stood to gain from the 
giveaway, the network television stations, ignored the issue over the nine-year period of 
study, while the newspapers placed it low on their agendas and CNN only ran one relevant 
broadcast.  She also found that when the newspapers covered the issue, more than 44% of 
their hard-news coverage was either “negative” or “very negative” compared to only 4% of 
“positive” coverage.  These findings suggest that media organizations that stand to benefit 
from policy issues may not necessarily like to bring attention to themselves, while those that 
do not stand to benefit may not only provide more coverage but more negative coverage as 
well.212  These two examples illustrate how forces from the organizational level or within the 
media (e.g., owners/executives or managers who make editorial decisions) and external 
sources (e.g., government legislation involving the media) may lead to instances of agenda 
cutting. 
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Journalists’ Prejudices 
 
 Finally, Wober claimed that agenda cutting may occur because of prejudices of 
journalists and news organizations. This reasoning falls in line with White’s 1950 
gatekeeping study in which he suggested that “Mr. Gates” used subjective judgment, 
including his own personal prejudices, when deciding what stories to omit.213  It is important 
to note, however, that this type of cutting by journalists may be unintentional. 
 In short, agenda cutting may occur by (1) placing an item low on the news agenda; 
(2) removing it from the agenda once it is there; or (3) completely ignoring it by never 
putting it on the agenda in the first place.  Because the concept of agenda cutting has been 
examined by few researchers, the current study attempts to further develop and expand this 
approach.  As mentioned, one aspect of the current research specifically focuses on how 
often and under what conditions agenda cutting is most like to occur.  As with the other 
potential influences on content just discussed, attention is concentrated on internal and 
external sources that may help cause this phenomenon.  By beginning with the potential 
causes of agenda cutting, scholars will be better able to understand this approach and begin to 
form research questions regarding motives behind “cutting” certain topics, stories, and issues 
from the media agenda; its effects on news coverage; and its possible outcomes on audience 
cognition.  
 In summary, the sources of influences discussed earlier in this chapter—extramedia, 
organizational, within-media organization—may attempt to affect news content and coverage 
decisions.  For the purposes of this study, extramedia influences consisted of pressures from 
advertisers, public relations practitioners, and political and governmental sources.   The 
initial organizational influences included in the present research were economic pressures, 
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pressures from owners and/or executives, and the level of ownership concentration.  The 
initial sources of within-media organization influences were staff-size pressures and indirect 
and direct management pressures.  These sources may try to affect coverage decisions and 
content decisions by trying to (1) influence or build the media agenda (agenda building); (2) 
influence the angle of a story; that is, influence the frame or manner in which it is to be 
covered (frame building); or (3) influence coverage decisions and content by convincing the 
media not to cover a story or a particular aspect of it (agenda cutting).   
 
Study Justification 
 
 While numerous studies have focused on how the media set the audience agenda, 
fewer have taken a step back to get to the root of matter:  how the media’s agenda is 
influenced in the first place.  Although some research has examined these different forces 
and their potential effects separately (e.g., public relations or advertising pressures effects on 
building the media’s agenda or frames), no research to date has studied how various 
influences may simultaneously affect news coverage or content decisions.  In other words, no 
known studies have considered the larger, more comprehensive picture.  
 Furthermore, few studies regarding the process of frame building have been 
undertaken.  In fact, Scheufele argued that “no evidence has…been systematically collected 
about how various factors impact the structural qualities of news in terms of framing.”214 
 Likewise, little research has concentrated on the much-ignored, but important, 
phenomenon of agenda cutting.  Although Wober coined the term and established the 
baseline knowledge for this type of research, only two known studies have attempted to 
measure this “new” area.  Media Tenor’s study used a media-effects approach and focused 
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on agenda cutting’s effects on audience opinion of the threat of mad cow disease.215 Colistra, 
on the other hand, attempted to develop the concept as a theoretical approach in her 
exploratory study of mainstream media coverage of long-term media policy issue.216  To do 
so, she tried to show that agenda cutting exists, which, like Wober,217 she determined that it 
does. Still, other literature has touched on the subject without specifically identifying it as 
agenda cutting.  For example, a Pew survey found that approximately 35% of journalists and 
news executives of local media reported that they “sometimes” or “commonly” avoided 
stories that could damage advertisers, which amounts to self-censorship.218   Because of the 
scant attention paid to these important topics, each of the aforementioned areas needs to be 
explored to determine how internal and external forces attempt to affect news content and 
coverage decisions. This type of research is especially pertinent in the current media 
landscape where news workers are faced with multiple competing loyalties, which are at least 
partially due to increased economic constraints and bottom-line pressures. 
The current study expands on previous research in agenda and frame building and 
further develops and tests the concept of agenda cutting.  Specifically, this research’s goal is 
to determine through what forces and under what conditions the media are most likely to be 
influenced and to what effect on news content and coverage decisions.  That is, how and 
under what conditions do external and internal forces attempt to influence the media and 
content decisions, and to what effect are they successful at doing so?   
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This research examined potential effects on content by using a national survey of 
local television news reporters.  TV news reporters are an important group to question 
regarding attempted influences and effects on content decisions for several reasons.  First, as 
mentioned earlier, Shoemaker and Reese hypothesized that broadcast media are more 
sensitive to economic concerns than print media because nearly all of their income originates 
from advertising.219  Thus, pressures and influences should be most evident in the television 
industry, although they are likely to occur, perhaps to a somewhat lesser extent, in the print 
sector as well.  Second, reporters are a better group to survey on these particular issues than, 
say, news directors, producers, or other executives because they may be more likely to give 
candid responses since they are further removed from the business side of news operations.220 
Third, reporters’ transient nature increases the likelihood that they will not cater their 
answers to show loyalty to and/or protection for their current news organization.  Therefore, 
they are more likely to offer more open assessments.  Finally, reporters are less likely to 
suffer from survey fatigue,221 as many studies involving broadcast workers focus on surveys 
of news directors and/or producers.222  
Using aspects from Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchical model of influences, along 
with research and examples from agenda-building and framing literature and media surveys, 
a comprehensive model of media influences and outcomes was tested (See Figure 2.3—
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Hypothesized Model of Influences on Media Content (IOMC)). This first phase of the 
analysis examined the overall picture and assessed possible pressures on media content 
decisions and potential outcomes of these influences.  Specifically, the overall model 
evaluated within-media organization influences as mediating the relationships between 
extramedia and organizational influences and the proposed content outcomes.  This 
systematic and comprehensive approach helps to improve our understanding of the different 
types of pressures media organizations face every day.  This model also helps to advance our 
knowledge of agenda building, frame building, and agenda cutting in the news industry. 
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Figure 2.3.  Hypothesized Model of Influences on Media Content (IOMC) 
 
Note:  The ovals in the model are unobserved latent constructs.  The rectangles 
represent observed variables.  These observed, measured variables are used to 
measure the unobserved latent constructs.  The model also contains errors, 
depicted as δ (deltas) and ε (epsilons), as well as disturbance terms, shown as ζ 
(zetas).  These errors and disturbance terms account for measurement error, 
which can lead to bias in the estimation of the regression coefficients. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Hypotheses & Research Questions 
 
 The second phase of the study addressed hypotheses and research questions dealing 
with specific relationships between variables that were not directly ascertainable by testing 
the overall model in the first stage of the project.  Specific parameters were explored through 
the more traditional methods of correlation and multiple regression analyses to test the 
plausibility, strength, and direction of relationships not directly presented in the model.  
Examining these specific relationships helps to improve our current knowledge base of 
agenda-building constructs presented by Shoemaker and Reese, as well as advance existing 
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literature regarding the strength and association of potential influences on media content 
decisions and the sources of influence that are strongest in these decisions.  
 Public relations agenda-building research suggests that if a media entity has an 
inadequate staff to fill the day’s news hole a station may rely on outside sources, such as 
information subsidies from public relations practitioners, to compensate for this lack of “man 
power.”223  Although this observation has been noted in previous research (e.g., Gandy), it 
has not been evaluated from the perspective of the current study, which measures staff size 
pressures by assessing reporters’ opinions on inadequate staff size and its effects on content.  
 Scholars have also found that staff size is linked to news quality or overall industry 
performance.224  For example, Lacy, Fico, and Simon found that staff size was positively 
correlated with performance in the newspaper industry.225 In other words, larger staff size 
means better news performance.  Further evidence in the literature shows that journalists tend 
to view staff size reductions and an inadequate number of staff working at a news 
organization unfavorably.226  Given this evidence, the staff size pressure measure was 
evaluated with regard to public relations pressures and effects on news content and coverage 
decisions.  Therefore, the following hypotheses were posed: 
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 H1: Staff size pressures will have a positive correlation with public relations  
  pressures.  
  That is, reporters who believe that an inadequate or reduced staff size can 
  have negative effects coverage will also report more instances of public  
  relations pressure. 
  
 H2: Staff size pressures will have a positive correlation with overall    
  effects/influences on content decisions. 
  That is, reporters who believe that an inadequate or reduced staff size can 
  have negative effects coverage will also report more instances of influences 
  on content and coverage decisions. 
 
 
 The proposed model in Figure 2.3 includes market size as a control variable.  The 
aforementioned hypotheses, however, do not.  Therefore, the following research question 
was posed to provide a more detailed examination of these relationships.   
 
 RQ1: Does adding market size as a control variable affect the strength of the  
  relationships in the first two hypotheses (i.e., (H1) Staff Size Pressures  
  and PR Pressures and (H2) Staff Size Pressures and Overall   
  Influence/Outcome on Content)? 
 
 
  In the television industry, stations are categorized into designated market areas 
(DMAs), which are classified by number.  The largest-market stations hold the 1-25 spots, 
while the smallest-market stations are generally in the hundreds.  Past literature has 
suggested that smaller-market media may be more susceptible to advertising influences.227  
Furthermore, as Shoemaker and Reese have argued, broadcast media are even more 
vulnerable to these types of pressures because they rely on advertisers for profits.228  On the 
other hand, larger-market media may be more likely to face political pressures.  This is 
because as a media organization becomes more concentrated, which is typically associated 
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with larger markets, the owners or executives may become have stronger social ties with 
some outside company, as noted by Shoemaker and Reese.  Connections with politicians and 
governmental officials may also be included.  Still, these types of potential influences have 
not been closely examined.  Based on the evidence in literature, four hypotheses were posed.  
Market size was reverse-coded in the data file so a larger DMA number corresponded with 
larger-market media, and vice versa.  This change is reflected in the hypotheses and in the 
model.  All measures of attempted influences and outcomes on content are based on 
reporters’ perceptions.    
 Market size will have a… 
 
 H3: negative relationship with overall effects/influences  on content decisions;  
 
 H4: negative relationship with advertising influences;  
 
 H5: a positive relationship with political pressures; and  
 
 H6:   a negative relationship with public relations pressures. 
 
 As mentioned, research has suggested that extramedia pressures and organizational 
pressures influence content.  Although scholars have proposed that advertisers, 
owner/executives are strong sources of influence, little to no research has examined what 
forces are the strongest predictors of influences on news content.229 Thus, this study 
considered the following research questions and hypotheses.   
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RQ 2: After taking into account the other two components, how well does each 
measure of extramedia influences predict outcomes/influences of news 
content decisions?  That is, what is the unique contribution of each extramedia 
influence measure on the content decision outcomes after partialing out the 
contributions of the other two measures? 
 
 H7:      The advertiser pressures measure is the strongest extramedia predictor of  
  outcomes/influences on news content and coverage decisions.  
 
 RQ3:   After taking into account the other two components, how well does each  
  measure of organizational influences predict outcomes/influences of news  
  content decisions?  That is, what is the unique contribution of each  
  organizational influence measure on the content decision outcomes after  
  partialing out the contributions of the other two measures? 
 
 H8:      The owner/executive pressures measure is the strongest organizational  
  predictor of outcomes/influences on news content and coverage decisions. 
 
 
 Finally, as noted in the literature review, the phenomenon of agenda cutting has been 
mentioned by few scholars and has been researched by even fewer.  One of the goals of the 
current study was to develop and expand this concept as a theoretical approach.  To better 
understand agenda cutting, the following research questions and hypotheses were posed: 
  
 RQ4: How well does each measure of extramedia influences predict the   
  level of agenda cutting after taking into account the other two components? 
  That is, what is the unique contribution of each measure on the agenda-cutting 
  effects on content after partialing out the contributions of the other two  
  measures? 
 
 H9:   The advertiser pressures measure is the strongest extramedia predictor of  
  instances of agenda cutting. 
 
 RQ5:   How well does each measure of organizational influences predict the  
  level of agenda cutting after taking into account the other two components? 
  That is, what is the unique contribution of each measure on the agenda-cutting 
  effects on content after partialing out the contributions of the other two  
  measures? 
 
 H10:   The owner/executive pressures measure is the strongest organizational  
  predictor of instances of agenda cutting. 
  
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
METHOD 
 
 
 A national survey of television reporters was conducted to examine external and 
internal influences on news content and coverage decisions. The current chapter provides a 
detailed explanation of the data-gathering process, followed by the procedures used to 
implement the survey.  The survey instrument itself is then discussed, along with a 
description of the respondents.   Finally, all of the study’s variables and their respective 
scales are operationalized, followed by the data-analysis procedures for both phases of the 
study.  Particular attention is paid to the explication of structural equation modeling, the 
method used in phase one. 
 
Data-Gathering Process 
 
Data for this study were obtained through a Web-based survey of television reporters.  
A Web survey was chosen because of monetary and time constraints for the project.  This 
method, however, has proved successful for this industry.230 This is likely because television 
professionals work in a busy newsroom environment, and this type of survey allows for a 
quick and a virtually immediate response.  Furthermore, the survey could be taken from any 
computer, thus allowing for more privacy than other survey methods, such as telephone 
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questionnaires. As mentioned in the previous chapter, TV reporters were chosen for several 
reasons, including their likelihood of giving more candid responses because (1) they are 
further removed from the business side of news operations,231 and (2) the transient nature of 
the profession increases the chances that they will not cater their answers to show loyalty to 
and/or protection for their current news organization.  Reporters are also less likely to be 
bombarded by surveys, as many studies involving broadcast workers focus on news directors 
and/or producers.232  Thus, reporters are less likely to suffer from survey fatigue.   
 Because structural equation modeling is a large-sample technique, an adequate list of 
potential respondents was required.  Furthermore, an even larger sample size was needed for 
the current study because a model-building SEM approach was used.  Briefly, this method 
requires randomly splitting the data file to use the first half of the data for a more exploratory 
approach, while saving the second half of the data for confirming the modifications made 
during the first phase.  This process is explained in greater detail in the “Data Analysis” 
section presented later in this chapter.  In the subsequent paragraphs, the sampling frame that 
was used to gather potential respondents and the sampling process are outlined, followed by 
an explanation of the Web-survey system. 
 Reporters for the survey were chosen by a two-stage process.  To identify potential 
participants, a list of U.S. television stations was compiled from Bacon’s MediaSource 
online.  Bacon’s is a subscription-based service used to obtain an extensive list and updated 
contact information for media organizations and news workers.  The information on the list is 
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frequently updated, and the service is used by advertisers, researchers, public relations 
professionals, media workers, corporations, and others to identify and contact those people 
working in any segment of the media industry.  Several categories of stations were omitted 
from this list, including Spanish-language channels, PBS, stations without news departments 
or a news team, and other specialized channels such as religious and home-shopping formats 
(e.g., QVC).  Some stations listed on the Bacon’s site had news departments, but no reporters 
were listed.  To reduce coverage error, these stations’ Web sites were consulted and general 
assignment reporters’ contact information, when listed, was recorded for inclusion in the 
survey.   
 Second, all general reporters (i.e., those not listed as specific types of reporters, such 
as “crime,”  “bureau,” or “investigative” reporter) from each station were considered.  Thus, 
this “sampling” procedure resembles a census approach, rather than a typical sampling 
process.  Only those with specific e-mail addresses (e.g., j.doe@wxyz.com and not 
news@wxyz.com) were eligible for participation in the study.  The final list resulted in 2074 
potential respondents.  After the completed list was obtained, contact information was 
gathered to send a pre-notification letter by mail and to send the actual e-mail invitation with 
the survey link included. This information was provided on the Bacon’s Web site. 
 The Qualtrics Web-based survey software, which is supported and provided by the 
Odum Institute of Social Science Research at UNC-Chapel Hill, was used to implement the 
project.  This program allowed for streamlined responses that were eventually downloaded to 
an SPSS data file for analysis.  Each reporter obtained from the selection process was 
automatically assigned a different link to access the survey by the Qualtrics program.  This 
feature allowed the researcher to track responses and data, and it also helped to prevent those 
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who had already responded to the survey from receiving additional e-mail reminders.  
Furthermore, access codes and passwords were not required, so it was easier for respondents 
to access and complete the survey.  This feature likely helped to increase the number of 
responses. 
 
Implementation Procedures 
 
Recruiting Participants 
 
 This study employed many of the techniques suggested by Dillman in his widely 
cited survey book, Mail and Internet Surveys: The Tailored Design Method.233  To solicit 
participants for the study, a pre-notification letter was sent via postal mail on Friday, Feb. 9, 
2007 (See Appendix 1. Mail Pre-Notification/Invitation Letter). The initial invitation was 
sent via mail because Dillman has found that using different modes in the survey 
implementation process improves response rates.234  Cleary also suggested sending a 
personalized paper letter to all potential survey respondents before sending out the first e-
mail message with Web-survey information.235  Using this approach likely kept some 
potential participants from deleting the survey e-mail message when it was sent, and it 
reinforced the fact that they were not being “spammed.”   
 The letter was personally addressed to each potential respondent, and some of the 
information and wording suggested by Dillman236 and Cleary237 were used.  Dillman has 
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noted that survey recipients should feel as if they were specifically chosen to participate.238 
He generally “expects to achieve a collective impact of five to eight percentage points from 
the use of personalized elements.”239  Similarly, Cleary found that the news directors and 
producers in her study seemed to respond better to this “personal touch,” as “many agreed to 
participate” after she explained that only a selected few were chosen for her study.240   
 Other methods were also used in the letter to potentially increase the response rate.  
The letter was printed on official letterhead of the School of Journalism and Mass 
Communication at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  A postscript was also 
used and was presented in boldface type in the letter.  The postscript indicated that 
participants also had the option of completing the survey by mail or by telephone. As 
suggested by Dillman, the letter was sent by first-class stamped, rather than bulk, mail.241 
Recipients were also offered a non-monetary incentive, an executive summary of the 
findings, regardless of whether they chose to participate.  Cleary found this step useful, as 
20% of her participants requested a copy.242 Although Dillman has recommended that, when 
possible, the researcher should provide a real signature in contrasting ink on each letter,243 
doing so was not realistic for a larger project such as the current study.  Thus, a scanned 
signature was included in the signature block.   
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Official Invitation and Follow-ups 
 
 Six days after the pre-notification/invitation letter was sent by mail, the official e-mail 
invitation with the much of the same information was sent to the work e-mail addresses 
obtained from the sampling frame (See Appendix 2. E-mail Invitation/Recruitment Message 
for Potential Survey Participants).  The e-mail invitation was sent on Thursday, Feb. 15, 
2007.  This particular day of the week was chosen because research has shown that e-mail 
messages sent on Wednesdays, Thursdays, or Tuesdays are more likely to be opened and 
thoroughly read.244  The official e-mail invitation included a respondent-specific link to the 
survey’s consent to participate page (See Appendix 3. Consent for Web Survey) and the 
actual survey (See Appendix 4. Web Survey of Television Reporters).  The specific links 
were generated by the Qualtrics software system. 
 Three reminder messages were sent for a total of five contacts (postal mail pre-
notification letter; e-mail invitation; and reminders one, two, and three). Recipients who had 
not yet completed the survey were sent the first reminder message on Wednesday, Feb. 21, 
which was seven days after the initial e-mail contact (See Appendix 5. First E-mail Reminder 
Message).  As mentioned previously, the Qualtrics Web-based survey software keeps track of 
those who have and have not completed the survey to prevent unnecessary messages from 
being sent to potential respondents.  A second reminder was sent to non-responders 
approximately one week later on Thursday, March 1 (See Appendix 6. Second E-mail 
Reminder Message).  Finally, a third e-mail reminder was distributed six days later on 
Wednesday, March 7 (See Appendix 7. Third E-mail Reminder Message).  Following 
                                                 
 
244Cleary, “Newsroom Diversity, Professional Development, and Staff Retention,” 120. Cleary 
obtained this information from the eMarketer Web site; however, the link to the specific article from which the 
original information was obtained was no longer valid.  Cleary claims that Wednesday is the most effective 
days, followed by Tuesday or Thursday.   
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Dillman’s recommendation for personalizing messages, the official electronic invitation and 
the reminders began with each respondent’s first name.  The study, survey, and all 
communication with respondents were approved by the Institutional Review Board at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (See Appendix 12. Notice of IRB Approval). 
 
Targeted Response Rate 
 
 Although a few previous e-mail studies have achieved higher response rates of about 
50%, this percentage was only achieved after several contacts and much time and labor on 
the part of the researcher.245  Furthermore, these studies focused on television news directors 
and/or producers—not reporters, as with the current project—and dealt with a considerably 
smaller sample (approximately 150 as opposed to more than 600 participants for the current 
study).  Thus, the labor spent in making several phone contacts and pleas was simply not 
feasible—neither time-wise nor in the economical sense.  Finally, the 30% targeted response 
rate for the current study is also comparable to that achieved by the Pew Research Center’s 
surveys of similar groups. 
 
Survey Instrument and Operationalization of Variables 
 
 The Web-survey consisted of 70 questions (See Appendix 4.  Web Survey of 
Television Reporters).246  A pretest of academics with extensive television experience was 
conducted, and it was found that the survey took an average of 13 minutes to complete, 
although reporters who participated in the actual survey oftentimes reported that it took less 
                                                 
 
245Cleary, “Newsroom Diversity, Professional Development, and Staff Retention”; Adams, 
“Networked News”; Cleary, “Newsroom Diversity, Professional Development, and Staff Retention”; see also 
Adams and Cleary, “Surfable Surveys.” 
 
 
246The survey questions were not numbered in the actual Web survey.  They are numbered in Appendix 
4 for clarity. 
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time.  The pretest was also used to check for ambiguities in questioning, word choice, and 
other issues that may deter respondents from completing the survey, and minor adjustments 
in wording were made.247   
 As mentioned previously, a mail pre-notification letter was sent to a total of 2,074 
general reporters.  Of those, six were returned as undeliverable, resulting in a total possible 
sample of 2068.  Eleven people requested a mail survey, which was sent with a postage-paid 
return envelope.  A total of seven were completed for inclusion in the analysis: five were 
returned by mail, one by fax, and one was taken on the Web via the respondent’s survey link.  
Additionally, two reporters requested to take the survey by phone.   
 Of the total sample of 2068, the data file contained 618 usable responses, resulting in 
a 30% response rate.  This process is discussed in more detail in the “Missing Values and 
Data Screening” section later in this chapter.  It is important to note that the beginning of the 
Web survey took place during a hectic time for those in the television industry—a sweeps 
period.  Sweeps periods, which occur four times per year, measure ratings simultaneously in 
all 210 local television markets in the nation.  The data from the ratings surveys are used to 
set local advertising rates, among other things.  Thus, during this time stations often air 
dramatic themes or events in their sitcoms or focus on titillating news stories, such as 
investigative pieces, to attract more viewers. 248  For 2007, February sweeps ran from 
February 1 through February 28.  As mentioned earlier, the survey was launched on February 
                                                 
 
247Data from the pretest were not used for the analysis.   
 
 
248
“What are the sweeps periods?,” Nielsen Media, http://www.nielsenmedia.com/FAQ/sweeps.html# 
What%20are%20the%20sweep%20periods? (accessed February 20, 2007).  According to Nielsen Media, “The 
term "sweep" dates back to the beginning of local television measurements in the 1950s and refers to how 
Nielsen Media Research mailed and processed diaries to sample households starting with the East Coast and 
sweeping across the nation.” 
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15 and was closed on March 14.  Despite this potential drawback, the targeted response rate 
was still met, suggesting that the topic was of importance to many reporters.249   
 
About the Respondents  
 
  From the usable sample (n=618), participants were 51% male and 47% female; 2% 
declined to answer.  Reporters in the 25-34 year-old age group made up the majority of 
respondents with 51%, followed by those 35-44 years of age with 21.3%.  Twelve and a half 
percent of the participants were between 45 and 55 years old, and younger reporters aged 18-
24 (9.3%) and those 55 or older (6%) represented the fewest number of respondents. The 
average respondent had worked in the television industry for approximately 13 years 
(mean=12.76; SD=9.04), and 65% had been employed at his/her current station from 1 to 5 
years.  A majority of the participants were from the larger DMAs, as 69% worked for stations 
in the 1-25 markets and 11% in the 26-50 markets.  The remaining 20% of participating 
reporters served stations in the smaller DMAs (51+).  Survey participants also tended to work 
in larger newsrooms, with 73% reporting that their stations’ news department consisted of 31 
or more people.  Most of the respondents (61%) worked for publicly owned media entities, 
and 83% worked for groups owning five or more stations.  Furthermore, 65% of the 
participating reporters claimed that their stations’ owners also owned other types of media 
(e.g., newspapers).  Thus, the demographic information suggests that the majority of 
respondents worked for more concentrated media entities.  A complete account of the 
respondent demographic information is shown in Appendix 8 (Respondent Demographic 
Information).   
                                                 
 
249Several reporters also communicated their appreciation for investigation into the topic.     
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 Before proceeding, it is important to point out the differences between the sample (the 
survey respondents) and the population (the list of reporters to whom the survey was sent).  
The only demographic-type of data provided by Bacon’s MediaSource, the sampling frame, 
were gender (assessed by using the listed salutation) and DMA.  A small, but 
inconsequential, difference regarding the gender of the survey respondents was found.  The 
gender makeup of the respondents was 51% male and 47% female (2% declined to answer).  
For the population, however, the gender represented 55/45 female-male split.  Although the 
difference is not significant, it is worth noting for the sake of diligence.  The DMAs, on the 
other hand, showed more marked differences between the population and the sample.  The 
list consisted of 40% of reporters representing the largest, 1-25, markets, as compared to 69% 
of the survey participants.  Smaller disparities surfaced in the other DMA groups, with a 17 
percentage-point difference within the 51+ DMAs (37% in population list versus 20% of the 
respondents) and a 11.5 percentage-point difference in the 26-50 DMA spots (22.5% for the 
population list and 11% of the respondents).    
 As previously mentioned, this study used a model-building approach that required a 
large sample.  Briefly, a larger number of cases were needed to randomly split the data file in 
half to use the first file for exploring and modifying the model, and the second subfile for 
confirming the changes made in the model in the first step.  Since there are only a given 
number of “general” reporters, all those listed in Bacon’s MediaSource meeting the specified 
criteria were considered for survey participation.  Therefore, stratifying based on the 
population was not possible.  This population-sample discrepancy is listed as a limitation for 
the study, and it is further discussed in Chapter 5.   
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Operationalization of Variables  
 The survey consisted of two main scale measures (Strongly Disagree/Strongly Agree 
and Almost Never/Very Often), both of which used a 7-point Likert-type format.  In most 
instances, the questions were ordered so scale items did not appear continuously.  Some 
items were also reverse-ordered to help prevent response bias.  Survey items were worded to 
assess respondents’ perceptions of situations in typical television newsrooms—not just their 
own.  This general approach was used to encourage more candid responses, and it is a 
technique often used by large-scale research outfits, such as Pew Research Center.  Some 
minor demographic-types of questions, such as ownership situation, were used to evaluate 
the respondents’ particular station.  Each of the latent construct’s indicators was assessed for 
internal consistency and reliability using Cronbach’s alpha.250  The latent variables in the 
survey and model are as follows:  (1) extramedia influences, (2) organizational influences, 
(3) within-media influences, and (4) content influence/outcome.  A list of observed variables, 
their corresponding latent constructs (just listed), along with the specific survey questions 
used to evaluate them is shown in Table 3.1. 
 
Extramedia Influences 
 
 A total of 12 questions were used to measure extramedia influences, which is one of 
the independent variables in the study.  The observed indicators (measures) used to measure 
different components of this latent construct are (1) advertising pressures, (2) public relations 
pressure, and (3) political/governmental pressures.  Each of these observed variables were 
measured using a series of questions related to each, and they are now discussed. 
                                                 
 
250The means, standard deviations, and Cronbach’s alpha values that follow are based upon the 
“cleaned” data file in which outliers and cases missing values on more than 30% of the measured variables were 
removed.  The criteria for omission are discussed in more detail in the “Missing Values and Data Screening” 
section presented later in this chapter. 
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 Advertising Pressures.  Four questions (7 & 12-14) were used to evaluate instances of 
advertiser pressures, and the scale achieved a Cronbach’s alpha of .87 (M=14.01, SD=5.77).   
Previous research has suggested that advertisers, in at least some instances, attempt to 
influence content in various ways, including trying to influence (1) the media to cover or 
emphasize certain stories, (2) the manner in which a story or topic is covered, or (3) the 
media to not cover a story or topic.  The survey questions were used to assess these 
pressures.   
 Public Relations Pressures. Three questions (42-44) were used to assess instances of 
public relations pressures.251  Practitioners may attempt to influence content in similar ways 
as advertisers.  Thus, similar survey questions represent public relations pressures.  Previous 
research also suggests that public relations professionals may be able to influence the media 
by distributing information subsidies, such as news releases and VNRs.  The receipt and use 
of these materials were also evaluated in the survey.  The alpha for the three-item scale was 
.81 (M=14.86, SD=4.25). 
 Political/Governmental Pressures.  Five questions (22, 25, & 32-34) were used to 
evaluate pressures from politicians and government officials.252  The four-item scale had an 
                                                 
 
251Originally, five questions were posed to assess instances of pressures from public relations 
practitioners.  Two questions (35 & 39), however, were found to reduce the reliability and internal consistency 
of the scale.  After careful review of all scale questions, the two questions were found inappropriate to group 
with the other scale items because one was used to measure the station’s actual use of VNRs and the other was 
used to measure how often the stations received them.  The questions did not seem to be measuring the same 
underlying concept of PR pressures, as the others were more specific.  Thus, these questions were removed and 
were retained for the use in a future study. 
 
 
252Seven questions were originally used to assess political/governmental official pressures.  Two of the 
questions (24 & 26) found to reduce the slightly reduce reliability and internal consistency of the scale because 
they seemed to be assessing different aspects of political pressures (seven-item alpha=.784).  After further 
review of the questions, the researcher decided to remove these items from the scale to improve reliability, 
especially because the squared multiple correlations were much lower than the others.  They were, however, 
retained for use in future studies.  Another scale item, question 25, had a lower squared multiple correlation 
than the other four items in the revised scale, but it was retained because (a) reliability was still high with its 
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alpha of .82 (M=22.70, SD=6.64).  As with the advertising and public relations pressure 
measures, several questions were posed to assess just how these sources attempt to influence 
news content and coverage decisions.  The literature also suggests that these sources may 
also try to influence the media by providing stations with leaks, prepackaged news, and off-
the-record interviews.  These areas have largely been ignored other than anecdotal examples.  
Thus, they were explored in the survey.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
inclusion and, more importantly, (b) because it measured a different aspect of political/governmental pressures 
than the other items.  Thus, it contributed information that the other items did not. 
Variable Survey Questions 
Extramedia Influences  
     Advertising Pressure  7, 12-14 
     Public Relations Pressure  42-44 
     Political/Governmental Pressure  22, 25, 32-34 
  
Organizational Influences  
     Level of Concentration 65, 67 
     Owner/Executive Pressure   19-21 
     Economic Pressure  5-6, 45-47 
  
Within-Media Org. Influence                     
     Staff Size Pressure Measure 1, 3 
     Direct Management Pressure  48, 50, 52 
     Indirect Management Pressure  57, 59, 61 
  
Market Size (reverse-coded DMA rank) Info. obtained from sampling 
 
 
Content Influence/Outcome  
     Level Agenda Building 9, 16, 27, 29, 36, 40, 49, 55, 58 
     Level Frame Building 10, 17, 28, 30, 37, 51, 56, 60 
     Level Agenda Cutting 8, 11, 15, 18, 23, 31, 38, 53, 54, 62 
Table 3.1.  Latent Constructs and Observed Variables (Indicators) with    
      Corresponding Survey Questions 
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Organizational Influences 
 
 Ten survey questions assessed organizational influences.  The observed indicators 
used to measure different components of this latent construct are (1) level of ownership 
concentration, (2) owner/executive pressures, and (3) economic pressures. 
 Level of Ownership Concentration.  Two questions (65 & 67) evaluated the 
concentration of ownership of each respondent’s television station.253  The questions were 
straightforward and involved type of ownership. Item 65 had a range of 1 to 4, so question 67 
had to be recoded to establish an equal scale for the items since it only involved two usable 
points.  The alpha was .74 (M=6.31, SD=2.08).  
 Owner/Executive Pressures.  Research indicates that owners and top-level executives 
try, and are successful at, influencing content decisions at some news organizations.  As with 
the measures of extramedia influences, these owner/executives may attempt to influence the 
types of stories that are covered/not covered, or the angles taken on certain topics or issues.  
Three questions (19-21) assessed this source of influence, and the scale achieved a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .94 (M=8.86, SD=4.56).254     
 Economic Pressures.  Five survey questions (5-6 & 45-47) evaluated the levels of 
economic pressures faced by journalists.  Previous survey research indicates that many 
journalists believe that bottom-line pressures are seriously hurting the quality of news 
                                                 
 
253Originally, three survey items measured this scale, but one question (66) was found to reduce the 
alpha of the scale (three-item alpha=.66).  This “problem” question measures whether the owners of the stations 
also own other types of media (e.g., newspapers).  The question was dropped from the scale, but it is reported in 
the respondent demographics section.   
 
 
254Four items were originally proposed to measure owner/executive pressures; however, question 4 
(after it was appropriately recoded), did not group as well with the other items.  That is, although the alpha level 
was quite high (four-item alpha=.852), the squared multiple correlation value for this question was much lower 
than the others (.153 compared to .72 - .84).  After closer inspection, this item was found to be different from 
the others in that it was more of a general, sweeping question.  In contrast, the others assessed more specific 
instances of owner/executive pressures.  Given this information, the item was omitted from the scale. 
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coverage.  The literature also suggests that these pressures are more prevalent in the 
television industry.  The alpha for the five-item scale was .78 (M=19.76, SD=6.21). 
 
Within-Media Influences 
 
 A total of 8 questions measured reporters’ feelings concerning staff size pressures, as 
well as their assessments of direct and indirect management pressures.  These observed 
measures of within-media influences are outlined in the paragraphs that follow.  
 Staff Size Pressure Measure.  Previous research concerning staff size suggests that it 
is linked to quality of coverage and industry performance.  Some studies have found that an 
inadequate staff size may have detrimental effects on news content.  Many media 
organizations, however, have been forced to cut staff because of bottom-line pressures.  Not 
surprisingly, journalists tend to view inadequate staff size, which is typically due to staffing 
cuts, in a negative light. Two survey items (1 & 3) were used to measure journalists’ opinions 
on particular staffing statements.255  The scale had an alpha of .68 (M=12.42, SD=1.84). 
Although one question (68) was used to assess the size of the news staff at each respondent’s 
current station, it was not used for the scale.  Instead, it is reported in the “About the 
Respondents” section earlier in this chapter.   
 Direct and Indirect Management Pressures.  Six questions assessed pressures from 
management within the news organization.  Three questions (48, 50, & 52) evaluated 
instances of direct forms of management pressures, such as a superior directly instructing 
journalists to cover a story from a certain angle.  The alpha for this scale was .72 (M=12.01, 
SD=4.53). Three questions (57, 59, & 61) asked respondents how often indirect forms of 
                                                 
 
255Although three questions were originally posed for inclusion in the scale, one item (Q 2) was found 
to reduce internal consistency and reliability (three-item alpha =.44).  After closer inspection, it was determined 
that this item instead measured something else—using advertising and/or public relations material because of 
inadequate staff size.  Thus, the item was removed from the scale and was retained for future analyses. 
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manager pressures occur in typical newsrooms.  This type of pressure may include indirect 
signals such as yawning at a story idea.  The scale for indirect management pressures 
achieved a Cronbach’s alpha of .83 (M=11.80, SD=5.04).    
 
Market Size 
 
 In this study, market size is an observed variable that is expected to affect perceptions 
of influences on media content.  This information consists of the DMA rank of the station for 
which the respondent works, and it was obtained in the sampling process via Bacon’s 
MediaSource.  As previously mentioned, smaller DMAs represent the largest markets.  To 
avoid confusion, this variable was reverse coded so that smaller DMA ranks represent 
smaller markets, and vice versa, and it was labeled as “Market Size” in the model and for 
addressing the hypotheses posed in the study.  DMA rank, however, is represented in its true, 
original form in the “About the Respondents” section earlier in this chapter and in the 
“Demographics” section in the appendices. 
 
Content Influences/Outcomes 
 
 A total of 27 survey items assessed how content is influenced as a result of the 
various types of internal and external pressures just discussed.  Nine questions (9, 16, 27, 29, 
36, 40, 49, 55, & 58) evaluated the outcome of agenda building.  As mentioned throughout 
the first two chapters, agenda building involves who or what is trying to influence the 
media’s news agenda.  Survey items specifically evaluated how often external and internal 
sources are successful at influencing media decisions of what stories to cover or emphasize.  
The alpha for the nine-item scale was .80 (M=30.01, SD=9.43). 
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 A second type of outcome, frame building, consists of instances in which the 
aforementioned sources influence the manner in which a story, topic, issue, or event is 
covered (e.g., the stance of an issue or the angle of a topic).  Eight questions (10, 17, 28, 30, 
37, 51, 56, & 60) assessed this specific form of influence on media content.  The scale had an 
alpha of .80 (M=27.06, SD=8.38). 
 Finally, media content may also be influenced by internal and external forces 
attempting to convince news workers to not cover a particular story, topic, issue, or event.  
This process is known as agenda cutting, and it may occur by (1) keeping an item off the 
news agenda, (2) having it removed once it is there, or (3) affording it little attention (burying 
it).  Ten survey items (8, 11, 15, 18, 23, 31, 38, 53, 54, & 62) assessed this content outcome, 
and the scale achieved a Cronbach’s alpha of .84 (M=28.68, SD=10.19). 
 
Data Analysis Procedures 
 
 As mentioned in the previous chapters, this study incorporated two distinct phases to 
examine through which internal and external forces and under what conditions the media are 
most likely to be influenced and to what effect on news content.  The first part of this project 
evaluated the proposed model of influences on media content using SEM.  The second 
approach employed the traditional statistical techniques of correlation and multiple 
regression analyses to address and evaluate the hypotheses and research questions posed in 
this study.  Before moving to details of each phase, an overview of SEM is provided in the 
subsequent sections. 
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Structural Equation Modeling with Hybrid Models:  A Brief Explication of the Technique 
 
 Structural equation modeling is an advanced quantitative procedure that has rarely 
been used in mass media research.  It is an extension of the General Linear Model and is a 
generalized technique.  That is, it “does not designate a single statistical technique but instead 
refers to a family of related procedures.”256  SEM is a powerful multivariate technique and 
can be considered a combination and/or extension of multiple regression, path analysis, and 
confirmatory factor analysis.  It is more useful and powerful than conventional statistical 
approaches because it can (1) assess or correct for measurement error;257 (2) incorporate both 
observed variables and latent (factors) variables, the latter of which is measured by observed 
indicators;258 and (3) consider modeling of correlated errors, interrelations, and 
interactions/mediation effects.259  
 Hybrid models in SEM consist of both latent factors and measured variables.  
According to Brown, structural equation models can be separated into two main sections:  the 
measurement model and the structural model.  The measurement portion of the model 
consists of a confirmatory factory analysis (CFA), a more traditional approach.   This 
component indicates (1) the number of unobserved latent variables (i.e., factors), (2) how the 
specified indicators (measured variables) are related to, or loaded on, the latent factors, and 
(3) if and how the errors of these indicators are related.  The second part of structural 
                                                 
 
256Rex B. Kline, Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling, 2d ed. (New York: Guilford 
Press, 2005), 9. 
 
 
257Barbara M. Byrne, Structural Equation Modeling with AMOS: Basic Concepts, Applications, and 
Programming (Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 2001), 3. 
 
 
258Ibid, 4. 
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“Structural Equation Modeling,” http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/structur.htm (accessed 
September 3, 2006). 
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equation models is the structural portion, “which specifies how the various latent factors are 
related to one another (e.g., direct or indirect effects, no relationship, spurious 
relationship).”260 
 SEM as it is known today generally remained in obscurity until the 1970s because of 
advanced knowledge requirements and the complex statistical software packages needed for 
its utilization.  The technique proliferated in the 1980s and 1990s largely because of software 
advances.  Thus, it is considered a rather newer approach in the social and behavioral 
sciences. 261  Still, researchers have outlined a set of steps that should be taken in conducting 
the analysis.  Kline has provided among the most detailed set of procedures that consist of 
specifying the model; model identification; selecting the variables, operationalizing the 
constructs, and screening and preparing the data file; model estimation; interpreting the 
parameter estimates; considering equivalent models; re-specifying the model, which is often 
necessary; and interpreting and reporting the results. Kline has also recommended 
completing two additional steps that are often left out of the process:  replicating the results 
in future studies and actually applying the findings.262  Model specification and identification 
are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs, followed by a section outlining the means by 
which missing data were addressed and a brief explication of the data-screening procedures.  
Variable measurement and operationalizations were just outlined in the preceding sections. 
The remaining procedures suggested by Kline are covered in the “Results” chapter (Chapter 
4).   
                                                 
 
260Timothy A. Brown, Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Applied Research (New York: Guilford Press, 
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261Gregory R. Hancock and Ralph O. Mueller, eds., Structural Equation Modeling: A Second Course, 
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Model Specification:  A Model of Influences on Media and Outcomes on News Content  
 
 SEM is an a priori approach, which means that the hypotheses of the project must be 
specified beforehand based on previous research and/or theory.  These predictions may be 
specified in the form of regression equations in which model parameters are defined and 
estimated to determine the relationship and fit among observed variables and latent factors 
based on the data provided. Hypotheses may also be represented pictorially by drawing the 
proposed model with its respective observed and unobserved variables and their predicted 
relationships using a SEM program with a graphic interface, such as AMOS.263  The latter 
approach was used for the current study. 
 As mentioned previously in this chapter, hybrid structural equation models using 
CFA examine the relationships between constructs and variables to determine how well the 
manifest (observed) variables measure the latent (unobserved) constructs.  This component is 
the measurement portion of the model.  SEM also permits examination between these 
unobserved (latent) constructs and is considered the structural portion of the model.  The 
unobserved constructs in the proposed model for the current study are extramedia influences, 
organizational influences, within-media influences, and influence/outcome on content and 
coverage decisions. 
 As shown in Figure 2.3, the paths (arrows) in the measurement portion of the model 
are directed from the latent constructs to the observed variables (i.e., from the ovals to the 
rectangles).  This means that the measured variables are represented as reflective (effect) 
indicators as opposed to formative (causal) indicators.  The indicators were depicted in this 
manner because they all represent ways of measuring the unobservable constructs.  If the 
                                                 
 
263Ibid, 63-64. 
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arrows were pointing from the indicators to the constructs, it would mean that they would 
“cause” the construct.  For example, this depiction would mean measures of advertising 
pressures (instances in which advertisers pressure media) would cause extramedia influences.  
This is not true because advertiser pressures are a type of extramedia influences.  Since the 
abstract concepts of extramedia, organizational, within-media, and influence/outcome on 
content are not directly measurable, the effect indicators are necessary because they are 
observable ways of measuring these constructs.  Furthermore, the latent constructs in the 
proposed model are not composites or indexes of the indicators.  The indicators instead 
represent a selection of ways to measure these unobserved constructs.  Thus, the 
representation in the model (arrows going out) is appropriate.264  
 
Model Identification: Assessing Identification of the Influences on Media Content (IOMC) 
Model 
 
 After the model was specified, identification was assessed to determine if it is 
theoretically testable.  According to Kline, if the model is identified, “it is theoretically 
possible for the computer to derive a unique estimate of every model parameter.”265  For a 
model to be identified, there must be a sufficient amount of variance and covariance 
information available from the observed variables to estimate the unknown information.   As 
mentioned, structural equation models may be depicted pictorially or specified through a 
series of algebraic equations.  To solve these equations, there must be enough known 
information to determine the value of the unknowns.   
                                                 
 
264For a deeper explanation, see Rex B. Kline, “Reverse Arrow Dynamics: Formative Measurement 
and Feedback Loops,” in Structural Equation Modeling: A Second Course, Hancock and Mueller, eds. 
(Greenwich, Conn.: Information Age Publishing, 2006), 43-68.   
 
 
265Kline, Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling, 2d ed., 64. 
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 A model must be identified in order to go forth with the estimation procedure in the 
fourth stage of the process.  Although algebraic identification can be extremely difficult, 
especially with complex models, a few precautions may be taken to help with the process.  
Four of the most commonly used steps are outlined below.  They are:  setting the metric for 
the latent variables, the “t-rule,” local identification, and the recursive “rule.” 
 Setting the Metric.  One way to help ensure model identification is to set a scale for 
every latent construct.  This can be accomplished in two ways.  First, one loading (regression 
coefficient) can be set to 1.0.  That is, one of the paths (arrows) from the latent construct to 
the observed variable is fixed to 1.0, which means that the metric of the unobserved variable 
(oval) will be the same as that particular observed variable.  For example, if the scale was set 
to a path leading to age, the metric of the latent variable would be communicated in years.  
Another option is to set the latent construct’s variance to 1.0, which establishes a 
standardized metric.  The former approach is most often used and was the method applied in 
the current study.  Typically, for non-Likert-type items, the path of the indicator with the 
strongest reliability is set 1.0.  Although this study used Likert-type scales, this criterion was 
used for uniformity. 
 The “t-rule.”  This stipulation indicates that the number of parameters to be estimated 
(the unknowns) must be less than or equal to the number of sample variances and 
covariances (the knowns).  This is a necessary condition for model identification.  The 
hypothesized IOMC model for this study had 13 observed measures (known sample 
variances and covariances), which translate into 91 sample moments, and 28 parameters to 
estimate (unknowns).  Because the number of knowns (91) exceeds the number of unknowns 
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(28), resulting in 63 degrees of freedom, the model was overidentified.  Thus, there was 
sufficient information available for identification purposes.   
 Local Identification.  The local identification “rule” simply suggests that if there are 
three or more indicators per latent variable, identification may be met.  This is also known as 
the three-indicator rule, and the initial hypothesized model met this condition.  It is important 
to point out, however, that a model may still be identified even if there are fewer than three 
indicators per latent variable.266  Nevertheless, Kline has contended that researchers, when 
working with smaller samples, are more likely to run into estimation problems on models 
with only two indicators per latent construct.267  
 Recursive “rule.”  It has also been noted that if the model is recursive (i.e., it does not 
contain feedback loops between the constructs or correlated error or disturbance terms), it is 
identified.268  Since the current model met this criterion, it was considered recursive. 
 In summary, the main point to remember about model identification is that every 
unknown parameter must have a unique solution in order to be identified.  The only fool-
proof method for determining identification is to depict it algebraically, a process that is 
often difficult or even impossible for fairly complex models such as the one posited in the 
current study. 
 
                                                 
 
266For example, see Kenneth A. Bollen, Structural Equations with Latent Variables (New York: John 
Wiley, 1989).  Bollen talks of the “two-indicator rule,” which is one of the sufficient conditions for 
identification in CFA models. 
 
 
267Kline, Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling, 2d ed., 172. 
 
 
268For example, see Bollen, Structural Equations with Latent Variables. 
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Missing Values and Data Screening  
 
 Before moving to the data-screening phase and estimation of the hypothesized model, 
it was necessary to assess the data file for missing values and possible nonresponse patterns. 
A total of 696 reporters officially started the survey;269 however, only cases that had 
complete values for 9 of the 13 measured variables in the study were retained.  This 
restriction led to the deletion of 78 cases missing values (responses) on more than 30% (five 
or more) of the variables under study, resulting in 618 usable cases.   
 A general rule of thumb for SEM and CFA is to have approximately 10 cases per 
parameters to estimate.270 The hypothesized model had 28 parameters to estimate, so a 
sample size of 280 was needed.  This study, however, used a model-development approach in 
which the data file was split into two subfiles (one for estimating the hypothesized model and 
making modifications and the other for confirming the modified model/changes).  Therefore, 
a larger sample size of 560 was required (280 x 2 = 560).  Since there were a total of 618 
usable cases, the sample size was large enough to proceed without caution.  
 After close inspection of the file, the data were considered missing at random (MAR), 
as no particular data-loss patterns were detected.271  Since the Maximum Likelihood (ML) 
estimation technique used in the study assumes that none of the data are missing, which is 
unlikely for survey research, missing values were imputed using the Expectation-
Maximization (EM) algorithm in EQS 6.1.  The expectation-maximization approach was 
                                                 
 
269This number does not include those reporters who officially started the survey but dropped out 
before answering the first five questions.  It does, however, include those people who dropped out later in the 
survey. 
 
 
270For example, see Rex B. Kline, Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling (New 
York: Guilford Press, 1998); Dennis L. Jackson, “Revisiting Sample Size and Number of Parameter Estimates:  
Some Support for the N:q Hypothesis,” Structural Equation Modeling 10, no. 1 (2003): 128-141. 
 
 
271Some of the cases missing data were simply due to respondents dropping out of the survey. 
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chosen because results from Gold and Bentler’s 2000 study comparing four different 
methods for handling incomplete data favored EM methods, despite the proportion of 
missing data, the data’s distributional characteristics, or sample size.272   
 After imputing missing values, the data were screened to ensure that assumptions 
associated with SEM were met.  Specifically, the data were first screened by examining 
descriptive statistics, checking for linearity, identifying outliers and/or extreme cases, and 
assessing the assumption of multivariate normality.   The means and standard deviation 
values appeared reasonable, and the minimum and maximum values were within appropriate 
range. The bivariate scatterplots showed sufficiently linear relationships between the 
variables.  Univariate boxplots showed several outliers and extreme values for the Staff Size 
Pressure measure and one outlier for the Agenda Building measure.  After an inspection of 
the data file, however, none of the cases appeared suspect.  Still, they were kept in mind for 
possible omission.  A closer inspection of potential outliers revealed five cases with large 
Mahalanobis distance values.  These cases had previously appeared as potential problem 
cases in the boxplots.  In addition to exceeding the critical Mahalanobis value, the cases also 
showed jumps in values from the next case.  This finding solidified the suspicion that the 
cases were outliers.  Therefore, they were removed from the data file.   
 To further check for normality issues, Mardia’s coefficient for multivariate kurtosis 
was examined in AMOS 7.0.  Mardia’s coefficient was slightly inflated at 7.427, and an 
inspection of the Mahalanobis values revealed that one additional case showed a jump in 
                                                 
 
272Michael Steven Gold and Peter M. Bentler, “Treatments of Missing Data: A Monte Carlo 
Comparison of RBHI, Iterative Stochastic Regression Imputation, and Expectation-Maximization,” Structural 
Equation Modeling 7, no. 3 (2000): 319-355. 
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value.273 The case was removed from and the data file was rerun to check for normality.  
Mardia’s coefficient dropped to 6.077, and no jumps in Mahalanobis values were detected 
after the suspect case was removed.  Thus, the data file was deemed acceptable to proceed 
with the analyses.  In all, six cases were removed, which resulted in a final data file of 612 
cases (618 - 6 = 612).  The descriptives for the 13 measured variables are shown in Table 3.2. 
                                                 
 
273Mardi’s coefficient can be interpreted as a z-score, which means that the current data set is 
approximately 7 standard deviations from the mean (as opposed to the traditional cutoff of 3 for outliers and 
extreme values).  Larger data sets, however, can actually inflate the magnitude of this value.  Taking the size of 
the current data file into consideration, the value of Mardia’s coefficient presents no reason to suspect major 
departures from normality.   For more information regarding multivariate normality, Mardia’s coefficient, and 
their relationship to sample size, see Barbara Manning Miller, “Issue Advocacy to Community Stakeholders: A 
Structural Equation Model of Potential Outcomes,” (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 
2006), 60; and Claudio Aqueveque and Davide Ravasi, “Corporate Reputation, Affect, and Trustworthiness:  
An Explanation for the Reputation-Performance Relationship,” Paper presented to the Linking Perceptions and 
Reality Session at the Reputation Institute’s 10th International Conference on Corporate Reputation, Image, 
Identity, and Competitiveness, New York, NY, May 2006, 15. 
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      Table 3.2.  Descriptives of Final Full Data File  
 
Variable      Meana          Std. Deviation    Minimum           Maximumb 
________________________________________________________________________ Advertiser Pressure 
 
14.01 5.77 4.00 28.00 
Public Relations 
Pressure 
 
14.86 4.25 3.00 21.00 
Political Pressure 
 
22.70 6.64 5.00 35.00 
Owner/Executive 
Pressure 
 
8.86 4.56 3.00 21.00 
Economic Pressure 
 
19.76 6.21 5.00 35.00 
Level of Ownership 
Concentration 
 
6.31 2.08 2.00 8.00 
Staff Size Pressure 
Measure 
 
12.42 1.84 2.00 14.00 
Direct Management 
Pressure 
 
12.01 4.53 3.00 21.00 
Indirect 
Management 
Pressure 
 
11.80 5.04 3.00 21.00 
Agenda Building 
Outcome Measure 
 
30.01 9.43 9.00 59.00 
Frame Building 
Outcome Measure 
 
27.06 8.38 8.00 50.00 
Agenda Cutting 
Outcome Measure 
 
28.68 10.19 10.00 56.00 
Market Size 
 
123.86 53.59 1 201 
 a All descriptives represent the actual values after data imputation and the removal of outliers and 
 potential problem cases. 
 b The minimum and maximum values do not represent the actual range values.  Instead, they represent 
 the possible values. 
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 Assumptions for Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation, the method used in the SEM 
analysis and the default estimation method in AMOS, were also assessed.  They are 
independence of observations, proper model specification, multivariate normality of the 
endogenous variables, and independence of the exogenous variables and disturbances.274  
The independence assumptions were met because of the sampling process, and the options 
selected in the Web-based survey system only permitted respondents to take the survey once.  
After participants completed the survey, their link came up as invalid if they attempted to 
regain access.  Since Mardia’s coefficient was slightly inflated at 6.077, it appeared that the 
data could possibly be considered non-normal.  Although the value was not particularly high 
given the larger sample size, it was decided to err on the side of caution by validating the 
results of the final model by using Bollen-Stine bootstrapping in AMOS 7.0.  The 
bootstrapped output verified the initial ML estimation results (See Appendix 10); therefore, 
output from the ML estimates is reported under the “Final Model Assessment” section in 
Chapter 4.   
 
Model Assessment:  Validation and Evaluation of the Measurement and Structural Models 
 
 For the first stage of the study, SEM was used to estimate and evaluate the 
hypothesized IOMC model.  SEM basically compares the sample data’s observed 
variance/covariance matrix with the variance/covariance matrix implied by the proposed 
model.  As suggested by Kline275 and Anderson and Gerbing,276 the current study followed 
the two-step modeling approach for examining structural regression models, the type of 
                                                 
 
274Kline, Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling, 2d ed., 115. 
 
275Ibid, 215-218. 
 
276James C. Anderson and David W. Gerbing, “Structural Equation Modeling in Practice:  A Review 
and Recommended Two-Step Approach,” Psychological Bulletin 103, no. 3 (May 1988): 411-423.   
 
103 
model proposed in this project.  This process involves first validating the measurement 
portion of the model.277  First, the proposed model is respecified as a CFA model with all 
possible associations represented among the latent constructs.  These relationships are 
depicted as covariances.   Next, this larger-scale CFA is assessed to determine whether it fits 
the sample data.  This is done by (a) examining the factor loadings to ensure that all paths 
(from the latent constructs to the measured indicators) are significant, (b) reviewing the 
covariance coefficients, and (c) assessing model fit using the same type of goodness-of-fit 
indices and measures that are used to evaluate the proposed model.  If the measurement 
model is found to be a poor fit to the data, it should be respecified using the same procedures 
implemented when modifying a full model (i.e., modification indices, theory, and previous 
research).  According to Kline, “If the fit of this CFA model is poor, then not only may the 
researcher’s hypotheses about the measurement be wrong, but also the fit of the original SR 
model to the data may be even worse if its structural model is overidentified.”278  Thus, 
recognizing discrepancies in the full structural model is easier if the researcher first identifies 
problems in the measurement portion of the model. Once an acceptable measurement model 
has been found, the full model is evaluated.279  Since the first part of this process is 
exploratory in nature, it was used only on the first subfile of 306, as described in the 
paragraphs that follow. 
 As mentioned earlier, the current study also took a model-development approach.  
The technique combines exploratory and confirmatory approaches by randomly splitting a 
                                                 
 
277Recall that the measurement model consists of the latent constructs and their respective indicators, 
basically CFAs, while the structural portion is made up of the paths among the latent constructs. 
 
 
278Kline, Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling, 2d ed., 216. 
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large data file in half, using one half for testing and modifying the proposed model and the 
other half for confirmation of changes.  For example, if the proposed model is found to fit 
poorly to the data, an alternative model can be proposed and tested based on the modification 
indices, theory, and previous research.   
 The data file of 612 cases was separated into two subfiles using a random number 
generator in SPSS 15.0.  All SEM analyses were conducted in AMOS 7.0.  The first subfile 
of 306 cases was used for validating the measurement model and for the initial testing and 
modifications of the IOMC model.  Although Shoemaker and Reese’s “onion” diagram has 
been an essential tool for scholars as it allowed for an easier classification system of where 
influences on content from, it is not a comprehensive model that can actually test the 
pressures and potential effects on the media and news content.  Since a systematic model of 
content influences and outcomes has neither been proposed nor tested prior to this project, 
the first subfile of this study was used for exploratory analyses, including model trimming 
and building based on modification indices obtained in the AMOS output.  The output 
suggestions, which are purely data-driven, were only implemented, however, when they were 
consistent with theory and previous research.  The second subfile was used to test the 
respecified model that materialized from the exploratory analyses with the first data file.  
Therefore, the latter was a confirmatory analysis.  Finally, the full data file of 612 cases was 
used to further substantiate the results of the two subfiles.   
Several indices were used to assess model fit.  The strength, direction, and 
significance of standardized and unstandardized coefficients were also examined.  First, the 
model chi-squared statistic was obtained.  The null hypothesis in SEM proposes that both the 
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observed and implied covariance matrices are from the same population.280  Therefore, 
according to Kline, the chi-squared statistic in this case “is actually a “badness-of-fit” index 
because the higher its value, the worse the model’s correspondence to the data.”281  
Therefore, the failure to reject the null hypothesis supports the researcher’s proposed model.  
As Kline has noted, “the logic is backward from the usual reject-support context for 
statistical tests” because here you want a nonsignificant value.282 Although there are some 
problems with the chi-squared statistic, such as its high sensitivity to sample size which often 
leads to the rejection of well-fitting models, it is still widely reported in SEM research.283 
 Other fit indices suggested by Hu and Bentler284 and others285 were also used to 
assess the proposed model.  The absolute fit indices that were implemented in the current 
study are the SRMR (standardized root mean squared residuals) and the RMSEA (root means 
square error of approximation) with p-close value; the relative fit indices are the TLI (Tucker 
Lewis index) and the CFI (comparative fit index).  
 There is no clear consensus on the cutoff points for most model fit indices.  Some 
researchers adhere to the traditional rules of thumb for reasonable model fit, which include a 
nonsignificant χ2 (which seldom occurs with larger sample sizes), SRMR < .10, and CFI and 
                                                 
 
280Miller, “Issue Advocacy to Community Stakeholders,” 61. 
 
 
281Kline, Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling, 2d ed., 135. 
 
 
282Ibid, 136. 
 
 
283For a deeper discussion of the chi-squared statistic, see Kline, Principles and Practice of Structural 
Equation Modeling, 2d ed., 136. 
 
284Li-tze Hu and Peter M. Bentler, “Cutoff Criteria for Fit Indexes in Covariance Structure Analysis: 
Conventional Criteria Versus New Alternatives,” Structural Equation Modeling 6, no. 1 (1999): 1-55. 
 
285For example, see Kline, Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling, 2d ed., 134; 
Roderick P. McDonald and Moon-Ho Ringo Ho, “Principles and Practice in Reporting Structural Equation 
Analyses,” Psychological Methods 7, no. 1 (March 2002): 72-73; Anne Boomsma, “Reporting Analyses of 
Covariance Structures,” Structural Equation Modeling 7, no. 3 (2000): 472-473. 
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TLI ≥ .90.286  Furthermore, researchers have noted that RMSEA values of ≤ .05 suggest close 
fit, while values of .05 to .08 indicate reasonable error of approximation; RMSEA values ≥ 
.10 signify poor model fit.287  P-close values associated with the RMSEA should be 
nonsignificant (>.05).288  Kline has also suggested reporting the 90% confidence intervals for 
the RMSEA with the lower bound ≤.05 and the upper bound ≤ .10.289  Hu and Bentler have 
suggested more stringent cutoff values for the aforementioned fit indices:  SRMR close to 08; 
CFI and TLI close to .95; and RMSEA close to .06 with a p-close value of ≥ .05.290 Although 
these stricter values have oftentimes been adopted as the “golden rules” of cutoff criteria, a 
fairly recent article has warned that Hu and Bentler’s suggestions have been misinterpreted 
and overgeneralized, as researchers and journal editors alike have disregarded the limitations 
noted in their 1999 study.291  As a result, both cutoff criteria were considered in the current 
study. 
                                                 
286For example, see Kline, Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling, 2d ed., 135-145; 
“Structural Equation Modeling,” Statistics Solutions, Inc., http://www.statisticssolutions.com/Structural-
Equation-ModelingSEM.htm (accessed March 1, 2007).    
 
287For example, see Michael W. Browne and Robert Cudeck, “Alternative Ways of Assessing Model 
Fit,” in Testing Structural Equation Models, eds. Kenneth A. Bollen and J. Scott Long (Newbury Park, CA: 
Sage, 1993), 136-162; Kline, Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling, 2d ed., 139. 
 
 
288
“Structural Equation Modeling,” Statistics Solutions, Inc., http://www.statisticssolutions.com/ 
Structural-Equation-ModelingSEM.htm (accessed March 1, 2007). 
 
289Kline, Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling, 2d ed., 139. 
 
290Hu and Bentler, “Cutoff Criteria for Fit Indexes in Covariance Structure Analysis: Conventional 
Criteria Versus New Alternatives,” 27. 
 
 
291Herbert W. Marsh, Kit-Tai Hau, and Zhonglin Wen, “In Search of Golden Rules: Comment on 
Hypothesis-Testing Approaches to Setting Cutoff Values for Fit Indexes and Dangers in Overgeneralizing Hu 
and Bentler’s (1999) Findings,” Structural Equation Modeling 11, no. 3 (2004): 320-341.  
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Construct and Parameter Assessments 
 
Correlation and multiple regression analyses were used to address the hypotheses and 
research questions proposed in this study.  This portion of the study was evaluated using 
SPSS 15.0.  The first hypothesis examined the relationship between public relations pressures 
and staff size pressures.  The second hypothesis correlated staff size pressures and 
influences/outcome on content decisions.  Both were assessed using bivariate (zero-order) 
correlation analyses.   Partial correlation coefficients were computed to evaluate the first 
research question, which examined the relationship strength of the first two hypotheses after 
controlling for market size.  Hypotheses 3 through 6 examined the zero-order correlations 
between market size with overall influence/outcome on content (H3); advertiser pressures 
(H4); political/governmental pressures (H5), and public relations pressures (H6).   
Multiple regression analyses were used to address research questions 2 through 5 and 
hypotheses 7 through 10.  Research question 2 evaluated how well each measure of 
extramedia influences predicts the overall content influences/outcomes.  Hypothesis 7 
proposed that the advertising pressures measure was the strongest predictor.  The third 
research question evaluated how well each organizational influence measure predicts the 
overall content influences/outcomes.  Hypothesis 8 posited that the owner/executive 
pressures measure was the strongest predictor.  To evaluate the “content influence/outcome” 
variable in multiple regression, it was first necessary to convert it from a latent, unobserved 
construct to an observed variable.  To do so, the factor score coefficients from running a CFA 
in AMOS were first obtained.  The product of each estimate and the value of its respective 
observed indicator were then summed to compute a new observed variable in SPSS.292  
                                                 
 
292For example, (coefficient 1 x agenda building) + (coefficient 2 x frame building) + (coefficient 3 x 
agenda cutting) = Observed Variable for Content Influence/Outcome.   
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Research question 4 assessed how well each measure of extramedia influences predicted 
reporters’ perceptions of instances of agenda cutting.  Hypothesis 9 predicted that advertiser 
pressure was the strongest predictor.  Finally, the fifth research question evaluated how well 
each organizational influence measure predicted instances of agenda cutting.  Hypothesis 10 
posited that pressures from owners and top-level executives best predicted reporters’ 
perceptions of agenda-cutting occurrences in the news decision process.   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
RESULTS 
 The main goal of this study was to examine television reporters’ perceptions of how 
internal and external forces attempt to influence news content and coverage decisions, to what 
effect they are successful at doing so, and to what effect on content. To offer a more 
comprehensive picture of this process, this study was segmented into two distinct phases.   
 The first stage of this research evaluated a proposed model of media influences and 
outcomes using SEM to assess the forces from a higher-level perspective by examining the 
overall process (See Figure 2.3).  Since this study took a model-development approach, the data 
file of 612 cases was randomly divided into two subfiles.  The first subfile was used for (a) 
validating the measurement model, (b) exploring the model, and (c) model trimming and model 
building.  Thus, the first subfile (n=306) was used for exploratory purposes.  The second subfile 
(n=306) was used to validate the adjustments that manifested from exploration of the first file.  
Finally, the full data file was used to substantiate the modifications and model fit results of the 
two subfiles.  Therefore, the second subfile and the full data file were used for confirmatory 
analyses.   
 The second stage of the study consisted of evaluating specific relationships that were not 
directly ascertainable through the model evaluation in stage one.  The hypotheses and research 
questions investigating these relationships were examined through correlation and multiple 
regression analyses using the full data file (n=612).  Additional data screening measures were 
also employed prior to the second-stage analyses to comply with the more stringent assumptions 
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associated with multiple regression.293  The results from each stage are discussed in the sections 
that follow. 
Stage One:  Model Assessment 
 
Validating and Exploring the Measurement Model 
 The measurement model was assessed using data from subfile 1 (n=306), the 
exploratory file.  The initial analysis indicated that the four-factor CFA model was a fairly 
poor fit to the exploratory data file based on the values of many of the selected indices [χ2 
(48) = 230.830, p < .001; CFI = .91; TLI = .87; SRMR = .0794; RMSEA = .11, p-close < 
.001, with the 90% confidence interval .098 to .126].   
 The standardized solution (shown in Figure 4.1) identified a few problems.294  First, 
the loading of the Level of Concentration Index onto the Organizational Influences factor was 
low (.08) and nonsignificant (p = .224).  Since this particular index was not tested or 
suggested in previous research and the correlation residuals of this indicator with those of 
other factors were not substantial, it was decided to omit the measure from the model.  
Second, it was found that, although significant (p < .01), the Staff Size Pressure Measure 
loading onto the Within-Media Influences factor was fairly low (.19).  Although it seemed 
facially valid to associate this indicator with influences within the media organization, 
previous research has considered measures associated with staff size as organizational-level 
                                                 
 
293The assumptions for multiple regression include multivariate normal distribution, linearity, and 
normally distributed residuals, among others. 
 
 
294The Market Size variable is not depicted in the measurement model because it is an observed 
variable that stands alone.  That is, it does not measure an unobserved variable; thus, it is not a part of a CFA, 
which is the measurement portion of the model. 
 
111 
constraints.295  Therefore, instead of associating the Staff Size Pressure Measure with Within-
Media Influences, as originally proposed, it was posited that it would be more strongly 
associated with Organizational Influences, as indicated in previous research.   
  
                                                 
 
295For example, see Shoemaker and Reese, Mediating the Message 2d ed., 139-173; Frederick Fico and 
William Cote, “Partisan and Structural Balance of Election Stories on the 1998 Governor’s Race in Michigan,” 
Mass Communication & Society 5, no. 2 (spring 2002): 165-182. 
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Figure 4.1.  Initial Measurement Model with Standardized Coefficients 
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 In addition to the issues that surfaced with the aforementioned indicators, the 
modification indices (MIs) also suggested some notable changes in the measurement model 
to improve fit.  Again, only those changes that were facially valid and made sense based on 
theory and previous research were implemented.  Three suggested changes were particularly 
noteworthy, and each involved the correlation of error terms.  The recommended changes 
were correlated errors between (1) the Staff Size Pressure Measure and Economic Pressure; 
(2) Political Pressure and PR Pressure; (3) and the Level of Agenda Building and the Level 
of Agenda Cutting measures.  First, the correlation between the Staff Size Pressure Measure 
and Economic Pressure errors was likely due to a measurement artifact, as both were 
measured on a Strongly Disagree/Strongly Agree scale; all other indicators were measured on 
an Almost Never/Very Often scale.   
 Second, the correlated error terms of the Political and PR Pressure measures, both of 
which are indicators of Extramedia Influences, are logical because both are forms of 
information subsidies.  That is, both sources provide free information (e.g., press releases, 
BNRs, VNRs, and press conferences) to the media.  The third indicator of the factor, 
however, Advertiser Pressures, does not.  Instead, pressures from advertisers are financially 
related.  Thus, the relationship between pressures from political/governmental officials and 
public relations practitioners is evident, as both provide information to the media free of 
charge without financial incentives/payments, as with advertisers.  
 Finally, the MIs also suggested that the measurement errors between the Agenda 
Building and Agenda Cutting measures were strongly related.  This recommendation is 
facially valid and is likely the result of opposite question wording in the survey.  For 
example, the first indicator, Agenda Building, was measured by asking questions about 
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covering or emphasizing particular stories/topics; that is, putting an item on the news agenda.  
The Agenda-Cutting measure, however, assessed just the opposite by asking questions about 
keeping stories/topics out of the news or off the news agenda.  Therefore, a negative 
correlation between the items makes sense because both used the same type of questions but 
assessed opposing outcomes (i.e., cover vs. not cover).   
 Based upon the results and the suggested modifications from the initial run, the 
measurement model was re-specified so that (1) the Level of Concentration measure was 
omitted; (2) the Staff Size Pressure Measure indicator was moved from the Within-Media 
Influences factor to the Organizational Influences factor; and the error terms between (3) the 
Staff Size Pressure Measure and Economic Pressure, (4) Political and PR Pressure, and (5) 
the Level of Agenda Building and the Level of Agenda Cutting measurement errors were 
correlated.   
 The re-specified measurement model in Figure 4.2 showed major improvements over 
the initial model [χ2 (35) = 107.199, p < .001; CFI = .96; TLI = .94; SRMR = .0539; RMSEA 
= .08, p-close = .002, with the 90% confidence interval .065 to .100].  In addition to the 
progress in model fit, the Staff Size Pressure Measure loaded slightly higher on the 
Organizational Influences factor (.22) than it did on the Within-Media Influences factor (.19), 
and it remained significant (p < .001). All other loadings and covariances within the 
measurement model were also significant.   Because changes were made with regard to the 
exclusion and placement of the observed measures in the measurement portion of the model 
(i.e., the Level of Concentration index was omitted and the Staff Size Pressure Measure was 
moved), the reliability coefficients for the measured variables and their respective constructs 
 115 
 
 
 
were reassessed and are reported in Table 4.1.296  Given the adequate fit of the measurement 
model, it was appropriate to proceed to the second stage of the two-step modeling process—
evaluation of the full structural model. 
 
                                                 
 
296A summary table of the alpha was necessary since one of the indicators, the Staff Size Pressure 
Measure, changed location as a result of the modifications in the measurement model.  Although the reliability 
coefficients for the measured indicators did not change, the reliabilities for the latent constructs represent the 
final changes for this measurement portion and inform the reader of the strength of the overall measures of the 
constructs. 
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Figure 4.2.  Modified Measurement Model with Standardized Coefficients 
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          Table 4.1.  Cronbach’s Alpha Reliabilities of Modified Model Scales 
Variable/Construct  
 
Scale Reliability  
(Cronbach’s α) 
Extramedia Influences .86 
     Advertising Pressure  .87 
     Public Relations Pressure  .81 
     Political/Governmental Pressure  .82 
  
Organizational Influences .84 
     Staff Size Pressure Measure .68 
     Economic Pressure .78 
     Owner/Executive Pressure .94 
  
Within-Media Org. Influence                    .85 
     Direct Management Pressure  .72 
     Indirect Management Pressure  .83 
  
Market Size (reverse-coded DMA rank) Info. obtained from sampling  
(no scale) 
 
 
Content Influence/Outcome .93 
     Level Agenda Building .80 
     Level Frame Building .80 
     Level Agenda Cutting .84 
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Figure 4.3.  Modified Hypothesized Model with Changes Implemented from the Measurement Model 
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Initial Model Testing:  Evaluating the Modified Hypothesized Model 
 The hypothesized model was modified by implementing the suggested changes that 
surfaced in the measurement portion of the two-step modeling approach.  This modified 
hypothesized model is shown in Figure 4.3.297  As with the measurement model, the revised 
hypothesized model was examined using the first subfile (n = 306), the exploratory data.  
Results indicated that the model’s fit to the data was fair, but there was some room for 
improvement [χ2 (48) = 180.436, p < .001; CFI = .93; TLI = .90; SRMR = .0635; RMSEA = 
.096, p-close < .001, with the 90% confidence interval .082 to .112]. 
 
Exploration and Modification 
 
 Upon examination of the overall model’s output, it was clear that a few areas could be 
modified to improve model fit and explanation of the main dependent variable, content 
influence/outcome.  Two observations, in particular, stood out from the others in the output:  
the relationship between Extramedia Influences and Within-Media Influences and the 
location of Market Size within the model.  All paths within the structural portion of the 
model were significant except for those between (1) Extramedia Influences and Within-
Media Influences and (2) Market Size and Content Influence/Outcome.  First, forces from 
outside the media (e.g., advertisers, public relations professionals, and political/governmental 
officials) do not appear to have a significant amount of direct influence over newsroom 
managers within media organizations, at least within the scope of the current study.  Instead, 
it appears that Extramedia Influences does eventually affect influences within the media, but 
                                                 
 
297Notice that the Market Size variable is now included for evaluating the model.  Again, it was not 
included in the first stage of the two-step modeling process, evaluation of the measurement model, because that 
stage is reserved for examining the measurement portion of the model; that is, the CFAs (unobserved constructs 
with their respective indicators).   
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this relationship is first mediated by influences at the Organizational level.  As noted 
throughout the study, all references to influences at each level are based on reporters’ 
perceptions. 
 The second notable observation that emerged from the analysis involved the effect of 
Market Size on perceptions of influences on media content.  As just mentioned, the path from 
Market Size to Content Influence/Outcome was nonsignificant, suggesting that the size of the 
market apparently does not have a direct effect on reporters’ perceptions of influences on 
media content—at least with this particular population.  One option was to remove the 
Market Size variable from the model altogether; however, it did not seem likely that the size 
of the market would not have some sort of effect on reporters’ perceptions of content 
influences.   Instead of removing the variable from the model, an alternative hypothesis was 
posed suggesting that Market Size would first have a direct effect on sources of influence 
outside the media (Extramedia Influences).  That is, instead of Market Size having a direct 
influence on the dependent variable, the new hypothesis posited that it would directly affect 
reports of Extramedia Influences, thus having an indirect effect on Content 
Influence/Outcome.  Specifically, it was expected that reporters working in larger markets 
would report overall fewer instances of attempted influences from extramedia sources.  That 
is, a negative relationship between Market Size and Extramedia Influences was proposed.298   
 Two additional changes seemed logical as a result of the observations just mentioned, 
along with those made in the measurement-model portion of the two-step modeling 
approach.  The first change involved the relationship between Extramedia and Organizational 
                                                 
 
298Recall that Market Size is measured by Designated Market Areas (DMAs).  With DMAs, the smaller 
the number the larger the media market (e.g., the 1-25 markets are the largest). For the current study, however, 
DMAs were reverse-coded so the larger numbers would correspond with the larger media markets, and vice 
versa.  This approach was taken to avoid confusion for both the researcher and the reader. 
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Influences.  In the hypothesized model (See Figure 4.3), it was proposed that the influences 
at the extramedia and organizational levels (both independent variables before changes) 
would covary.  In other words, no direct effects between the two variables were proposed.  
After moving the Market Size variable, however, this relationship was reconsidered—
especially given that Extramedia Influences was no longer an exogenous variable. Thus, 
given the posited direct relationship between Market Size and Extramedia Influences, it made 
more sense to expect that those sources of Extramedia Influences would also have a direct 
effect on Organizational Influences.  Rather than simply predicting that the variables changed 
together (covaried), a stronger hypothesis predicting a direct relationship was proposed.     
 A second change was posited partially as a result of modifications made in the 
measurement portion of the model:  the relationship between Organizational Influences and 
Content Influence/Outcome.  Originally, influences at the organizational level were only 
proposed to affect reporters’ perceptions of influences on content indirectly; that is, after 
“filtering through” influences within the media organization (Within-Media Influences). This 
notion, however, was reconsidered, especially given that the Staff Size Pressure measure was 
more closely associated with the Organizational Influences factor.  After reconsideration of 
influences at the organizational level, it seemed logical that each of the measures (economic 
pressures, pressures from owners and top-level executives, and staff size pressures) could 
also directly affect reporters’ perceptions of content influences.  Specifically, it was proposed 
that organizational influences could not only indirectly affect content by first influencing 
newsroom managers within the media organization, but they could also affect reporters’ 
perceptions of influences on content directly.  Although it was not specifically suggested in 
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the analysis output, the modification makes sound theoretical sense.299  For example, 
reporters may feel that station workers could easily avoid covering a particular story because 
of an inadequate staff size (staff size pressure), or because it may offend a company with 
economic clout over their station (economic pressure) or the general manager 
(owner/executive pressure).  In other words, they do not necessarily have to wait for their 
news directors to tell them to do so.  Instead, they may feel the pressure themselves and act 
accordingly.   
 Based on empirical modifications suggested from the analysis output and on 
theoretical and face validity justifications, the model was re-specified so that (1)  the path 
from Extramedia Influences to Within-Media Influences was omitted; (2) Market Size was 
hypothesized to have a direct effect on Extramedia Influences, rather than Content 
Influence/Outcome; (3) the covariance from Extramedia Influences to Organizational 
Influences was changed to a direct path; and (4) Organizational Influences was hypothesized 
to have a direct effect on Content Influence/Outcome (not just Within-Media Influences).300   
 The revised model showed improvement over the initial run of modified hypothesized 
model and indicated a fairly reasonable fit to the data [χ2 (47) = 133.082, p < .001; CFI = .96; 
TLI = .94; SRMR = .0575; RMSEA = .077, p-close = .002, with the 90% confidence interval 
.062 to .093].  Although the chi-squared test statistic was significant [χ2 (47) = 133.082, p < 
.001], other fit indices suggested reasonable model fit [CFI = .96; TLI = .94; SRMR = 
                                                 
 
299For example, Shoemaker and Reese have long indicated that the influence process is not a linear 
one.  That is, influences do not have to move straight down the hierarchy (e.g., from ideological to extramedia 
to organizational to media routines to individual). Instead, gatekeepers at the different levels of the hierarchical 
model, the diagram on which the current model is partially based, have the ability to affect many different 
areas/levels simultaneously—not just those down the chain, so to speak. 
 
 
300Each change was made one at a time and the output was assessed before making subsequent 
changes.  
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.0575].  Furthermore, the RMSEA value was within range of reasonable error of 
approximation, based on the traditional rules of thumb [RMSEA = .077],301 even though its 
associated p-close statistic was significant (p-close =. 002).302  Moreover, all standardized 
regression weights were significant, and the revised model accounted for 92% of the variance 
in the dependent variable, Content Influence/Outcome, thus providing additional support for 
the strength and validity of the model.  Given that the interrelationships depicted in the model 
have not before been tested from the current, broader-range perspective, the model fit indices 
coupled with the total variance explained provide further validation that the model and the 
conceptualization of the variables and factors in this study represent a promising line of 
scholarship. The revised model with the results from this exploratory stage is shown in 
Figure 4.4. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
301For example, see Kline, Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling 2d ed., 139. 
 
 
302The significance here, however, is due to the lower bound of the 90% confidence interval falling 
above .05; the appropriate range is ≤.05 for the lower bound and ≤ .10 for the upper bound.  Values falling 
outside these ranges suggest poor approximate fit.  Since only one range is out of bounds, it sends a mixed 
message (Kline, Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling 2d ed., 139-140).   
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Figure 4.4.  Revised Model on Exploratory Subfile 1 with Standardized Coefficients (n = 306) 
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Final Model Assessment 
 Since the model was deemed to be an acceptable fit with the data in the exploratory 
subfile, it was re-evaluated using data from the remaining subfile (n=306) that was withheld 
for the confirmatory portion of the analysis.  Results indicated that the model was also a 
fairly reasonable representation of the withheld subfile, thus confirming the findings of the 
previous analysis [χ2 (47) = 159.357, p < .001; CFI = .94; TLI = .92; SRMR = .0679; 
RMSEA = .089, p-close < .001, with the 90% confidence interval .074 to .104].   
 To provide additional validation, the model was retested using the full sample of 612 
cases.  The results from this analysis further confirmed that the model was an acceptable 
representation of the data [χ2 (47) = 243.457, p < .001; CFI = .95; TLI = .93; SRMR = .0572; 
RMSEA = .083, p-close < .001, with the 90% confidence interval .073 to .093], based on 
many of the traditional rules of thumb for model fit.  All of the regression weights (paths in 
the model) for the full sample were significant, as shown in Table 4.2, and the model 
explained 90% of the variance in Content Influence/Outcome, the dependent variable.  The 
final confirmatory model with the results from the full data file (n=612) is shown in Figure 
4.5.  Table 4.3 illustrates the direct and indirect effects among each of the latent constructs in 
the model, and Appendix 9 shows the correlation matrix for the measured variables. 
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Figure 4.5.  Final Confirmatory Model on Full Sample with Standardized Coefficients (n = 612) 
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   Table 4.2.  Regression Weights for Validated Model on Full Data Set 
 
Path Unstd. 
Estimate (S.E.) 
Std.
 
Estimate  
p-value 
 
Market Size → Extramedia Infl. 
 
 
-.022 (.004) 
 
-.236 
 
*** 
Extramedia Infl. → Org. Infl. 
 
.471 (.059) .672 *** 
Org. Infl. → Within-Media Infl. 
 
.782 (.062) .679 *** 
Within-Media Infl. → Content Infl./Out. 
 
1.301 (.104) .587 *** 
Org. Infl. → Content Infl./Out. 
 
1.140 (.118) .447 *** 
Extramedia Infl. → Adv. Press. meas. 
 
1.000   .876  
Extramedia Infl. → PR Press. meas. 
 
.303 (.046) .361 *** 
Extramedia Infl. → Political Press. meas. 
 
.494 (.073) .376 *** 
Content Infl./Out. → Agenda Cutting meas. 
 
1.000 .887  
Content Infl./Out. → Frame Building meas. 
 
.851 (.026) .917 *** 
Content Infl./Out. → Agenda Building meas. 
 
.992 (.032) .951 *** 
Org. Infl. → Owner/Exec. Press. meas. 
 
1.000 .776  
Org. Infl. → Economic Press. meas. 
 
1.251 (.075) .714 *** 
Org. Infl. → Staff Press. meas. 
 
.097 (.023) .186 *** 
Within-Media Infl. → Dir. Mgmt Press. meas. 
 
.905 (.042) .815 *** 
Within-Media Infl. → Ind. Mgmt Press. meas. 
 
1.000 .809  
Covariance/Correlated Meas. Error    
e5 (Econ. Press.) ↔ e4 (Staff Size Press.) 2.248 (.369) .287 *** 
e2 (PR Press.) ↔ e3 (Political Press.) 11.379 (1.175) .467 *** 
e9 (Agenda Building) ↔ e11 (Agenda Cutting) -7.615 (1.119) -.556 *** 
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      Table 4.3.  Standardized Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects for Structural Paths 
 Note:  The table shows the direct, indirect, and total effects that the first variable in a row has on the other 
 variable in the same row.  The numbers in the table are interpreted as path coefficients.  Direct effects 
 represent how one variable directly affects another variable in the model.  For example, the direct effect of 
 Organizational Influences (ninth row) on Content Influence/Outcome is .447.  Organizational Influences 
 also has an indirect (mediating) effect on Content Influence/Outcome.  That is, it also first affects Within-
 Media Influences (See Figure 4.5) and then affects Content Influence/Outcome.  Thus, it has a mediating 
 effect of .399.  Indirect effects are estimated as the product of the direct effects that include them.  In this 
 case, Organizational Within-Media = .679 and Within-Media Content  Influence/Outcome = .587, so 
 .679 X .587 = .399.  The total effects column represents the sum of all direct and indirect effects of one 
 variable on another in each of the rows listed in the table.  Therefore, the total effect of Organizational 
 Influences on Content Influence/Outcome is .846.  The result indicates that Content Influence/Outcome is 
 expected to increase by .846 for each standard deviation change in  Organizational Influences via all direct 
 and indirect causal paths between these variables (.447 direct effect + .399 indirect effect = .846 total 
 effect). 
 
Structural Path Direct  
Effect  
Indirect  
Effect 
Total 
Effect 
 
Market Size → Extramedia Influences 
 
 
-.236 
 
.000 
 
-.236 
Market Size → Organizational Influences 
 
.000 -.159 -.159 
Market Size → Within-Media Influences 
 
.000 -.108 -.108 
Market Size → Content Influence/Outcome 
 
.000 -.134 -.134 
Extramedia Influences → Organizational Influences 
 
.672 .000 .672 
Extramedia Influences → Within-Media Influences 
 
.000 .456 .456 
Extramedia Influences → Content Influence/Outcome 
 
.000 .568 .568 
Organizational Influences → Within-Media Influences 
 
.679 .000 .679 
Organizational Influences → Content Influence/Outcome 
 
.447 .399 .846 
Within-Media Influences → Content Influence/Outcome 
 
.587 .000 .587 
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 As mentioned earlier, Mardia’s coefficient of multivariate kurtosis was slightly inflated 
(6.077), indicating that the data may be non-normal.303  Although this value was not 
particularly high, the Maximum Likelihood estimates just reported were compared with 
bootstrapped results as a precautionary measure.  Specifically, AMOS 7.0 was used to 
execute bootstrapping using 2,000 samples with replacement, and the estimates and standard 
errors were compared with those from the full data set (n=612).  Results indicated that there 
were no sizeable differences, which further substantiated the findings from the initial runs of 
the model (See Appendix 10.  Unstandardized Maximum Likelihood Estimates versus 
Bootstrapped Estimates using 2000 Samples with Replacement). Therefore, the Maximum 
Likelihood estimates have been reported. 
 
Summary of Model Testing 
 The findings presented from testing the model provide one account of how television 
reporters perceive external and internal forces as influencing media content and coverage 
decisions.   Although the size of the market in which the survey respondent worked did not 
have a direct effect on perceptions of content influences, as originally hypothesized, it did 
eventually affect reporters’ perceptions of these influences indirectly, as shown in Figure 4.5.  
In other words, market size’s influence on content was first mediated by all other constructs 
in the model (i.e., extramedia, organizational, and within-media influences).  Instead, market 
size only had a significant direct influence on extramedia influences, such as the amount of 
advertiser, political, and public relations pressures.  Specifically, as the size of the market 
increased, reporters’ perceptions of occurrences of extramedia pressures decreased.  Overall, 
                                                 
 
303Refer to the Missing Values and Data Screening section in Chapter 3.  See footnote 273 for an 
explanation of Mardia’s coefficient. 
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this finding suggests that smaller-market media professionals may perceive more instances of 
pressures from extramedia sources, while those in larger markets experience fewer.   
 Furthermore, extramedia influences had a positive, direct effect on organizational 
influences, suggesting that more reports of influences from outside the media coincided with 
increased pressures from organizational sources, such as owners and top-level executives.  
These same extramedia sources, however, did not appear to have a direct effect on those 
working within the media entity itself (Within-Media Influences).  Instead, pressures from 
these outside sources were first mediated through those at the organizational level, indicating 
an indirect influence on both those decision-makers working within the station and 
eventually on content and coverage decisions.   
 As illustrated by the validated model (See Figure 4.5), organizational influences 
affected reporters’ perceptions of influences on content both indirectly, as mediated through 
decision-makers working within the station itself, and directly.  Both relationships were 
positive, suggesting that more reports of pressure from these sources resulted in higher levels 
of influence on content and coverage decisions.  Taken as a whole, the model demonstrates 
how extramedia, organizational, and within-media influences and market size act together to 
affect media content and coverage decisions from an agenda- and frame-building and 
agenda-cutting perspective.   
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Stage Two:  Construct and Parameter Assessments— 
Testing the Hypotheses and Research Questions 
 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Reporters who believe that an inadequate or reduced staff size can hurt the 
quality of or have negative effects on news coverage will also report more instances of public 
relations pressures.  That is, the Staff Size Pressure Measure will be positively correlated 
with Public Relations Pressures.   
 
The first hypothesis examined the relationship between the public relations pressure 
and staff pressure scales.  As previously noted, the staff size pressure scale consisted of 
questions asking respondents about their perceptions of staff size effects on news coverage, 
not actual staff size at the station where they worked.  To test this relationship, a bivariate 
correlation analysis was used to evaluate the two scales.  Results suggest that those who 
believe that an inadequate or reduced staff size has negative effects on coverage and/or 
quality also reported more instances of pressures from public relations practitioners, thus 
indicating a positive relationship [r(610) = .159, p < .001].   Therefore, hypothesis 1 was 
supported.  It is important, however, to note the small effect size, which indicates that 3% of 
the variance in reporters’ perceptions of public relations pressures is accounted for by its 
linear relationship with staff size pressures.  This observation could indicate that the 
significant relationship between the two variables may possibly be attributed to the large 
sample size.  As a result, the effect size of this significant relationship should be considered 
when generalizing this finding and applying it to future studies.  
 
Hypothesis 2:  Reporters who believe that an inadequate or reduced staff size can hurt the 
quality of or have negative effects on news coverage will also report more instances of 
influences on media content and coverage decisions.  That is, the Staff Size Pressure 
Measure will be positively correlated with Overall Influences/Outcome on News Content  
and Coverage Decisions. 
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Hypothesis 2 evaluated relationship between staff size pressures and overall 
influences on content.304 To test this relationship, a bivariate correlation analysis was 
conducted to compute a correlation coefficient between the two scales.  The results indicate a 
positive relationship between the staff size pressure scale and overall influence/effect on 
content, thus supporting hypothesis 2 [r(610) = .153, p < .001].   Specifically, findings suggest 
that reporters who perceive an inadequate or reduced staff size as hurting the quality of 
and/or negatively affecting coverage also report more overall instances of influences on 
television media content.  As with the previous hypothesis, the effect size for the relationship 
between staff size pressures and Overall Influences on Content was small and should be 
noted when applying the current findings. 
 
Research Question 1:  Does adding market size as a control variable affect the strength of 
the relationships in the first two hypotheses (i.e., (H1) Staff Size Pressure and PR Pressure; 
and (H2) Staff Size Pressure and Overall Influence/Outcome on Content)? 
 
 To answer the first research question, partial correlation analyses were conducted to 
examine the relationships between the Staff Size Pressure measure with both PR Pressure 
and Influence/Outcome on Content and news coverage decisions, partialling out the effects 
of Market Size.  In other words, this type of analysis examines the linear relationship 
between the variables while holding the size of the respondents’ media markets constant.  
Since a majority of the reporters work in the larger, 1-25 DMAs, controlling for market size 
also helps to level the playing field in terms of responses and their meaning with regard to 
relationships between the variables. 
                                                 
 
304Refer to footnote 292 for information on changing this originally latent variable into an observed 
variable for the purpose of the analyses in this section. 
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 After the analyses, the partial correlation coefficients were compared with the 
bivariate (zero-order) coefficients to determine whether market size influenced the strength 
of the aforementioned relationships.  If the size of the respondents’ media market was the 
sole determinant of variables’ relationships, the partial correlations would be equal to zero.305  
Both correlations remained significant, and the coefficient for hypothesis 2 (Staff Size 
Pressure & Content Influence/Outcome) increased in magnitude; the effect size for the first 
hypothesis, however, was unchanged (see Table 4.4).  The results suggest that market size 
has no influence on the relationship between reporter’s perceptions of staff size pressures and 
pressures from public relations professionals.  It does, however, slightly intensify the 
relationship between reporters’ perceptions of staff size pressures and their perceptions of 
influences on news content and coverage decisions.  Still, there are significant relationships 
beyond what might be accounted for by market size, as suggested by the coefficients 
presented in Table 4.4.   
 
 Table 4.4.  Bivariate and Partial Correlation Comparisons of Staff Size  
        Pressure, PR Pressure, and Influence/Outcome on Content 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 **p < .001 
 
 
                                                 
 
305Samuel B. Green and Neil J. Salkind, Using SPSS for Windows and Macintosh: Analyzing and 
Understanding Data, 4th ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson Education, Inc., 2005), 263, 271. 
 Bivariate  Partial Change 
(H1) Staff Size 
Pressure & PR Pressure  
 
 
.159** 
 
.159** 
 
----- 
(H2) Staff Size 
Pressure & Content 
Influence/Outcome  
 
 
 
.153** 
 
 
.164** 
 
 
+ .011 
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Hypotheses 3 through 6:  Market size will have (H3) a negative relationship with the overall 
influences/effects on content decisions; (H4) a negative relationship with advertiser 
pressures; (H5) a positive relationship with pressures from politicians and government 
officials; and (H6) a negative relationship with public relations pressures. 
 
To evaluate hypotheses 3 through 6, bivariate correlation analyses were conducted to 
examine the relationships between the size of the markets in which the responding reporters 
worked and reporters’ perceptions of (a) overall influences/effects on content; (b) pressures 
from advertisers; (c) political/government official pressures; and (d) pressures from public 
relations practitioners.  Hypotheses 3 through 5 were supported, as reporters working in 
smaller markets described (H3) more overall influences on media content [r(610) = -.122, p = 
.001]; (H4) more instances of advertiser pressure [r(610) = -.233, p < .001]; and (H5) fewer 
instances of political pressure [r(610) = .100, p < .010].  In the overall sense, these results 
suggest that smaller-market stations may be more susceptible to Influences on Media Content 
and Coverage Decisions than those in larger media markets. Furthermore, the stronger 
negative relationship between Market Size and advertiser pressures indicates that smaller-
market stations may be more susceptible to pressures from advertisers than their larger-
market brethren, based on reporters’ perceptions.  Conversely, as expected, television 
stations in larger markets are more likely to experience pressures from politicians and/or 
government officials than those in smaller market areas.  Although the predictions for the 
third through fifth hypotheses were supported, hypothesis 6, which posited a negative 
relationship between public relations pressures and market size, was not [r(610) = .002, p = 
.478].  In fact, no significant relationship was found, suggesting that market size is not 
related to reporters’ perceptions of instances of influences from public relations practitioners.  
In other words, reporters working for smaller markets do not necessarily experience more 
pressure from PR professionals.   
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Once again it is important to point out the small effect sizes, which might indicate 
that the significant relationships found among the variables may be attributed to the larger 
sample size.  The fact that the sample was more heavily representative of reporters from 
larger media markets may also explain the smaller coefficients.  This notion is further 
discussed in Chapter 5.     
 
Research Question 2:  After taking into account the other two components, how well does 
each measure of extramedia influences predict influences on news content and coverage 
decisions?  That is, what is the unique contribution of each extramedia influence measure on 
the content outcomes after partialing out the contributions of the other two measures? 
 
Hypothesis 7:  The advertiser pressures measure is the strongest extramedia predictor of 
outcomes/influences on news content and coverage decisions. 
 
To answer the second research question and hypothesis 7, a multiple regression 
analysis was used to examine the influence of each extramedia measure (advertiser, public 
relations, and political/government official pressures) on the overall influence/outcome on 
media content after controlling for the contributions of the other two variables.  The analysis 
was first set up to run the direct solution in which all three independent variables were 
entered simultaneously.  The correlation matrix representing the interrelationships among the 
variables is presented in Table 4.5.  As indicated, all three extramedia measures are 
significantly related to the dependent variable, content influence/outcome.  Furthermore, all 
three independent variables are significantly related to each other, which was be expected 
given that they all measure the same underlying construct (Extramedia Influences).306   
 
                                                 
 
306The stronger correlation between Public Relations Pressures and Political Pressures is likely due to 
the fact that they are both forms of information subsidies, which was discussed in stage one of the study during 
the SEM assessment.  The fact that they are more highly correlated with each other than with the dependent 
variable, however, could be a source of error in explaining the total variance explained.  Therefore, this 
relationship is considered when interpreting the final results of the analysis. 
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Table 4.5.  Correlation Matrix (Full Regression Model) for Extramedia Influence Measures 
       and Overall Influence/Outcome on Media Content 
 Content 
Infl./Outcome 
Advertiser 
Pressure 
PR 
Pressure 
Political/Gov’t 
Official Pressure 
Content 
Infl./Outcome 
 
 
1.00 
 
.425** 
 
.303** 
 
.270** 
Advertiser 
Pressure 
 
  
1.00 
 
.303** 
 
.337** 
PR  
Pressure 
 
   
1.00 
 
.539** 
Political/Gov’t 
Official Pressure 
    
1.00 
n = 612; ** p < .001 
 
 Results of the full regression model indicate that a linear combination of the three 
independent variables, the extramedia measures, explains 22% (21% adjusted) of the 
variance in overall influences on content, the dependent variable [F (3,608) = 56.025, p < 
.001).  More specifically, this direct solution indicates that a combination of the three 
measures significantly predicts reporters’ perceptions of influences on media content.  The 
results of the full regression model are shown in Table 4.6.  Findings indicate that both the 
Advertiser and PR Pressures measures make significant individual contributions to 
explaining the variance in reporters’ perceptions of influences on media content [Advertiser t 
= 9.176, p < .001; PR t = 3.744, p < .001].  Political/Government Officials Pressure, 
however, does not [t = 1.462, p = .144], even though the full regression model was 
significant.    
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       Table 4.6. Full Regression Model for Three Extramedia Measures Predicting Overall 
   Content Influence/Outcome 
 B SE B β t-statistic p-level 
Constant 
 
13.683  
 
1.238 ----- ----- ----- 
Advertiser Pressure 
 
.503 .055 .354 9.176 < .001 
PR Pressure .312 
 
.083 .162 3.744 < .001 
Political/Gov’t 
Official Pressure 
.079 .054 .064 1.462 .144 
 n = 612; B = Unstandardized (Raw) Coefficient; SE B = Standard Errors of the  
 Unstandardized (Raw) Coefficients; β = Standardized Beta Weight 
  
 
 A commonality analysis was conducted to describe the interrelationships among the 
variables in more detail.  Specifically, this analysis explains how the independent variables 
combine to explain the dependent variable, and it also reveals which is the strongest 
predictor.  The results of this analysis are shown in Table 4.7.  In support of hypothesis 7,  
the Advertiser Pressures measure is the strongest predictor in the overall regression model, as 
it explains 18% of the variance in reporters’ perceptions of influences on media content with 
a unique contribution of nearly 11%  [t = 11.582, p < .001].307  Public Relations Pressures 
makes the second largest contribution in explaining the dependent variable, Content 
Influence/Outcome, with 9.2% and a unique contribution of nearly 2% [t = 7.863, p < .001].  
Finally, the Political/Government Official Pressures measure explains 7.3% of variation in 
the dependent variable, making a unique contribution of only .3% [t = 6.934, p < .001].   
  
                                                 
 
307The t-statistics in this section describing the results of the commonality analysis are from the 
regression analyses in which the independent variables were entered in different orders.  The tables with this 
information are not shown in order to maintain clarity and to preserve space for more essential elements of the 
analyses. 
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 Table 4.7.  Commonality Analysis for Extramedia Influences/Content Outcome  
             Model with Three Predictors 
 Advertiser 
(Adv) 
PR Political/Gov’t 
(Political) 
Unique to Adv .109 
 
----- ----- 
Unique to PR 
 
----- .018 ----- 
Unique to Political 
 
----- ----- .003 
Common to Adv & PR 
 
.017 .017 ----- 
Common to Adv & 
Political 
 
.013 
 
----- .013 
Common to PR & 
Political 
 
----- .016 .016 
Common to All .041 .041 .041 
 
Totals .180 .092 .073 
  Note:  Figures represent R2 values. 
 
 One of the goals of multiple regression is to explain the largest amount of variance 
with the fewest number of variables.  Although it may seem that the most parsimonious 
model for explaining variation in reporters’ perceptions of influences on content may include 
only pressure from advertisers (Advertiser Pressures) and public relations practitioners (PR 
Pressures), the third extramedia measure, Political/Government Official Pressures, 
contributes to this explanation in combination with these other variables.  That is, it may not 
be essential for inclusion in the overall regression model for the sake of parsimony; however, 
it is relevant because it contributes in conjunction with the other extramedia measures.   
 The full regression model with all three extramedia influence measures explains 22% 
of the variation in reporters’ perceptions of influences on content, the dependent variable.  
Results from the multiple regression analysis suggest that as advertisers, public relations 
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professionals, and politicians and governmental officials exert more pressure on the media, 
the more influence they have on media content and coverage decisions, as based on 
reporters’ perceptions.  This relationship is especially evident with advertisers, as this source 
of influence is the strongest predictor in the model.  The regression equation is as follows: 
Content Influence/Outcome = .503*Adv + .312*PR + .079*Political/Gov’t Official + 
13.683. 
 
Research Question 3:  After taking into account the other two components, how well does 
each measure of organizational influences (staff size pressure measure, economic pressure, 
and owner/executive pressure) predict influences on news content and coverage decisions?  
That is, what is the unique contribution of each organizational influence measure on the 
content outcomes after partialing out the contributions of the other two measures? 
 
Hypothesis 8:  The owner/executive pressures measure is the strongest organizational 
predictor of outcomes/influences on news content and coverage decisions. 
 
Multiple regression was used to analyze how media content is influenced by each 
measure of organizational influence considered in the study (staff, economic, and 
owner/executive pressures) after controlling for the contributions of the other two scales. The 
regression analysis running the direct solution was first executed.  As indicated in the 
correlation matrix in Table 4.8, all three organizational measures are significantly related to 
the dependent variable, Content Influence/Outcome.  As expected, all three predictor 
variables are also significantly related to each other, as they measure the same underlying 
construct (organizational influences).   
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Table 4.8.  Correlation Matrix (Full Regression Model) for Organizational Influence  
       Measures and Overall Influence/Outcome on Media Content 
n = 612; ** p < .001 
 
 The full regression model indicates that a linear combination of the three 
organizational measures, explains 47.2% (47% adjusted) of the variation in Content 
Influence/Outcome, the dependent variable [F (3,608) = 181.504, p < .001).  Specifically, 
this direct solution indicates that a combination of the three measures significantly predicts 
reporters’ perceptions of influences on media content.  The results of the full regression 
model are shown in Table 4.9.  Findings indicate that both the Economic and 
Owner/Executive Pressure measures make significant unique contributions to explaining the 
variance in reporters’ perceptions of influences on media content [Economic t = 10.594, p < 
.001; Owner/Exec t = 11.775, p < .001]; however, the Staff Size Pressure measure does not  
[t = -1.162, p = .246].308   
                                                 
 
308This latter measure’s standardized beta weight is negative while the correlation coefficient is 
positive, indicating that it may be a suppressor variable.  See footnote 315 for information concerning 
suppression. 
 
 Content 
Infl./Outcome 
Staff  
Pressure 
Economic 
Pressure 
Owner/Exec 
Pressure 
Content 
Infl./Outcome 
 
 
1.00 
 
.153** 
 
.592** 
 
.609** 
Staff  
Pressure 
 
  
1.00 
 
.331** 
 
.151** 
Economic  
Pressure 
 
   
1.00 
 
.531** 
Owner/Exec 
Pressure 
    
1.00 
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       Table 4.9. Full Regression Model for Three Organizational Measures Predicting     
  Overall Content Influence/Outcome 
 B SE B β t-statistic p-level 
Constant 
 
12.566 
 
1.674 ----- ----- ----- 
Staff Size Pressure 
 
-.162 .140 -.036 -1.162 .246 
Economic Pressure .510 
 
.048 .386 10.594 < .001 
Owner/Exec 
Pressure 
.736 .063 .410 11.775 < .001 
 n = 612; B = Unstandardized (Raw) Coefficient; SE B = Standard Errors of the  
 Unstandardized (Raw) Coefficients; β = Standardized Beta Weight 
 
 A commonality analysis was conducted to more fully describe the interrelationships 
among the variables.  As illustrated in Table 4.10, Owner/Executive Pressure explains 37% 
of the variance in reporters’ perceptions of influences on media content with a unique 
contribution of nearly 12%  [t = 18.978, p < .001],309 making it the strongest predictor in the 
overall regression model.  Therefore, hypothesis 8, which predicted that pressure from 
owners and top-level executives was the dominant organizational influence, was accepted.  
Economic Pressure  makes the second largest contribution in explaining the dependent 
variable, Content Influence/Outcome, with 35% and a unique contribution of nearly 10% [t = 
18.129, p < .001].  Finally, the Staff Size Pressure measure explained 2.3% of variation in the 
dependent variable while making virtually no individual contribution with .1% [t = 3.831, p < 
.001].   
                                                 
 
309The t-statistics in this section describing the results of the commonality analysis are from the 
regression analyses in which the independent variables were entered in different orders.  The tables with this 
information are not shown in order to maintain clarity and to preserve space for more essential elements of the 
analyses. 
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 Table 4.10.  Commonality Analysis for Organizational Influences/Content Outcome 
         Model with Three Predictors 
 Staff  
 
Economic 
(Econ) 
Owner/Executive 
(Owner/Exec) 
Unique to Staff .001 
 
----- ----- 
Unique to Econ 
 
----- .097 ----- 
Unique to Owner/Exec 
 
----- ----- .120 
Common to Staff & 
Econ 
 
.003 .003 ----- 
Common to Staff & 
Owner/Exec 
 
.001 ----- .001 
Common to Econ & 
Owner/Exec 
 
----- .232 .232 
Common to All .018 
 
.018 .018 
Totals .023 .350 .371 
  Note:  Figures represent R2 values. 
 
 Given the fact that the Staff Size Pressure measure makes virtually no unique or joint 
contribution in explaining the dependent variable, it appears that the most parsimonious 
model for predicting influences on media content includes only two independent variables—
Economic and Owner/Executive Pressures.  Therefore, a regression analysis was run on this 
two-variable model.  By excluding the Staff Size Pressure measure, the total variance 
explained stays at 47%, but the F statistic shows a large jump [F (2,609) = 271.425,  
p < .001].  Furthermore, all variables included in the new two-predictor regression model 
make significant contributions, as shown in Table 4.11. 
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       Table 4.11.  Full Regression Model for Two Organizational Measures Predicting     
     Overall Content Influence/Outcome 
 B SE B β t-statistic p-level 
Constant 
 
10.864 
 
.810 ----- ----- ----- 
Economic Pressure .494 
 
.046 .373 10.734 < .001 
Owner/Exec 
Pressure 
.739 .063 .411 11.813 < .001 
 n = 612; B = Unstandardized (Raw) Coefficient; SE B = Standard Errors of the  
 Unstandardized (Raw) Coefficients; β = Standardized Beta Weight 
 
 Another commonality analysis was conducted to more fully describe the 
interrelationships among the variables in the new regression model.  The results presented in 
Table 4.12 indicate that the contributions made by Owner/Executive and Economic Pressure 
in explaining the variation in the dependent variable are partially achieved in combination 
with each other, as is evidenced by the 25% contribution that is “common to both.” Still, 
each of these organizational measures makes a significant unique contribution to explaining 
variation in reporters’ perceptions of influences on media content [Owner/Exec t = 18.978,  
p < .001; Econ t = 18.129, p < .001].   
 
 Table 4.12.  Commonality Analysis for Organizational  
          Influences/Content Outcome Model with Two Predictors 
 Economic 
(Econ) 
Owner/Executive 
(Owner/Exec) 
Unique to Econ 
 
.100 ----- 
Unique to Owner/Exec 
 
----- .121 
Common to both 
 
.250 .250 
Totals .350 .371 
  Note:  Figures represent R2 values. 
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 The revised regression model with only two organizational influence measures 
influence explains 47% of the variation in reporters’ perceptions of influences on content, the 
dependent variable.  Overall findings suggest that as reporters perceive more instances of 
bottom-line, economic pressures, as well as pressures coming from owners and top-level 
executives, the more they perceive these sources as having an influence on content and 
coverage decisions.  This relationship is especially apparent with owners/top-level 
executives, as this source of influence is the strongest predictor in the model.  Results from 
the multiple regression analysis suggest that although staff pressures (Staff Size Pressure) is 
also a predictor of the reporters’ perceptions of content influences, the variation that it 
explains is almost wholly achieved in combination with the other two variables that were 
included in the final model.   Therefore, staff pressures should not necessarily be discounted 
as a predictor of content influences, but instead it is unnecessary to include in the most 
parsimonious model, at least for the scope of the current study.  The final regression equation 
is as follows: Content Influence/Outcome = .494*Econ + .739*Owner/Exec + 10.864. 
 
Research Question 4:  How well does each measure of extramedia influences predict the 
level of agenda cutting after taking into account the other two components? That is, what is 
the unique contribution of each measure on the agenda cutting content outcome after 
partialing out the contributions of the other two extramedia measures? 
 
Hypothesis 9:  The advertiser pressures measure is the strongest extramedia predictor of 
instances of agenda cutting. 
 
 To answer the fourth research question and hypothesis 9, a multiple regression 
analysis was used to examine the influence of each extramedia measure (advertiser, public 
relations, and political/government official pressures) on the Level of Agenda Cutting after 
controlling for the contributions of the other two measures.  The analysis was first set up to 
run the direct solution.  The correlation matrix representing the interrelationships among the 
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variables is presented in Table 4.13.  As indicated, all three extramedia measures are 
significantly related to the dependent variable, as well as to each other.     
 
Table 4.13.  Correlation Matrix (Full Regression Model) for Extramedia Influence Measures 
         and Level of Agenda Cutting  
 Level of  
Agenda Cutting 
Advertiser 
Pressure 
PR 
Pressure 
Political/Gov’t 
Official Pressure 
Level of  
Agenda Cutting 
 
 
1.00 
 
.463** 
 
.236** 
 
.175** 
Advertiser 
Pressure 
 
  
1.00 
 
.303** 
 
.337** 
PR  
Pressure 
 
   
1.00 
 
.539** 
Political/Gov’t 
Official Pressure 
    
1.00 
n = 612; ** p < .001 
 
 Results of the full regression model indicate that a linear combination of the three 
extramedia measures, explains 22.6% (22.2% adjusted) of the variance in the Level of 
Agenda Cutting [F (3,608) = 59.014, p < .001).  More specifically, this direct solution 
indicates that a combination of the three measures significantly predicts reporters’ 
perceptions of frequency of agenda cutting influences on media.  The results of the full 
regression model are shown in Table 4.14, and the findings indicate that both the Advertiser 
and PR Pressures measures make significant individual contributions to explaining the 
variance in reporters’ perceptions of instances of agenda cutting [Advertiser t = 11.433, p < 
.001; PR t = 2.912, p < .010].  Political/Government Official Pressure, however, does not [t = 
-.927, p = .354], even though the full regression model was significant.    
 
 
 146 
 
 
 
       Table 4.14.  Full Regression Model for Three Extramedia Measures Predicting the  
      Level of Agenda Cutting 
 B SE B β t-statistic p-level 
Constant 
 
14.770 
 
1.529 ----- ----- ----- 
Advertiser Pressure 
 
.775 .068 .439 11.433 < .001 
PR Pressure .300 
 
.103 .125 2.912 < .010 
Political/Gov’t 
Official Pressure 
-.062 .067 -.040 -.927 .354 
 n = 612; B = Unstandardized (Raw) Coefficient; SE B = Standard Errors of the  
 Unstandardized (Raw) Coefficients; β = Standardized Beta Weight 
  
 
 A commonality analysis was conducted to describe the interrelationships among the 
variables in more detail.  As previously mentioned, this analysis explains how the 
independent variables combine to explain variation in the dependent variable, and it also 
reveals which is the biggest predictor.  As illustrated in Table 4.15, the Advertiser Pressures 
measure is by far the strongest predictor in the overall regression model, explaining 21.4% of 
the variance in reporters’ perceptions of instances of agenda cutting with a unique 
contribution of nearly 17%  [t = 12.899, p < .001].310  Therefore, hypothesis 9, which 
predicted that pressure from advertisers was the strongest extramedia influence, was 
accepted.  Public Relations Pressures makes the second largest contribution in explaining the 
dependent variable, Level of Agenda Cutting, with nearly 6% and a unique contribution of 
1.1% [t = 6.006, p < .001].  Finally, the Political/Government Official Pressures measure 
                                                 
 
310The t-statistics in this section describing the results of the commonality analysis are from the 
regression analyses in which the independent variables were entered in different orders.  The tables with this 
information are not shown in order to maintain clarity and to preserve space for more essential elements of the 
analyses. 
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explains 3.1% of variation in the dependent variable, making a unique contribution of only 
.2% [t = 4.390, p < .001].311   
  
 Table 4.15.  Commonality Analysis for Extramedia Influences/Agenda Cutting  
                 Model with Three Predictor Variables 
 Advertiser 
(Adv) 
PR Political/Gov’t 
(Political) 
Unique to Adv .167 
 
----- ----- 
Unique to PR 
 
----- .011 ----- 
Unique to Political 
 
----- ----- .002 
Common to Adv & PR 
 
.017 .017 ----- 
Common to Adv & 
Political 
 
.001 
 
----- .001 
Common to PR & 
Political 
 
----- -.001 -.001 
Common to All .029 .029 .029 
 
Totals .214 .056 .031 
  Note:  Figures represent R2 values. 
 
 Since the Political/Gov’t Official Pressure measure makes virtually no unique or joint 
contribution in explaining the dependent variable, it appears that the most parsimonious 
model for predicting instance of agenda cutting includes only two predictor variables—
Advertiser and Public Relations Pressures.  Thus, a new regression analysis was run on this 
two-variable model.  By excluding the Political/Gov’t Official Pressure measure, the total 
variance explained remains around the 22% mark (22.4%; 22.2% adjusted), but the F-statistic 
                                                 
 
311It should be noted here that suppression could be present since the combined contribution of PR 
Pressures and Political/Gov’t Pressure is -.001.  The effect, however, should not be an issue since it is virtually 
nonexistent (-.001 = -.1%).   Furthermore, measure’s standardized beta weight is negative while the correlation 
coefficient is positive, indicating that it may be a net suppressor variable (see Table 4.14).  See footnote 315 for 
more information about suppression. 
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shows a fairly large jump [F (2,609) = 88.111, p < .001].  Additionally, both variables in this 
new regression model make significant contributions, as shown in Table 4.16.   
 
       Table 4.16.  Full Regression Model for Two Extramedia Measures Predicting the  
      Level of Agenda Cutting 
 B SE B β t-statistic p-level 
Constant 
 
10.864 
 
.810 ----- ----- ----- 
Advertiser Pressure .494 
 
.046 .373 10.734 < .001 
PR Pressure .739 .063 .411 11.813 < .001 
 n = 612; B = Unstandardized (Raw) Coefficient; β = Standardized Beta Weight 
 
 To further explain the interrelationships between the variables in the new two-
variable regression model, another commonality analysis was conducted.  The results in 
Table 4.17  show that the unique contributions of the Advertiser and PR Pressure variables 
remains that same at 17% (16.8) and 1%, respectively, but the common contribution 
increases slight to 4.6%.312  
 
  Table 4.17.  Commonality Analysis for Extramedia Influences/Agenda  
      Cutting Model with Two Predictors 
 Advertiser 
(ADV) 
PR 
Unique to ADV 
 
.168 ----- 
Unique to PR 
 
----- .010 
Common to both 
 
.046 .046 
Totals .214 .056 
       Note:  Figures represent R2 values. 
                                                 
 
312ADV t = 12,899, p < .001; PR t = 6.006, p < .001.  These statistics are from the regression analyses 
in which the independent variables were entered in different orders.  The tables with this information are 
omitted to maintain clarity and to preserve space for more essential elements of the analyses. 
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 The revised regression model using only two extramedia influence measures explains 
22.4% (22.2% adjusted) of the variance in the dependent variable, reporters’ perceptions of 
agenda-cutting occurrences.  Overall findings suggest that more instances of pressures from 
advertisers and public relations professionals lead to more instances of agenda-cutting effects 
on news content, based on reporters’ perceptions.  That is, reporters perceive that the more 
TV stations are pressured by advertisers and PR practitioners the more likely these news 
organizations are to keep certain items off of their news agendas, thereby influencing content 
through agenda-cutting effects.  This relationship is especially apparent with influences from 
advertisers, by far the strongest predictor in the model.  Results suggest that although 
pressures from politicians and government officials is a predictor of reporters’ perceptions of 
agenda-cutting occurrences, the variation that it explains is achieved in combination with the 
other two variables that were included in the model.313  As a result, Political/Gov’t Officials 
Pressures should not necessarily be dismissed as a predictor of instances of agenda cutting.  
Instead, it is merely unnecessary to include in the most parsimonious model for predicting 
this dependent variable, at least for the scope of the current study.  The final regression 
equation for the two-variable model is Level of Agenda Cutting = .761*ADV + .253*PR + 
14.250. 
                                                 
 
313This explanation is evident by examining the Table 4.15.  Although the total contribution of the 
Political/Gov’t Officials Pressure measure is 3.1%, a majority of this percentage is from the amount that is 
“Common to All” variables (2.9%).   
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Research Question 5:  How well does each measure of organizational influences predict the 
level of agenda cutting after taking into account the other two components? That is, what is 
the unique contribution of each measure on the agenda cutting content outcome after 
partialing out the contributions of the other two organizational measures? 
 
Hypothesis 10:  The owner/executive pressure measure is the strongest organizational 
predictor of instances of agenda cutting. 
 
 To answer the final research question and hypothesis of the study, another multiple 
regression analysis was used to examine the influence of each organizational measure (staff, 
economic, and owner/executive pressures) on the reporter perceptions of agenda-cutting 
occurrences after controlling for the contributions of the other two scales.  As with the 
previous assessments, the analysis was first set up to run the direct solution in which all three 
independent variables were entered concurrently.  The correlation matrix representing the 
interrelationships among the variables is presented in Table 4.18.  As indicated, all three 
organizational measures significantly correlate with the dependent variable, level of agenda 
cutting.  All three independent variables are also significantly related to each other, but no 
relationship is large enough to warrant suspicion of multicollinearity.    
 
Table 4.18.  Correlation Matrix (Full Regression Model) for Organizational Influence  
         Measures and Level of Agenda Cutting 
 Level of Agenda 
Cutting 
Staff 
Pressure 
Economic 
Pressure 
Owner/Exec 
Pressure 
Level of Agenda 
Cutting 
 
 
1.00 
 
.116* 
 
.616** 
 
.675** 
Staff 
Pressure 
 
  
1.00 
 
.331** 
 
.151** 
Economic 
Pressure 
 
   
1.00 
 
.531** 
Owner/Exec 
Pressure 
    
1.00 
n = 612; * p < .010; ** p < .001 
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 Results of the full regression model indicate that a linear combination of the three 
independent variables explains 55.4% (55.2% adjusted) of the variance in the dependent 
variable, instances of agenda cutting.  More specifically, this direct solution indicates that a 
combination of the three measures significantly predicts reporters’ perceptions of agenda-
cutting effects on news content [F (3,608) = 251.858, p < .001).  As shown in Table 4.19, 
each organizational level influence measure makes significant individual contributions to the 
overall regression model.  
 
       Table 4.19. Full Regression Model for Three Organizational Measures Predicting  
  the Level of Agenda Cutting  
 B SE B β t-statistic p-level 
Constant 
 
12.391 
 
1.912 ----- ----- ----- 
Staff Pressure 
 
-.470 .159 -.085 -2.949 < .010 
Economic Pressure .638 
 
.055 .388 11.588 < .001 
Owner/Exec 
Pressure 
1.075 .071 .481 15.050 < .001 
 n = 612; B = Unstandardized (Raw) Coefficient; SE B = Standard Errors of the  
 Unstandardized (Raw) Coefficients; β = Standardized Beta Weight 
  
 
 A commonality analysis was conducted to better evaluate the interrelationships 
among the variables.  The results of this analysis are shown in Table 4.20.  In support of 
hypothesis 10,  the Owner/Executive Pressure measure is the strongest predictor in the 
overall regression model, as it explains 45.5% of the variance in reporters’ perceptions of 
agenda-cutting occurrences, with a unique contribution of 17%  [t = 22.586, p < .001].314  
Economic Pressure accounts for 38% of the variation in the dependent variable, with a 
                                                 
 
314The t-statistics in this section describing the results of the commonality analysis are from the 
regression analyses in which the independent variables were entered in different orders.  The tables with this 
information are omitted to maintain clarity and to preserve space for more essential elements of the analyses. 
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unique contribution of 10% [t = 19.314, p < .001].  The Staff Pressure measure makes the 
smallest contribution, 1.4%, in explaining the variation in the level of agenda cutting, making 
a unique contribution of only 1% (.6) [t = 2.896, p < .010].315   
  
Table 4.20.  Commonality Analysis for Full Organizational Influences/Agenda  
          Cutting Model with Three Predictors 
 Staff Economic 
(Econ) 
Owner/Executive 
(Owner/Exec) 
Unique to Staff .006 
 
----- ----- 
Unique to Econ 
 
----- .098 ----- 
Unique to Owner/Exec 
 
----- ----- .166 
Common to Staff & 
Econ 
 
-.005 -.005 ----- 
Common to Staff & 
Owner/Exec 
 
.003 
 
----- .003 
Common to Econ & 
Owner/Exec 
 
----- .276 .276 
Common to All .010 .010 .010 
 
Totals .014 .379 .455 
  Note:  Figures represent R2 values. 
 
  
                                                 
 
315Suppression may present since the contribution that is common to Staff and Economic Pressures is   
-.005.  Furthermore, the signs of Staff Pressure’s regression weight and its correlation coefficient are opposite, 
suggesting possible negative, or net, suppression (see Tables 4.18 and 4.19).   According to Tabachnik and 
Fidell, “if a suppressor variable is identified, it is properly interpreted as a variable that enhances the importance 
of other IVs by virtue of suppression of the irrelevant variance in them” (see Barbara G. Tabachnick and Linda 
S. Fidell, Using Multivariate Statistics, 4th ed. (Needham Heights, Mass.:  Allyn and Bacon, 2001), 149.  
Therefore, net suppression, if indeed present, does not necessarily present a detrimental situation for the 
researcher.  Currently, there is no statistical means to evaluate the magnitude by which the regression weight 
and correlation need to differ to identify suppression (see Richard L. Smith, Joel W. Ager, Jr., and David L. 
Williams, “Suppressor Variables in Multiple Regression/Correlation,” Education & Psychological 
Measurement 52, no. 1 (spring 1992):  17-29.) 
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Overall findings suggest that the more TV stations have to contend with economic 
and staff pressures, as well as pressures from owners and top-level executive, the more likely 
agenda-cutting effects on coverage decisions are likely to occur.   Again, these findings are 
based upon reporters’ perceptions of these influences and their effects on content—in this 
case, not covering a particular topic (agenda cutting).  This relationship is especially apparent 
with owners/top-level executives, as this source of influence is the strongest predictor in the 
model.  The final regression equation follows: Level of Agenda Cutting = 
1.075*Owner/Exec + .638*Econ - .470*Staff + 12.391. 
 
Data Screening 
 As previously mentioned, regression analysis requires that more stringent 
assumptions be met than both correlation analysis and SEM.  This study followed the 
techniques suggested by Karakostas to ensure the data were appropriate for analysis.  Briefly, 
this method consists of (1) grouping the predicted values into categories; (2) performing a 
one-way ANOVA to determine whether the residual means are equal across the categories; 
and (3) running a Levene’s test to determine if the variances of the residuals are equal across 
categories.316  The regression residuals were slightly skewed and kurtotic for RQ4, and one 
of the residual groups in RQ5 showed a small level of skewness.  Furthermore, the 
assumption of homoscedasticity appeared to be violated for second, fourth, and fifth research 
questions.317  Given this information, all four regression analyses were re-evaluated using 
2,000 bootstrapped samples with replacement in Systat 12.0.  The bootstrapped parameter 
                                                 
 
316K.X. Karakostas, “Interpreting Regression Diagnostics,” Journal of Educational and Behavioral 
Statistics 29, no. 3 (fall 2004): 370. 
 
 
317The Shapiro-Wilks test results also suggested possible non-normality for a couple of the groups of 
residuals in research questions three and five. 
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estimates and standard errors showed no major differences from the original results, which 
suggests that the possible non-normality of the actual data file had no marked effects on the 
regression analyses (See Appendix 11.  Parameter Estimates and Standard Errors of the 
Actual Data Set versus the Bootstrapped Data Set).  Thus, all reported values are based on 
the actual data set. 
Summary of Stage Two Findings: Construct and Parameter Assessments 
 
 The results of the correlation and multiple regression analyses confirm all but one of 
the hypotheses posed in the study.  The bivariate correlation analyses indicated a positive 
relationship between (H1) Staff Size Pressures and Public Relations Pressures; (H2) Staff 
Size Pressures and Overall Influence on News Content and Coverage Decisions; and (H5) 
Market Size and instances of Political Pressures.  The findings confirmed a negative 
relationship between market size and (H3) Overall Influence on Content and Coverage 
Decisions and (H4) Advertiser Pressures.  Although a negative correlation was predicted for 
Market Size and instances of Public Relations Pressures (H6), this hypothesis was rejected.  
In fact, the correlation coefficient was almost zero (r(610) = .002, p = .478), indicating no 
relationship between the two variables. 
 Research question one assessed the general influence of Market Size as a control 
variable on the relationships evaluated in the first two hypotheses (i.e., (H1) Staff Size 
Pressures & PR Pressures and (H2) Staff Size Pressures & Content Influence/Outcome).  
Results from the partial correlation analyses indicated that Market Size had no effect on the 
relationship between staff and public relations pressures; however, holding Market Size 
constant resulted in a slightly stronger relationship between staff size pressures and Overall 
Influence on Content.  Still, the findings show that there are significant relationships between 
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the variables in the first two hypotheses beyond that which might be explained by the size of 
the respondents’ markets.  Finally, the multiple regression analyses addressing the second 
through fifth research questions and hypotheses 7 through 10 identified and confirmed 
advertiser pressures and owner/executive pressures as the strongest extramedia and 
organizational predictors of both overall content influence and instances of agenda cutting.  
The final chapter that follows provides a more in-depth discussion of the results and their 
practical and theoretical implications, as well as the strengths and limitations of the study and 
suggestions for future research. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The purpose of this study was to examine through what forces and under what 
conditions the media are most likely to be influenced and with what effect on news content.  
That is, how, how often, and under what conditions do external and internal forces attempt to 
influence the media and their coverage, and to what effect are they successful at doing so?  
To answer this question, this study used a multi-level research approach in order to provide a 
more complete picture of the media landscape involving these issues. The overall goal of the 
study was to examine how extramedia, organizational, and within-media forces influence 
news content and coverage decisions.  The influence outcomes considered in the study are 
the levels of agenda building, frame building, and agenda cutting.  To evaluate these 
relationships, a comprehensive model of media influences and outcomes was tested using 
original data from a national Web survey of television reporters.  Specifically, the survey 
assessed reporters’ perceptions of the types and instances of influences faced by TV stations 
across the country, as well as their views of how these sources of pressure actually succeed in 
influencing news content.   
 In addition to testing the overall model, this research also assessed relationships 
among variables that were not directly specified in the first phase of the study.  Specifically, 
the relationships between staff size pressures and both public relations pressures and overall 
influences on news content were examined, both alone and controlling for market size.  In 
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separate analyses, market size was also evaluated in relation to advertiser, public relations, 
and political pressures, as well as to its correlation with overall influences on content and 
coverage decisions.  Finally, the incremental strength of the extramedia (advertiser, public 
relations, and political pressures) and organizational (staff, economic, and owner/executive 
pressures) influences measures was assessed to determine the strongest predictor of both the 
overall influence on news content and, in particular, instances of agenda cutting.   
 The current, and final, chapter is divided into three main sections.  The first section 
discusses the implications and conclusions from testing the influences on media content 
(IOMC) model.  Second, the specific relationships among the selected constructs and 
variables within the model are elucidated in more detail.  A portion of the discussion includes 
the study’s potential for advancing theory, especially with regard to agenda cutting, as well 
as its professional implications.  The final section covers the strengths and limitations of the 
study.  Directions and suggestions for future research are also included in this section and 
throughout the chapter as needed. 
Implications of the Influences on Media Content (IOMC) Model 
 
 In the 1990s, Shoemaker and Reese proposed their hierarchical model of influences 
depicting how the media’s content may be influenced on different levels, ranging from micro 
to macro, from forces both within and outside of news organizations.318  Although some 
research has examined these different forces and their potential effects separately (e.g., 
public relations or advertising pressures effects on building the media’s agenda or frames), 
seemingly no research has studied how various influences may simultaneously affect news 
coverage or content decisions.  In other words, none have considered the larger, more 
                                                 
 
318Shoemaker and Reese, Mediating the Message. 
 
 158 
 
 
 
comprehensive picture.  Although Shoemaker and Reese’s diagram provides a good basis on 
which to guide this type of scholarship, it is not a “testable” model.  Furthermore, while 
much research has centered on how media content may affect audiences, fewer studies have 
taken a step back to consider who or what is influencing the media’s decisions—especially 
with regard to concurrently examining the three main influence outcomes considered in the 
current study (i.e., agenda building, frame building, and agenda cutting).  As a result, some 
researchers have pointed out that more knowledge is needed about how and by whom the 
media agenda is set;319 how and through what forces media frames are constructed;320 and 
how and why certain news items are simply kept off, or cut out of, the media agenda.321  
Using the television industry as the foundation, this study addressed these gaps in the 
literature by offering a possible explanation of how news content and coverage decisions 
may be influenced by forces from both within and outside media organizations.  The current 
research offers a unique perspective, as it considers how different potential forces of 
influence interact to ultimately affect news coverage.  Specifically, the IOMC model 
illustrates how extramedia, organizational, and within-media influences interrelate to build, 
frame, and cut items on the news agenda, based on reporters’ perceptions (See Figure 4.5).   
 
Market Size as a Moderating Influence on Overall Influences/Outcomes on News Content 
and Coverage Decisions 
 
 Market size was defined by reverse-coding the respondents’ designated market areas 
(DMAs).  As previously mentioned, the television industry categorizes stations into DMAs, 
which are based on the size of the media markets in which they are located.  These DMAs 
                                                 
 
319For example, see Rogers, Dearing, and Bregman, “The Anatomy of Agenda-Setting Research,” 33. 
 
 
320For example, see Scheufele, “Framing as a Theory of Media Effects,” 109. 
  
 
321For example, see Wober, “Agenda Cutting.” 
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are classified by numbers—the largest-market stations hold the 1-25 spots, while the smaller-
market stations are generally from 76 to more than 200.   For clarity, this variable was 
reverse-coded so that larger DMA ranks represent larger (rather than smaller) markets, and 
vice versa.   
 The hypothesized model originally proposed that Market Size would have a direct 
effect on Influences on Content and Coverage Decisions, the main dependent variable of the 
study (See Figure 2.3).  That is, it was initially presented as a control variable in the overall 
structural model.  The particular placement in the model was based on previous research 
suggesting that smaller-market media may be more susceptible to influences on content 
because of poorer resources or smaller staff sizes with which to produce news, more 
pronounced economic constraints, or greater pressure from advertisers and other outside 
sources.322  Therefore, a negative effect was predicted, indicating that respondents’ from 
smaller-market stations would report more instances of influences on content.  Exploratory 
model testing, however, indicated that this proposed relationship was nonsignificant, and it 
was suggested that size of the respondents’ market had a stronger, more direct negative 
influence on the Extramedia Influences construct.  Simply put, reporters from smaller DMAs 
perceived more instances of pressures from outside sources, which, for the purposes of the 
current study, are advertisers, public relations, and political pressures.  Market size did 
ultimately influence reporters’ perceptions of overall influences on news content and 
coverage decisions, but it did so indirectly.  That is, it first affected reporters’ perceptions of 
influence at the Extramedia level, followed by additional negative relationships at the 
                                                 
 
322For example, see McManus, Market-Driven Journalism; Soley and Craig, “Advertising Pressures on 
Newspapers”; Hays and Reisner, “Feeling the Heat from Advertisers;” Soontae An and Lori Bergen, 
“Advertiser Pressure on Daily Newspapers: A Survey of Advertising Sales Executives,” Journal of Advertising 
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Organizational and Within-Media Influences levels.  In other words, reporters from smaller 
markets perceived more instances of pressures from Extramedia sources, as well as more 
accounts of Organizational and Within-Media pressures.  These relationships ultimately 
resulted in more instances of overall influences on content, based on reporters’ perceptions 
(see Table 4.3).  This finding is logical, especially given evidence from previous research 
regarding advertiser pressures in small markets.  For instance, An and Bergen surveyed 
advertising directors at daily newspapers and presented them with four ethical scenarios 
regarding demands from advertisers.  They found that directors from the smaller papers were 
more likely to bow to advertiser pressure and favor content that presented these advertisers in 
a positive light, thereby avoiding the possibility of offending these revenue generators.323 
Similarly, Soley and Craig found that, although there was no disparity between small versus 
large circulation papers in terms of amounts of advertiser pressures, advertisers were more 
likely to succeed in influencing content at the smaller papers.  Editors at the smaller papers 
also reported significantly more instances of in-house pressures to produce content to please 
advertisers.324  In short, market size eventually affected reporters’ perceptions of overall 
influences on content, but this relationship was first mediated by all other constructs in the 
model.   
 
The Relationship between Extramedia Influences Within-Media Influences 
 
 The original hypothesized model proposed that Extramedia Influences would directly 
affect influences within the media organization (Within-Media), which are measured by 
direct and indirect pressures from newsroom management (See Figure 4.3).  This 
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relationship was largely based on Shoemaker and Reese’s multi-level diagram, which 
suggests that the influence process is not necessarily linear; instead, the different types of 
influence could (and most likely) simultaneously occur.  Although their hierarchical model 
did not specifically incorporate a “Within-Media Influences” level, which was created for the 
current study using some of the authors’ concepts, it was expected that the construct would 
exhibit similar process behavior as suggested by the concurrent influence flow among the 
levels in the “onion” diagram.   In other words, it was speculated that the pressure flow from 
the Extramedia to the Within-Media level would not be a strictly linear (and indirect) one—
that is, from Extramedia to Organizational and, finally, to Within-Media.  Instead, it was 
posited that influences at the Extramedia level would also have a direct effect on influences 
within the media organization.   
 Exploratory model testing suggested that Extramedia Influences did eventually affect 
influences within the media, but the relationship was first mediated by pressures at the 
Organizational level.  That is, forces from outside the media (e.g., advertisers, public 
relations professionals, and political/governmental officials) do not appear to have a 
significant amount of direct influence over newsroom managers within media organizations, 
at least within the scope of the current study.  Instead, it seems that influences from the 
Extramedia level are first mediated by forces at the Organizational level and then passed on 
to managers within the news organization itself.  These findings suggest that more pressures 
from forces outside the media organization correspond with greater pressures at the 
Organizational level, which are then passed on to Within-Media Influences and eventually to 
content decisions.    
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 It is important to note, however, that lack of a direct link between the Extramedia and 
Within-Media levels does not mean that those working outside the media should head 
straight to owners and top-level executives at the Organizational level to get their particular 
messages across.  For example, a public relations practitioner does not necessarily need to 
phone and send his or her broadcast news release (BNR) to a TV station owner in an attempt 
to get it covered in the news. Strictly evaluating the results in this manner is a consequence of 
looking at only one small piece of a larger structure.  Public relations pressure is only one 
measure of Extramedia Influence, and it should be interpreted as such—at least for this first 
phase of the study.  Instead, the findings indicate that pressures at the Extramedia level are 
more strongly, and significantly, related to increased influences at the Organizational level. 
In other words, they exhibit a stronger association to reporters’ perceptions of increased 
economic pressures; views that inadequate staff size would have a detrimental effect on the 
news; and more accounts of pressures from owners and top-level executives.  Recall that 
influences within the media is represented by two measures, direct and indirect newsroom 
management pressures.  Consequently, the nonsignificant relationship between the 
Extramedia and Within-Media Influences constructs merely suggests that forces outside the 
media do not have a notable direct influence on newsroom managers, within the scope of the 
current study.   
A likely explanation for the lack of a direct relationship between the two 
aforementioned constructs stems from the fact that influences and actions from the reporters 
themselves were not considered as a measure for pressures within the media organization.  
Including such a measure might have allowed for a direct relationship; however, it was not 
included in this project for sound reasons. Since the survey contained somewhat sensitive 
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information regarding the profession and the industry, this study went to great lengths to 
obtain candid responses with which to assess influences and outcomes on content.  Reporters 
were specifically chosen, as opposed to news directors, because they were viewed as more 
likely to give candid responses since they are further removed from the business side of news 
operations. Moreover, reporters’ transient nature was expected to increase the likelihood that 
they would not cater their answers to protect the views of their current news organization, 
which were likely to seep into their perceptions of the industry as a whole. Asking sensitive 
information concerning their fellow frontline journalists—not simply about advertisers, 
owners and top-level executives, newsroom managers, or “TV stations in general”—had the 
potential to offend these respondents and, in turn, alter their answers to the survey questions.  
Therefore, asking these questions was not worth the risk—at least for this project, as it was 
partially used to build a strong base on which to build future studies.  Future research, 
however, should consider including this measure to determine if it has a significant direct 
effect on the relationship between Extramedia and Within-Media Influences.   
 Anecdotal evidence and scholarly literature support both the Extramedia Influences 
level’s indirect relationship with influences within the new organization (Within-Media), as 
well as its direct link with pressures at the Organizational level.  A recap and further 
discussion of the direct link between Extramedia and Organizationl Influences, which was 
originally represented as a simple covariance, is provided in the subsection that follows. 
 
The Relationship between Extramedia and Organizational Influences 
 
 For the current study, Organizational Influences was represented by three measures:  
economic, owner/executive, and staff size pressures.  Initially, the hypothesized model 
proposed that there would simply be some kind of relationship between the Extramedia and 
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Organizational Influences constructs—that the two constructs would covary (Refer to Figure 
2.3).  In other words, more instances of pressures from forces outside the media would 
correspond with more pressures from organizational sources, and vice versa.  As discussed, 
exploratory model testing suggested a stronger relationship indicating a direct relationship 
from influences at the Extramedia level to increased pressures at the Organizational level, 
rather than a simple covariance.  This change was incorporated based on the computer output 
during the exploratory phase, as well as the logical assumption that increases in the amount 
of Extramedia Influences (advertiser, public relations, and political pressures) would lead to 
greater levels of Organizational influences—increased perceptions of economic pressures; 
views that inadequate staff size would have a detrimental effect on the news; and more 
accounts of pressures from owners and top-level executives.325  The direct connection 
between the two constructs is, perhaps, best explained by discussing the relationship in terms 
of the constructs’ respective measures. 
 As mentioned, for the purposes of this study, Extramedia Influences was measured by 
advertiser, public relations, and political/government official pressures, and Organizational 
Influences was represented by owner/top-level executive, economic, and staff size pressures.  
The finding that the Extramedia Influences construct has a direct effect on those pressures at 
the Organizational level is a logical one, and it is especially evident when the relationship is 
delineated with regard to the constructs’ measures. One rationalization involves economic 
pressure, a measure of Organizational Influences.  Reporters’ perceptions of more pressures 
from Extramedia Influences correspond with perceptions of more economic pressure.  For 
                                                 
 
325Furthermore, since the Extramedia Influences construct changed from and exogenous to an 
endogenous variable with the location change of Market Size within the model, a direct path (rather than a 
covariance) was required to execute the analysis in AMOS.   
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example, pressures from advertisers likely lead to more instances of financial and economic 
pressures, based on reporters’ perceptions.  Furthermore, reporters who perceive more 
instances of Extramedia Influences also seem to identify more detrimental effects resulting 
from reduced or inadequate staff size (staff size pressure).  For instance, respondents who 
report more instances of PR and political pressures, both measures of Extramedia Influences, 
also appear to view inadequate staff size as being a negative for news organizations.  In other 
words, this explanation indicates a positive relationship because more instances of 
Extramedia pressures lead to more reporters agreeing that reduced or an inadequate staff size 
is a negative characteristic for stations.  This reasoning falls in line with previous research 
that suggests that a smaller staff size typically corresponds with using more information 
subsidies, which are generally provided by public relations practitioners and public affairs 
offices for government officials.326  In addition to logical reasoning that supports the stronger 
direct link, evidence in the literature also helps to validate this finding.   
 Top media executives are often board members of other major companies on which 
their news organizations rely for advertising.  Therefore, they are likely subjected to a certain 
amount of pressure, especially if their news organization is running a controversial story 
about these other institutions of which they are members.  As a result of these pressures, the 
executive might exert his or her authoritative power down the ranks to kill the story.  
Shoemaker and Reese offer an example of a related incident at ABC News where a reporting 
team uncovered “scandalous conditions at nursing homes owned by Charles Wick, a friend of 
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President Reagan.”327  Ultimately the story did not air because the producers were told it was 
not newsworthy.   It appears, although not clearly proved in this case, that forces outside 
news organizations can influence executive decision-making and, therefore, influence media 
content.  This particular example provides anecdotal support for the direct relationship 
between forces at the Extramedia and Organizational levels, as well as the more elaborate 
connection between all constructs/sources of influence in the model (i.e., 
ExtramediaOrganizationalWithin-MediaContent Influence/Outcome).  
 Another example, this time involving NBC, provides relative support for the finding 
that forces outside the media affect those at the Organizational level. During the opening 
ceremony of the 1996 Olympics, NBC’s Bob Costas referred to U.S.-China tensions, 
including China’s “problems with human rights” and “property rights disputes.”328 China’s 
governmental officials and state-run news media voiced their displeasure for the remarks, 
and NBC promptly issued an apology.  The news organization is owned by General Electric 
Company, which, according to a New York Times article, is “one of the largest foreign 
industrial enterprises in China, with hundreds of millions of dollars invested in areas such as 
lighting, plastics and medical equipment.” 329 When an NBC Sports vice president was 
questioned about these corporate interests and their involvement in the decision to issue the 
apology, he claimed that they were not considered, “not as far as I was concerned.”330 This 
example provides at least some tangential support for the finding that forces outside the 
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media—in this cases political/governmental officials—may have a direct affect on those at 
the Organizational level—here, owners and top-level executives.   
 In summary, although a covariance relationship was originally proposed and 
supported, face validity and exploratory model testing confirmed an even stronger direct 
relationship between the Extramedia and Organizational Influences constructs, thus 
providing both an improved explanation of the overall model and a better foundation with 
which to build future research.  Future research should further examine this relationship, as 
well as a possible inverse relationship between the two; that is, the possibility that 
Organizational Influences may also directly affect forces at the Extramedia level.  This 
potential relationship and more detailed suggestions for it role in future studies is outlined in 
the “Strengths and Limitations” section that is presented later in this chapter. 
 
The Relationship between Organizational and Within-Media Influences 
 
 As previously discussed, the hypothesized IOMC model proposed that Organizational 
Influences would have a direct influence on sources of influences within the media 
organization.  Model testing confirmed this relationship, suggesting that the greater instances 
of pressures at the Organizational level lead to increased amounts of influence at the Within-
Media level, which is measured by direct and indirect pressures from newsroom 
management.   
 This finding provides evidence for the argument that forces at the Organizational 
level—owner/executive, economic, and opinions on staff size pressures—exhibit a direct 
influence over sources of influence within the news organization (newsroom managers).  
Thus, the significant link supports prior contentions long held by media critics such as Ben 
Bagdikian and Robert McChesney that media owners have an influence on news 
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organizations and, in turn, media content.331  Likewise, it provides further credence to 
Shoemaker and Reese’s claim that “media owners have an unmistakable impact on media 
content because they [establish] policy for the entire organization.”332  McManus also alluded 
to the relationship between the Organizational and Within-Media levels.  He contended that 
“management has a legal responsibility to serve the economic interest of owners;” therefore, 
newsroom managers may exert pressure on journalist to uphold these interests.  The direct 
relationship also falls in line with previous research suggesting that the financial interests of 
owners can affect the amount of news coverage, as well as the tone of both hard-news 
coverage333 and editorials.334  
 Although owner and executive pressure is just one measure of influence at the 
Organizational level, other literature dealing with reporters’ perceptions of economic 
pressure, another measure, further substantiates the direct link between the Organizational 
and Within-Media Influences constructs.  For example, McManus called attention to 
economic pressures in his explanation of market-driven journalism, in which he remarked 
that media organizations are a part of a “market-based economy” competing in four different 
markets—investors, advertisers, sources of news, and consumers.335  He argued that these 
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investors, or owners, are the most influential in the production of news because they are a 
part of the corporate structure, while the other three markets must externally exert their 
influence.  Since the investors appear to have the strongest influence in media organizations, 
according to McManus’ model, news workers, including newsroom managers within the 
news organization itself, may feel economic and bottom-line pressures from these owners or 
from the top-level executives who are relaying the messages.  Thus, McManus’ argument 
provides further validation for the direct link between the Organizational and Within-Media 
constructs, suggesting that the more instances of pressures at the Organizational level lead to 
greater pressures and influences within the media organization.   
 In addition to examining direct link just discussed, future researchers could expand on 
this finding to include a measure of ownership concentration at the Organizational level, as 
well as additional measures of influences within the media organization itself, such as 
reporters or newsroom policy.  As discussed, the present study initially proposed an 
ownership concentration index as one indicator of Organizational Influences; however, it 
exhibited a low reliability with regard to the other variables, which, coupled with its status as 
an untested measure, warranted its omission.  Future studies could work to refine the measure 
and its placement within the model. Testing additional measures would only serve to further 
elucidate our current understanding of influences at the Organizational and Within-Media 
levels.   
  
The Relationship between Within-Media Influences and Overall Content Influence 
 
 As indicated in the IOMC model, Within-Media Influences was the main mediator of 
the IOMC model (See Figure 4.5).  More simply put, it was the construct that all other 
influences in the model passed through before reaching Influences and Outcomes on Content 
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and Coverage Decisions, the main dependent variable of the study.  A central implication for 
the study is that higher levels of Extramedia and Organizational pressures have a significant 
influence, whether direct or indirect, on forces within the news organization (Within-Media).  
The IOMC model also suggests that these Within-Media Influences are then directly related 
to reporters’ perceptions of Influences on News Content and Coverage Decisions, which is 
measured by the level of (1) agenda building; (2) frame building; and (3) agenda cutting.  
That is, more reports of influences and pressures within the media organization lead to more 
instances of influences on news content, based on reporters’ perceptions.   
 From a professional perspective, this finding could serve as the starting point for 
creating innovative newsroom policy and guidelines of how to deal with such situations of 
attempted influence when they arise.  At the very least, implications from this portion of the 
IOMC model could provide a basis on which to facilitate newsroom dialogue about these 
issues.  Potential influences on news workers have brought newsroom ethics to the front line 
of debates, especially with regard to how news content is affected.  Since news people are 
continually faced with competing loyalties (e.g., to readers/viewers, managers, advertisers, 
and stockholders, to name a few), they potentially deal with such issues on a regular basis.  
Therefore, these discussions are especially important today with even more concern over the 
bottom line, which seems particularly pronounced in the television industry.336 From another 
professional standpoint, the finding should be of use to those making management hiring 
decisions for news organizations.  Since, as the results show, newsroom managers have a 
direct influence on news content and coverage decisions, they should exercise this influence 
with the public interest in mind.  Therefore, the study illuminates the need to assess and hire 
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potential management candidates based on journalistic training, previous journalistic 
experience, and their track record with regard to running a newsroom and, perhaps, abiding 
by journalistic ethical standards.  In turn, the managers might be less likely to bow to 
unfavorable pressures from forces at the Extramedia and Organizational levels.337   
 The role of the ombudsman or public editor might also be considered.  Instead of 
sources of attempted influences going straight to newsroom management or reporters, these 
media “mediators” may be experiencing the brunt of these pressures.  Future research should 
consider people serving in this position as possible sources of qualitative information on the 
subject of influences and outcomes on news content.  Furthermore, the role of the 
ombudsman is also important to investigate, as they can also use their position to inform the 
public about the means by which their respective newsrooms deal with attempted pressures 
from forces such as advertisers, owners, and government officials.  Doing so could help news 
organizations rebuild and maintain trust with the public and possibly attract more readers and 
viewers. 
 The finding also offers important implications with regard to media theory, explicitly 
concerning its relevance to Social Control of the Newsroom studies. As discussed, Within-
Media Influences was measured by direct and indirect management pressures.  Briefly, 
direct management pressures were assessed through survey questions asking reporters how 
often they believed newsroom managers/superiors within a TV station provide clear 
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instructions or directly tell reporters what to cover, how to cover it, or what not to cover.  
Indirect management pressures, on the other hand, involve suggesting particular story topics 
or angles through more subtle means, such as yawning at or making fun of a story idea, or 
showing disinterest by not airing a reporters’ story.  According to Breed’s argument, if these 
actions are repeated over time, journalists learn, or become socialized, to cover (or not cover) 
a story in the manner suggested by their superiors, but they do so at their own discretion. In 
fact, one staff member in Breed’s classic 1955 study noted that news workers learned what to 
cover “by osmosis.”338  Although Breed observed that the hidden norms and routines (the 
indirect form of management pressures) seem to be the more powerful force in the 
newsroom, they are not afforded as much attention in scholarship as direct means of 
communicating.  This inattention is likely due to the difficulty in defining, measuring, and 
analyzing these covert influence signals.  The current study, however, provides both the 
measures and results by which to better elucidate this important area of newsroom culture.  
Although the present study examines these direct and indirect forms of control through the 
larger lens of an overall model of content influences and outcomes, it provides a rich source 
of information for future studies examining this particular area in more detail.  Specifically, 
the information and results gathered in the study have the potential to make a significant 
contribution to media scholarship by providing a much-needed update of the prior “Social 
Control of the Newsroom” studies, particularly with regard to the indirect, or hidden, areas of 
socialization. 
 
                                                 
 
338Breed, “Social Control in the Newsroom,” 328. 
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The Link between Organizational Influences and Overall Content Influences 
 
 Originally, the hypothesized model posited that influences at the Organizational level 
were only expected to affect reporters’ perceptions of influences on content indirectly; that is, 
after “filtering through” influences within the media organization (Within-Media Influences). 
This notion, however, was reconsidered, in part because the staff size pressure measure was 
re-classified as an Organizational, rather than Within-Media, indicator because it exhibited a 
stronger association with the Organizational Influences factor. As mentioned, previous 
literature supported this new categorization.339 After reconsideration, it seemed logical that 
each of the measures (economic pressures, pressures from owners and top-level executives, 
and staff size pressures) could directly affect reporters’ perceptions of content influences.  
Specifically, it was proposed that Organizational Influences could not only indirectly affect 
content by first influencing newsroom managers within the media organization, but they 
could also affect reporters’ perceptions of influences on content directly.  Although it was not 
specifically suggested in the analysis output, the modification makes sound theoretical and 
logical sense. For example, reporters may feel that station workers could easily avoid 
covering a particular story because of an inadequate staff size (staff size pressure), or because 
it may offend a company with economic clout over their station (economic pressure) or the 
station manager (owner/executive pressure).  In other words, news workers do not 
necessarily have to wait for their news directors to tell them to do so.  Instead, they may feel 
the pressure themselves and act accordingly.  Simply put, they may have been socialized to 
accept that responsibility and self-edit.   
                                                 
 
339For example, see Shoemaker and Reese, Mediating the Message 2d ed., 139-173; Fico and Cote, 
“Partisan and Structural Balance of Election Stories on the 1998 Governor’s Race in Michigan,” 165-182. 
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 Previous survey results provide additional support for the direct relationship.  For 
example, a 2000 survey by Pew Research Center found that 42% of local journalists and 25% 
of those working for national stations believed that journalists sometimes purposely avoid 
covering certain stories that they believe are truly newsworthy.340  Of those respondents, an 
average of 21% (16% national and 26% local) answered that these journalists typically 
decide to avoid these stories on their own; that is, without basing their decision on (a) how 
they believe their bosses would respond; (b) signals from their bosses; or (c) some other 
reason.  In particular, these two survey questions inadvertently concern one of the Content 
Influence/Outcome measures of the present study:  the level of agenda cutting.  Still, the Pew 
survey responses have broader implications, indicating that news workers do not necessarily 
wait for their newsroom managers/superiors to tell them to cover or emphasize a particular 
topic; cover it from a particular angle; or avoid covering a topic altogether.   
 In the same survey, journalists were also asked their opinions as to what extent 
corporate owners influence news organizations’ decisions about which stories to cover or 
emphasize.  Notice the question deals with one of the Organizational Influence measures 
considered in the current study (i.e., owner pressures), as well as one of the Content 
Influence/Outcome indicators (i.e., agenda building).  One-third of the national journalists 
and half of the local journalists surveyed reported that corporate owners influence news 
outlets’ decisions of the stories to cover or emphasize “a great deal” or “a fair amount.”  
Thus, these results provide additional backing for the direct link between the Organizational 
and Content Influence/Outcome constructs, as influences from newsroom managers within 
the organization are not considered.   One final illustration from the same Pew Research 
Center survey offers added validation for the direct link.  Respondents were provided a series 
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“Self Censorship: How Often and Why,”  
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of reasons for purposely avoiding truly newsworthy stories, and they were asked how often 
they thought journalists they know avoid stories based on the reasons given.  Forty-four 
percent of the journalists working for local stations said that journalists they know would 
commonly or sometimes avoid stories if it would be embarrassing or damaging to the 
financial interests of a news organization’s owners or parent company.341  Furthermore, more 
than one-third of the local journalists reported that journalists they know would commonly or 
sometimes avoid stories that would be embarrassing or damaging to friends or associates of a 
news organization’s owners.  These particular questions involve two measures of 
Organizational Influences that were used in the current study (i.e., economic pressures and 
pressures concerning owners), and they also assess how journalists would make coverage 
decisions on their own accord; that is, without direction from newsroom superiors.  Thus, 
these Pew survey results also provide some related support for the Organizational Influences’ 
direct relationship with news organizations’ Influences on News Content and Coverage 
Decisions.   
 
Implications of the Construct and Parameter Estimates 
 
 In addition to testing the overall model, this study also assessed relationships among 
variables that were not directly specified in the first phase of the study.  This section provides 
a discussion regarding the professional, academic, and theoretical implications of the 
findings that resulted from the analyses used to evaluate the study’s hypotheses and research 
questions.  Specifically, the results from examining staff size pressures and both public 
relations pressures and Overall Influences on News Content, both alone and controlling for 
Market Size, are discussed.  Additionally, the implications from the separate analyses 
                                                 
 
341The wording in the actual survey is “commonplace” rather than “commonly.” 
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involving Market Size in relation to advertiser, public relations, and political pressures, as 
well as to its correlation with Overall Influences on Content and Coverage Decisions are 
further explained.  Finally, inferences are provided based on the results regarding the 
incremental strength of the Extramedia and Organizational Influences and the assessments to 
determine the strongest predictor of the Overall Influence on News Content construct and 
instances of agenda cutting measure.   
 
Staff Size Pressures and it Relationship with Pressures from Public Relations Practitioners 
and Overall Content Influences  
 
 The first two hypotheses in this second stage of the study concerned staff size 
pressure, which was measured by two survey questions assessing reporters’ opinions of an 
inadequate or reduced staff size and its effects on news coverage.  That is, the measure does 
not represent the staffing situations at the respondents’ station.  The indicator was not 
represented in this manner because reporters were asked about pressures and influences at 
TV stations in general, not necessarily at their particular station.  As discussed, this method 
was used, among other reasons, to elicit more candid responses and, in turn, a more accurate 
depiction of the influence and outcome processes in the television industry. 
 As predicted, staff size pressures was positively correlated with both public relations 
pressures and Overall Influences on News Content and Coverage Decisions, the latter being 
the main dependent variable of the larger study.  Regarding the first relationship, this finding 
suggests that those who believe that an inadequate or reduced staff size has negative effects 
on coverage and/or quality also reported more instances of pressures from public relations 
practitioners.  This reasoning falls in line with previous research suggesting that a smaller 
staff size typically corresponds with using more information subsidies, which are generally 
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provided by public relations practitioners and public affairs offices for government 
officials.342  More specifically, public relations and agenda-building research suggests that if 
a news organization has an inadequate staff to fill the day’s news hole, a station may rely on 
outside sources, such as information subsidies from public relations practitioners, to 
compensate for this lack of “man power.”343 Although this finding has been observed in 
previous research, it has not been evaluated from the perspective of the current study, which 
measures staff size pressures by assessing reporters’ opinions regarding inadequate staff size 
and its effects on coverage.  From another viewpoint, although reporters may sometimes 
frown upon PR practitioners’ pressures to run their information, they may also have no 
choice but to air these provided pieces because they simply may not have the means to fill 
the news space themselves due to reduced or inadequate staff at their stations.   
As previously discussed, the second hypothesis predicted a positive relationship 
between staff size pressures and Overall Influence on News Content and Coverage decisions.  
In support of the hypothesis, the finding suggests that reporters who perceive an inadequate 
or reduced staff size as hurting the quality of and/or negatively affecting coverage also report 
more overall instances of influences on television media content.  This finding is logical 
because those reporters who perceive more instances of influences on news content also view 
inadequate staffing at a station as a negative in terms of the quality of news coverage.  This 
may be because stations with inadequate or reduced staff situation could be more susceptible 
to influences from forces both within and outside the news organization.  Existing literature 
                                                 
 
342For example, see Turk, “Information Subsidies and Influence;” Turk, “Information Subsidies and 
Media Content;” and Gandy, “Information Subsidies;” McManus, Market-Driven Journalism. 
 
 
343For example, see Turk, “Information Subsidies and Influence;” Turk, “Information Subsidies and 
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provides some tangential support for this finding.  For example, Lacy, Fico, and Simon found 
that staff size was positively correlated with performance in the newspaper industry.344 In 
other words, larger staff size corresponds with better the news performance, which typically 
means little to no influence on news content from outside sources.  Other research has also 
supported a link between staff size and news quality or overall industry performance.345   
 From a journalistic standpoint, this finding is important because it provides some 
evidence that increased instances of pressure from public relations practitioners correspond 
with reporters viewing a reduced or inadequate staff size as a negative characteristic for TV 
stations.  Managers could use this information to address news workers’ concerns and, 
perhaps, establish and/or revise policies and procedures for using information provided by 
PR professionals.  When doing so, clarification of what constitutes as “use” of these public 
relations materials is also important, as Curtin found that one editor in her study denied using 
press releases only to later admit that these items were used for sparking a story idea.346 
Furthermore, managers could take the current results into consideration when faced with 
potential staffing cuts from higher-level executives to help them argue on the side of keeping 
a larger staff, not only to potentially improve news quality but possibly employee morale as 
well.  Public relations professionals could also use this information to work to further 
improve relationships with media professionals.  Finally, these findings also have theoretical 
implications because they provide further insight into a much-examined area of agenda-
building scholarship—public relations and information subsidies—with regard to, perhaps, a 
                                                 
 
344Lacy, Fico, and Simon, “Relationship among Economic, Newsroom, and Content Variables.” 
 
 
345For example, see Sooyoung Cho, Esther Thorson, and Stephen Lacy, “Increased Circulation Follows 
Investments in Newsroom,” Newspaper Research Journal 25, no. 4 (fall 2004): 36; Busterna, “Television 
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more complex relationship between news workers and PR professionals.  That is, more 
complex, but less-researched, in the sense that reporter opinions on staffing issues may be the 
result of them fearing for their autonomy from outside sources providing this free news 
material, which they may sometimes need to fill their time slots. Furthermore, it provides 
additional information with regard to theoretical approaches concerning influences on news 
media content. 
 Future research in this area might continue to assess opinions regarding staff size, 
opposed to size of the staff itself, to offer more support for findings in the present study.  
Since this project used only two questions to assess reporters’ opinions on this important 
matter, future scholars should add more measures to provide a deeper look into how news 
workers view staffing cuts and how it affects their ability to properly perform their job 
functions.  As noted earlier, the effect sizes for the relationships were small, which could be 
an indication that the significance levels were an effect of the larger sample size.  Previous 
research, however, supports the findings in the current study.  The fact that the sample was 
more representative of reporters from larger markets could also be a factor in the small 
coefficients, as these respondents likely have different views concerning the influences and 
outcomes under study.  Future researchers should take note of the effect size when 
generalizing these findings, and they should further examine the relationships under different 
market situations to determine if the effect size increases in magnitude. 
 
Assessing the Impact of Market Size  
 In addition to assessing the simple correlations between staff size pressures and both 
public relations pressures and Overall Influences on News Content, this study also examined 
these relationships while holding the size of the respondents’ market constant; that is, 
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controlling for Market Size.  The further examination of these relationships was important 
given that previous research has suggested that smaller-market media may be more 
susceptible to external pressures, which can, in turn, affect news coverage decisions.347  
Although the initially proposed model in phase one of the study included Market Size as a 
control variable, the aforementioned hypotheses did not.  Therefore, it was necessary to 
evaluate the relationships from this perspective in order to more accurately describe their 
implications. This evaluation was especially important given the later realization that the 
study’s sample more heavily represented reporters working in the larger DMAs.  
 Results showed that controlling for Market Size had no effect on the relationship 
between staff size pressures and pressures from public relations professionals, as the 
correlation coefficient remained unchanged.  It did, however, slightly intensify the magnitude 
of the relationship between reporters’ perceptions of staff size pressures and their perceptions 
of Influences on News Content and Coverage Decisions.  Still, since both correlations 
remained significant, the findings confirm that there are significant relationships between the 
variables beyond what might be accounted for by Market Size. These findings suggest that 
the size of the respondents’ markets has no significant effect on their perceptions of pressures 
regarding staff size, public relations pressures, and overall influences on content.  The 
diminutive increase in effect size (one hundredth of one percent) for the relationship between 
staff size pressures and Influences on Content is likely due to the fact that the sample was 
more representative of reporters from larger markets.  The fact that Market Size did little to 
affect the strength of the aforementioned relationships, and nothing to affect their 
                                                 
 
347For example see, McManus, Market-Driven Journalism; Soley and Craig, “Advertising Pressures on 
Newspapers”; Hays and Reisner, “Feeling the Heat from Advertisers;” An Bergen, “Advertiser Pressure on 
Daily Newspapers.” 
 
 
 181 
 
 
 
significance, provides as least some evidence that the skewness of the sample in terms of 
reporter DMA did not likely affect the relationships explained in the overall IOMC model in 
phase one of the study.   
 Besides assessing Market Size as a control variable, this study also examined the 
variable with regard to its relationship with reporters’ perceptions of (a) overall 
influences/effects on  news content and coverage decisions; (b) pressures from advertisers; 
(c) political/government official pressures; and (d) pressures from public relations 
practitioners.  Based on existing literature, the present research predicted that Market Size 
would have a negative relationship with overall content influences, advertiser pressures, and 
public relations pressures, and a positive correlation with instances of pressures from 
politicians and government officials, based on reporters’ perceptions.   
 All but one of the hypothesized relationships was confirmed:  the negative correlation 
between public relations pressures and Market Size.  In fact, these two variables were shown 
to be unrelated, which indicates that smaller-market media workers are not necessarily 
subjected to more instances of pressures from public relations practitioners than their larger-
market brethren.  This finding is peripherally supported by Cameron and Blount’s research 
that found that smaller stations did not use VNRs more than those in larger markets,348 as 
well as by Harmon and White’s study that suggested that all sizes of markets were likely to 
use VNRs.349 
                                                 
 
348Glen T. Cameron and David Blount, “VNRs and Air Checks: A Content Analysis of the Use of 
Video News Releases in Television Newscasts,” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 73, no. 4 
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 Overall, the findings suggest that reporters from smaller-market stations perceived 
more instances of Influences on Content than reporters from larger DMAs.  Furthermore, the 
results indicate that news workers at smaller-market stations may be more susceptible to 
pressures from advertisers than those in larger markets.  Conversely, as expected, television 
stations in larger markets are more likely to experience pressures from politicians and/or 
government officials than those in smaller market areas.   
 It is important to point out the small effect sizes of the aforementioned correlations, 
which might indicate that the significant relationships found among the variables may be 
attributed to the larger sample size.  The fact that the sample was more heavily representative 
of reporters from larger media markets may also explain these smaller coefficients.  It is 
expected that the effect sizes would likely be higher if the sample was a closer representation 
of the population.  Therefore, future studies might expect stronger, significant effects if more 
smaller-market media are included.  As explained in more detail in the “Strengths and 
Limitations” section of this chapter, obtaining a closer representation of the population was 
not possible for the current study since such a large number of cases were required for the 
analysis.   
 To elucidate on the broader implications of these findings, the discussion briefly 
reverts to the validated model in phase one, where Market Size was found to have a 
significant, direct negative relationship with influences at the Extramedia level (Refer to 
Figure 4.5).  Given the findings in phase two of the study—which found that Market Size had 
a negative correlation with advertiser pressures; a positive correlation with political 
pressures; and no relationship with PR pressure—it appears that the direct negative 
relationship between Market Size and the Extramedia Influences in the IOMC model is likely 
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due to the stronger negative relationship between Market Size and Advertisers Pressures, 
which was detected in phase two.  This assumption especially seems valid since the only 
other significant Extramedia measure in terms of Market Size was a positive correlation with 
political pressures. This deeper examination of both stages of the study potentially suggests 
that Market Size may not have as strong an influence on the overall process of influences and 
outcomes in the television industry as suggested by previous research.  A more likely 
explanation, however, deals with the fact that the sample more strongly represented reporters 
working in larger media markets.  It is expected that the relationships presented in this study 
dealing with Market Size would be stronger if more reporters from the smaller DMAs were 
included.  To be sure, however, more research is required, such as testing the validated model 
in a future study using new data and running the analysis both with and without the Market 
Size variable, as well as with more representation of journalists working in medium and 
smaller media markets.  Still, this finding offers strong potential for media economics 
researchers, especially those interested in the influences of market size on the creation of 
news content.  The suggestions made from this closer look at the full study also have strong 
implications for professionals working outside the media with regard to the conditions under 
which their communication efforts are more likely to be effective. 
 
Assessment of the Extramedia and Organizational Influence Measures to Determine the 
Strongest Predictors of Overall Content Influences and Agenda Cutting Occurrences 
  
 The final four research questions and hypotheses in stage two of the study gauged the 
incremental strength of the extramedia (advertiser, public relations, and political pressures) 
and organizational (staff, economic, and owner/executive pressures) influences measures to 
determine the strongest predictor of both the Overall Influence on News Content and, in 
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particular, instances of agenda cutting.  The assessments of the Extramedia Influence 
measures are first discussed. 
 
Incremental Strength of the Extramedia Measures 
 The IOMC model examined how Extramedia Influences interrelates with other 
constructs to influence news content, based on reporters’ perceptions.  In this phase of the 
study, Extramedia Influences were examined together; that is, as an overall construct.  
Although this assessment provided valuable information in terms of the overall model, the 
relative contribution of each extramedia measure (i.e., advertiser, public relations, and 
political pressures) also warranted further investigation to better delineate how forces outside 
the media attempt to, and succeed at, influencing content.  Perhaps more significant, 
however, was the evaluation of these measures with regard to the content influence measure 
of agenda cutting.  Since this phenomenon has been afforded little attention by academics 
and professionals alike, explaining its function with regard to these apparent sources of 
influence had the potential to help develop this concept as a vital area of both business and 
media scholarship. 
 As predicted, TV reporters’ perceptions of advertiser pressures had the greatest 
influence on news content and coverage decisions.  Public relations pressure was the second 
strongest extramedia predictor of content influences, while pressures from political and 
governmental officials exhibited the least amount of influence.   
 It is important to point out that although political pressures did little to influence 
content within the scope of the current study, it was included in the overall regression model 
because of its contribution in conjunction with the other measures.  One probable reason for 
its small effect is that professionals representing politicians and government officials often 
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use the same communication tactics as public relations practitioners (e.g., news releases, 
advisories, story pitches).  Although the researcher attempted to distinguish between the two 
sources, it is still possible that the respondents could have mistaken pressures from public 
information officers (PIOs) working for politicians with public relations practitioners.  
Furthermore, since these professional use many of the same communications strategies, it is 
oftentimes difficult for a busy journalist to distinguish between the two.  Therefore, 
examining the separate entities for research purposes may be rather difficult and the results 
somewhat muddled. Remedying this situation may be more challenging than one might think, 
especially since these professional do not necessarily call journalists at the station stating “I 
work for a government official” or “I am the public relations contact for….”  The answer 
may lie within the examination of actual communications tactics received by the stations in 
order to identify their originator (e.g., a PR professional representing a nonprofit, or a PIO 
representing an official in local government).  To gauge types of pressure other than actual 
communications tactics, a researcher could ask journalists to record the sources of their 
phone calls (i.e., the types of companies or offices calling them) when these organizations or 
offices contact them to garner media attention or to provide off-the-record information. 
 As mentioned, the results of this examination indicate that advertisers have the largest 
amount of influence on news content and coverage decisions in the television industry, based 
on reporters’ perceptions.  This finding provides additional support for existing literature 
regarding advertisers’ influence on the media—especially Croteau and Hoynes’ contention 
that advertisers have “substantial influence over what is and is not emphasized in the 
media.”350  It also offers some validation for Baker’s claim that media organizations sell 
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audiences to advertisers, rather than news products to audiences.351 He has argued that 
managers are faced with multiple loyalties in today’s competitive media market, and that 
favor usually goes toward the larger purchaser; the purchaser with the most knowledge as to 
how the media can serve its needs; and the purchaser most sensitive to how the media can 
affect its interests.  In other words, the advertisers are favored. 
 This study’s findings indicate that public relations practitioners also have some 
success in influencing coverage, but at smaller level than advertisers.  Despite the smaller 
influence of political pressures, it contributed to the overall interaction between the three 
extramedia variables to provide a better explanation of content influences, within the scope 
of the current study.  Therefore, it was retained for the overall explanation. 
 As previously discussed, stage two of the study also provided an examination of the 
incremental strength of the Extramedia Influence measures with regard to their effect on a 
specific type of influence on news content:  instances of agenda cutting.  Briefly, agenda 
cutting may occur when an item is (1) placed low on the news agenda (buried); (2) removed 
from the agenda once it is there; or (3) ignored because it was never put on the news agenda 
in the first place. Since the present study serves as the first attempt to develop and expand 
this concept as a theoretical approach, the most obvious form of agenda cutting—ignoring, or 
not covering, a story or topic—was assessed in the survey.   
 The findings suggest that agenda cutting does indeed exist, and the extramedia 
measures, particularly pressures from advertisers, exhibit an even stronger influence than on 
the Overall Influences on Content construct.  The results reveal a similar pattern as the 
previous analysis of the extramedia measures and Overall Content Influences.   
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 As hypothesized, advertiser pressures was the strongest extramedia predictor of 
instances of agenda cutting.  This finding is not surprising given the abundance of empirical 
and anecdotal evidence that concerns advertisers pulling ads from publications and TV 
stations because of content.352 Pressures from public relations practitioners was the second 
greatest influence, while political and government official pressures made virtually no 
contribution to explaining agenda-cutting occurrences. Unlike the previous analysis, 
however, political pressures was excluded from the final regression model because it did not 
make a significant contribution, neither alone nor in conjunction with the other extramedia 
measures.  Although this measure did little to predict and explain instances of agenda cutting 
in the current study, it should not necessarily be discounted as a possible source of influence 
in future research.  The reasons that were offered for its small contribution in the previous 
analysis regarding Overall Content Influences also apply here.  Moreover, the contribution 
reporters’ perceptions of political pressures with regard to the other two extramedia measures 
may simply boil down to a matter of business versus politics.  Reporters may perceive more 
instances of business-types of pressures, such as those from advertisers and public relations 
practitioners, because they are the usual suspects—and scapegoats—for such attempted 
influences on content.  Political influences, however, are a different story, as journalists are 
repeatedly trained in journalism schools that those in government and political arenas should 
not be permitted to influence the news.  Therefore, reporters may be less likely to recognize 
such sources of more subtle influences if and when they occur.  Since agenda cutting is a 
little-studied phenomenon, its development would likely benefit from further examination of 
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the political pressures measure, as well as the other extramedia indicators considered in the 
present study.  Future research regarding Overall Influences on News Content and Coverage 
decisions would benefit from further exploration the extramedia measures as well. 
 
Incremental Strength of the Organizational Measures 
 In addition to assessing the extramedia measures, this study also examined the 
relative contribution of each of the organizational measures (i.e., owner/executive, economic, 
and staff size pressures) with regard to Overall Influences on News Content and Coverage 
Decisions and instances of agenda cutting.  
 As hypothesized, pressures from owners and top-level executives had the greatest 
influence on news content and coverage decisions, based on reporters’ perceptions.  
Economic pressure was the second strongest organizational predictor of content influences, 
while pressures regarding staff size showed the least amount of influence.  The overall 
findings suggest that as reporters perceive more instances of bottom-line, economic 
pressures, as well as pressures coming from owners and top-level executives, the more they 
perceive these sources as having an influence on content and coverage decisions.  This 
relationship is especially apparent with owners/top-level executives, as this source of 
influence is the strongest predictor in the model.  Although a recent study by Pew Research 
Center in March 2008 suggested that economic and business pressures are the top concern for 
the local and national journalists who were surveyed,353 the present study suggests that 
pressures from owners and top-level executives are a powerful force—particularly with 
regard to influences on news content.  Evidence in separate studies by Shoemaker and 
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Reese354 and McManus,355among others, provide support for this finding that owners and 
top-level executives can be strong influencers when it comes to news coverage decisions. 
 Although staff size pressure also exhibits an influence on reporters’ perceptions of 
Content and Coverage Decisions, the variation that it explains is achieved in combination 
with the other two measures.  Furthermore, it provides virtually no unique contribution in 
explaining influences on news content.  As a result, this organizational measure was 
excluded from the most parsimonious regression model.  The staff pressure measure, 
however, should not necessarily be discounted as a predictor of content influences.  Future 
researchers could continue to assess opinions regarding staff size, as well as the actual size of 
the staff to provide additional information on this measure’s potential role in affecting 
Influences on Content Decisions.  As discussed, the current project used only two questions 
to assess reporters’ opinions regarding staff size issues.  Future scholars should add more 
measures to provide a deeper look into how news workers view staffing situations in relation 
to the effect on news quality, content, and instances of agenda cutting, which is discussed in 
the paragraphs that follow.   
 In addition to assessing the Organizational Influence measures’ effects on Overall 
Content Influences, the second stage of the study also examined these measures with regard 
to instances of agenda cutting. The findings show a similar pattern as the previous analysis of 
the organizational measures and influences on content, and they suggest that the measures 
more strongly influence reporters’ perceptions of agenda-cutting occurrences than they did 
for Overall Content Influences. 
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 As predicted, owner/executive pressure was the strongest predictor of instances of 
agenda cutting, based on reporters’ perceptions.  Economic pressures was the second 
strongest organizational influence, and reporters’ views of staff size pressures offered the 
least in terms of explaining instances of agenda cutting.  Overall findings suggest that the 
more TV stations have to contend with economic and staff pressures, as well as pressures 
from owners and top-level executive, the more likely agenda-cutting effects on coverage 
decisions are likely to occur.  Again, these findings are based upon reporters’ perceptions of 
these influences and their effects on content—in this case, not covering a particular topic 
(agenda cutting).  This relationship is especially apparent with owners/top-level executives, 
as this source of influence is the strongest predictor in the model.  Although staff size 
pressure offered little in terms of explaining instances of agenda cutting, it was included in 
the overall regression model because of its significant unique contribution, as well as its 
contribution in conjunction with the other measures.   
 Even though existing literature offers at least some tangential support of advertisers 
influencing instances of agenda cutting, fewer examples have suggested how organizational 
measures contribute to this function.  The present study, which is the first attempt at 
developing this phenomenon, strongly suggests that organizational pressures, particularly 
pressures from owner/executives and economic pressures, are major players where agenda 
cutting is concerned—perhaps even more so than extramedia forces.  A side-by-side 
comparison of the two regression analyses concerning agenda cutting reveals that the 
strength of association is much higher for the organizational measures, as compared to 
measures of extramedia influences.  Although this assumption is based on a rough 
“unofficial” assessment, future research could build a stronger argument by providing a more 
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formal comparison of the two influence levels pertaining to agenda cutting.  To do so, the 
researcher could examine the measures that were validated in the present study using 
multiple regression to consider both the extramedia and organizational measures in the same 
analysis. 
 
Strengths and Limitations 
 One of the most important contributions of the IOMC model and the current study is 
that it provides a higher-level, overall perspective of how forces both within and outside the 
media may attempt to, and succeed at, influencing news content and coverage decisions.  
This type of research is especially pertinent in the current media landscape where news 
workers are faced with multiple competing loyalties, which are at least partially due to 
increased economic constraints and bottom-line pressures.  In the television industry, which 
was the current project’s focus, news content and coverage decisions appear to be influenced 
by forces outside the media, those at the organizational level, and sources within the news 
organization itself.  Market size also played a role in the overall model; however, it did not 
directly affect the level of influences on news content.  Instead, it was more strongly related 
to reporters’ perceptions of the amount of extramedia influences, which was measured by 
instances of advertiser, public relations, and political/government official pressures.  The 
final validated model clarifies how all of the influence levels interrelate to eventually affect 
media content and coverage decisions.  First, it suggests that forces outside the media 
(Extramedia Influences) directly affect influences at the Organizational level.  These 
organizational forces, in turn, directly influence sources within the media organization 
(Within-Media Influences) and, finally, news content itself, based on reporters’ perceptions.  
Forces at the Organizational level also exhibit a direct influence on content and coverage 
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decisions; that is, without first being mediated by (or filtering through) influences from 
newsroom managers, which are a source of measure at the Within-Media level.  Findings 
from the final validation on the full data set (n=612) suggested that the IOMC model 
explained 90% of variance of the dependent variable, Influences on News Content and 
Coverage Decisions (See Figure 4.5). 
 Among the most important contributions of the study is its inclusion of and support 
for agenda cutting as a theoretical approach.  Briefly, agenda cutting may occur when an item 
is (1) placed low on the news agenda (buried); (2) removed from the agenda once it is there; 
or (3) ignored because it was never put on the news agenda in the first place. The process is 
proposed to occur because of logistical constraints, external and internal influences, and/or 
journalists’ own prejudices.  The current research found that the process was most likely to 
occur because of external and internal influences (i.e., extramedia and organizational 
influences), and it also provides some support for occurrences due to logistical constraints 
(e.g., staff size pressures), albeit on a much smaller level.   
As discussed, this study provides strong support for the existence of agenda cutting, 
as well as validation for its use as a theoretical approach in media scholarship and beyond.   
Inclusion of agenda cutting as a pertinent area of research only serves to deepen our 
understanding of influences and outcomes on content.  Specifically, agenda cutting could be 
thought of as a branch of agenda building and agenda setting.  It is important to point out, 
however, that it is not simply the opposite of agenda setting.  Instead, it appears that the 
reasons for its occurrence are different and perhaps even more complex because the involved 
forces may have a different motives and intentions for keeping an item out of the news. 
 Examining agenda cutting from a media-effects perspective is also an important area 
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to consider for future researchers.  If an item is not covered or is placed low on the news 
agenda, the public may be unaware of important societal issues.  In turn, this cutting function 
may affect how people view and participate in their social structures; thus, future research 
should also examine the role audiences and how they are affected.  Measuring audience 
effects on an issue that the researcher may not know is being cut at the time of study, 
however, presents a possible problem; that is, unless the researcher has a pre-designed survey 
on hand to be sent out with the cut topic inserted at last minute.  As a result, the best way for 
audience effects to be assessed is likely through experimental research in which participants 
are presented with altered media products (e.g., print, Web, and broadcast) and then given a 
questionnaire with knowledge items.    
Given the implications of the current project, the significance of agenda cutting 
cannot be stressed enough. This area shows promise for several areas, including the business 
sector, but it should be of particular interest to those studying advertising, public relations 
and strategic communication, media economics, media ownership, political communication, 
censorship, and propaganda. 
 Another notable implication of the model is that the influence process may be more 
linear than previously suggested by Shoemaker and Reese, at least within the scope of the 
present study.  This claim is illustrated by the simple, non-divergent paths among most of the 
constructs in the model (Refer to Figure 4.5).  The only relationship that breaks away from 
this linear process in the IOMC model is the direct link between the Organizational 
Influences and Content Influence/Outcome constructs.  More simply put, this relationship 
was the only one in the model that did not travel down the chain of influences; that is, from 
Extramedia to Organizational to Within-Media and finally to Influence/Outcome on Content. 
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Future studies should further examine the process to determine whether these relationships 
hold true. 
As discussed, Extramedia Influences was found to have a direct effect on influences 
at the Organizational level during model testing in phase one of the study.  Future research 
should also examine if the inverse might also be true—Organizational Influences affecting 
influences at the Extramedia level.  One hypothetical example of the relationship between the 
organizational and extramedia levels is media owners and executives’ contributions to 
political campaigns.  The owners/executives may contribute to the party and/or candidate that 
they believe would help them with their agenda (e.g., a policy agenda such as relaxation of 
ownership rules).  In exchange, the candidate, if elected, would feel pressure to satisfy the 
needs of the media owners who contributed.  On the other side, a political candidate could 
suggest that he or she would like the news organization to cover (or not cover) a certain 
issue. In return, that politician suggests that he or she will help the media organization with 
its goals or agendas.  Although these hypothetical examples are just that, they provide a good 
illustration of how gatekeepers in the organizational and extramedia levels can influence each 
other.  In other words, influences may be bilateral.  In reality, the pressures that these two 
levels exert on one another are most likely not as direct. 
In addition to the aforementioned hypothetical situation, previous research also 
provides some related support for examining this possible relationship in a future project.   
For example, Hasen stated his case in the Texas Law Review opposing the media exception to 
campaign finance laws, which provides support for the reciprocal relationship between the 
extramedia and organizational levels.356  In one part of the argument, he used a public 
                                                 
 
356Hasen, “Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Murdoch Problem,” 1627-65. 
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choice/egalitarian pluralist model to speculate that media owners use their company’s 
political endorsements to secure access to public officials and further influence their own 
interests.  Hasen further suggested that political influence may be a strong motivator to own 
media organizations and that those owners could use the companies to influence public 
opinion for their own self-interests.  Such self-interests could include political favors, gaining 
or maintaining access to candidates, or influencing principled decision-making.357 
 Hasen’s argument, then, implies that media owners are susceptible to outside  
pressures that could, in turn, affect content.  Supporting this implication, Shoemaker and 
Reese have suggested that even though top-level media executives may not often attempt to 
influence specific news stories, “they may do so under pressure from leaders of other 
powerful institutions.”358 Conversely, Hasen’s argument also implies that media owners may 
exert pressure on outside organizations, including political institutions, by donating money to 
support campaigns in order to further their own interests.   
 One potential drawback to this study’s overall findings is the fact the sample more 
heavily represented reporters from larger markets.  Although respondents were not 
specifically questioned regarding their own stations, which would be situated in these 
markets, there is a chance that their responses might be based on views of their own news 
organizations.  As previously noted, a fairly large number of cases were required since this 
project used a model-building approach.  Briefly, the larger sample was needed to randomly 
split the data file to use the first file for exploring and modifying the model, and the second 
for confirming the changes made in the model in the first step.  Because there are only a 
                                                 
 
357Ibid, 1644. 
 
 
358Shoemaker and Reese, Mediating the Message, 132.  
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given number of “general” reporters, all those listed in Bacon’s MediaSource meeting the 
specified criteria were considered for survey participation.  In other words, sampling to 
obtain a stratified sample based on the population was not possible because a 30% response 
rate was required to attain the appropriate number of cases needed for the analysis. 
Therefore, a more pronounced representation of reporters working for stations in the largest 
(1-25) media markets could not be avoided for the current study.  
 Although the IOMC model appears to be an accurate representation of the data 
collected for the study, it is important to point out that there may also be other models that 
that describe these news content influences and outcomes.  In other words, the validated 
model is not necessarily “the final word” when it comes to explaining the processes outlined 
in the study.  There may also be competing models that provide an equally appropriate 
explanation.  To be sure, future research should further examine this area, as well as evaluate 
the current model with regard to other media, such as the newspaper industry.  Yet even with  
the possible limitations just discussed, there is no valid reason to refute the IOMC model or 
its findings. 
 In addition to implications from the analyses, this study also has strengths and 
weaknesses with regard to the data-analysis techniques and the use of survey data.  As 
mentioned, SEM is a powerful multivariate technique that can be considered a combination 
and/or extension of multiple regression, path analysis, and confirmatory factor analysis.  It is 
more useful and powerful than conventional statistical approaches because it can (1) assess 
or correct for measurement error;359 (2) incorporate both observed variables and latent 
                                                 
 
359Byrne, Structural Equation Modeling with AMO, 3. 
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(factors) variables, the latter of which is measured by observed indicators;360 and (3) consider 
modeling of correlated errors, interrelations, and interactions/mediation effects.361 SEM is 
also an a priori approach, which means that the hypotheses of the project must be specified 
beforehand based on previous research and/or theory.  Therefore, the technique can be used 
test theory.  Yet despite its strengths, the method cannot necessarily establish true cause and 
effect because it is based on correlational data.362 
The Web survey in the study presents its own advantages and drawbacks.  One 
advantage of conducting a survey via the Web is that it allows for a quick response.  This 
fast-paced form of answering questions is especially important for TV journalists working in 
busy newsrooms.  This method also allowed for more privacy than other survey techniques, 
such as phone questionnaires, because it could be taken from any available computer, not just 
one used at work.  Another advantage of the survey used in the present study is that it was 
sent to reporters—the front-line news people—rather than managers or executives. As 
mentioned, TV reporters were chosen for several reasons, including their likelihood of giving 
more candid responses because (1) they are further removed from the business side of news 
operations,363 and (2) the transient nature of the profession increases the chances that they 
will not cater their answers to show loyalty to and/or protection for their current news 
organization.  Furthermore, reporters are also less likely to be bombarded by surveys and are 
                                                 
 
360Ibid, 4. 
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“Structural Equation Modeling,” http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/structur.htm (accessed 
September 3, 2006). 
  
362Kline, Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling, 2d ed., 93-94. 
 
 
363Personal communication in January 2007 with Charlie Tuggle, broadcast professional and associate 
professor of broadcasting at UNC-Chapel Hill; See also Shoemaker and Reese, Mediating the Message, 2d ed.,  
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less likely to suffer from survey fatigue than news directors.364 Still, this survey is not 
without its disadvantages, as it only provides cross-sectional data.  In other words, it only 
offers a snapshot of reporters’ perceptions of the television industry at the time it was 
administered.  Since much of the survey research in the social sciences is based on cross-
sectional data, future researchers would be wise to gather consistent data over time as well; 
that is, take a longitudinal approach.  
Overall, the findings from this study should also be valuable to those working in 
public relations, advertising, and the government because they shed light on how, how often, 
and under what conditions these professionals’ communications strategies are most effective.  
As a result, this research may help professionals in these areas alter these strategies 
accordingly to ensure that they are using their resources most efficiently.  The findings from 
this project also provide valuable information for policymakers who deal with such issues as 
ownership (de)regulation, political involvement, and advertising.  With the major 
deregulation from the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the more current debates 
surrounding media ownership, a comprehensive model of potential influences on media 
content may be useful in making decisions about industry guidelines with regards to these 
issues.  Finally, this study has strong theoretical implications for academics, as it provides 
information to advance theory with regard to agenda- and frame-building research, social 
control of the newsroom studies, as well as the development of agenda cutting.  The 
advancement of these areas should also be useful to professionals, especially those in public 
relations and advertising, because the theories apply to strategic communication. 
                                                 
 
364For example, see Adams and Cleary, “Surfable Surveys.”  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1.  Mail Pre-Notification/Invitation Letter  
 
«First_Name» «Last_Name» 
«Organization» 
«Mail_Address_Line_1» «Mail_Address_Line_2» 
«Mail_City», «Mail_State» «Mail_Postal_Code» 
 
Dear «Salutation» «Last_Name»: 
 
I am writing to ask for your help in an important study of reporter views of how people and companies attempt 
to influence the media.  Specifically, I am conducting Web-based survey of television reporters to better 
understand how, how often, and under what conditions forces both within and outside the media try to influence 
news content decisions.  This survey is being conducted as a part of my dissertation research for the School of 
Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  Dr. Donald L. Shaw, 
Kenan Professor, is the faculty adviser for the project. 
 
In the next few days, you will receive an e-mail message sent to «Email» with instructions and a link to the 
survey.  I am writing in advance because I realize that many people like to know ahead of time that they will be 
contacted.  I hope you will consider participating.  Results from this survey will be useful for journalists, 
managers, owners, and scholars alike, as this study will improve our understanding of the nation’s most popular 
medium. If your e-mail address listed above is incorrect and you wish to participate, please contact me at 
colistra@email.unc.edu and I will send you a link to the survey. 
 
You were specifically chosen to participate in this survey after a selective sampling process.  Your response is 
important to this study’s success, and your opinions and expertise are highly valued.  Reporters, such as 
yourself, were chosen for this survey because they are at the front lines of the news world.  Surprisingly, 
however, voices and opinions like yours are not often considered in this type of research, even though you may 
be able to provide the best insight into the issues faced by industry professionals everyday.   
 
Your answers are private and confidential.  I guarantee that your responses will not be identified with you 
personally.  The results of this project will be summarized and presented in various formats, but it will be 
impossible for anyone to match responses with individual names.  This survey is voluntary, and there is no 
penalty if you do not participate.  You may also choose to quit the survey at any time. However, I hope you 
choose to participate, as you can add to the value of this project by taking a few minutes to share your opinions 
and industry knowledge.   
 
Regardless of whether you choose to participate, you are welcome to a summary of my findings.  To receive a 
summary, hit “reply” to the e-mail invitation that you will soon receive, and send me a message with the 
request.  If you have any questions or concerns about participating in this study, I would be happy to talk with 
you.  You can reach me by e-mail at colistra@email.unc.edu or by phone at (919) 260-2748.   
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Rita F. Colistra 
Roy H. Park Doctoral Fellow and Ph.D. Candidate | University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
 
P.S.   If you would prefer to complete the survey by mail or phone, please contact me and I will be  
 happy to accommodate you. 
 
Appendix 2.  Web Survey of Television Reporters 
This study has been approved by the Institutional Review Board at UNC-Chapel Hill.  If you have any concerns about your rights 
as a articipant in this study, you may contact the IRB at (919) 966-3113 or by e-mail at IRB_subjects@unc.edu. Refer to study 
number 07-0088. 
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Appendix 2.  E-mail Invitation/Recruitment Message for Potential Survey Participants 
 
«First Name», 
 
A few days ago, you should have received a letter via postal mail asking for your participation in an 
important survey as a part of my dissertation research for the School of Journalism and Mass 
Communication at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  Briefly, I am conducting Web-
based survey of television reporters to better understand how, how often, and under what conditions 
do forces both within and outside the media try to influence news content decisions.   
 
If you are interested in participating, you can follow this link to the brief survey: «Respondent-
Specific URL».  It should take only a few minutes of your time.  Keep in mind that there no right or 
wrong answers, as I am only interested in obtaining your perceptions about issues facing the 
television industry in general.  You may complete and submit the survey electronically from any 
computer with Internet access. 
 
You were specifically chosen to participate in this study after a selective sampling process.  Your 
response is important to this study’s success, and your opinions and expertise are highly valued.  This 
survey is voluntary, and there is no penalty if you do not participate.  You may also choose to quit the 
survey at any time. However, I hope you choose to participate, as you can add to the value of this 
project by taking a few minutes to share your opinions and industry knowledge.  Results from this 
survey will be useful for journalists, managers, owners, and scholars alike because it will improve our 
understanding of the issues facing the television industry.  
 
Your answers are private and confidential.  I guarantee that your responses will not be identified with 
you personally.  The results of this project will be summarized and presented in various formats, but it 
will be impossible for anyone to match responses with individual names.   
 
Regardless of whether you choose to participate, you are welcome to a summary of my findings.  To 
receive a summary, hit “reply” and send me a message with the request.  I hope you will consider 
participating.  Again, you can follow this link to the survey:  «Respondent-Specific URL» 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about completing this survey, I would be happy to talk with 
you.  You can reach me by e-mail at colistra@email.unc.edu or by phone at (919) 260-2748. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Rita F. Colistra 
Roy H. Park Doctoral Fellow and Ph.D. Candidate | University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
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Appendix 3.  Consent for Web Survey 
 
IRB Study # 07-0088 
 
By participating in this online survey, you agree to participate in a study being conducted by a 
doctoral student at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  Your participation is voluntary 
and you may quit at any time.  All precautions have been taken so that there are no risks to your 
participation, unless you feel uncomfortable answering questions about the television industry in 
general and a few general questions about yourself and the organization you work for.  If you have 
any questions about this study, you may contact the principal investigator, Rita Colistra, at 
colistra@email.unc.edu or (919) 260-2748.  The faculty advisor for this project, Dr. Donald L. Shaw, 
may also be contacted at cardinal@email.unc.edu or (919) 962-4087. 
 
All research on human volunteers is reviewed by a committee that works to protect your rights and 
welfare.  If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research subject you may contact, 
anonymously if you wish, the Institutional Review Board at (919) 966-3113 or by e-mail to 
IRB_subjects@unc.edu. If you contact the IRB, please refer to study number 07-0088. 
 
What is the purpose of this study?  
The purpose of this research study is to assess reporters’ perceptions of how people and companies 
try to influence news coverage decisions.  This research aims to gather and assess your viewpoints 
about the television industry in general, not necessarily about your own news organization. 
 
How many people will take part in this study? 
If you decide to be in this study, you will be one of approximately 2,000 people asked to participate in this 
survey. 
 
How long will your part in this study last?  
The survey takes approximately 13 minutes to complete.  
  
How will your privacy be protected?   
Every effort will be made to ensure that your privacy and confidentiality will be protected.  Your 
name and contact information will only be used to track who has or has not responded so reminder 
messages may be sent.  Your name will not be used in any of the information obtained from this study 
or in any of the research reports.  No information will be attributed to any individual participant.  
Results of each question will be compiled electronically by the Web survey program, and only I, Rita 
Colistra, and a statistical methods advisor will have access to these data.  I will avoid deductive 
disclosure by limiting my analysis to the overall data collected by all respondents. 
 
 
Thank you for your participation in this research. 
Please click on the arrow in the right-hand corner below to begin the survey.  
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Appendix 4.  Web Survey of Television Reporters 
    
Note:  Questions were not numbered on the actual Web survey.  They are only numbered 
here for clarity and for in-text references to particular survey items. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. An inadequate staff size hurts the quality of news coverage. 
Strongly Disagree         Strongly Agree 
             1               2               3               4               5           6                7 
 
2. Public relations or advertising materials fill holes in news programs caused by lack of 
staff. 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
             1               2               3               4               5           6                7 
 
3. When the size of staff is reduced at a station, it has negative effects on news coverage. 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
       1               2               3               4               5           6                7 
 
4. Station owners and top-level executives have little to no influence on news coverage and 
content decisions. 
Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
            1               2               3               4               5           6                7 
 
5. In general, TV stations stress profits over quality of coverage. 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
            1               2               3               4               5           6                7 
 
6. Bottom-line pressures are hurting the quality of television news coverage. 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
            1               2               3               4               5           6                7 
 
 
Please choose the one option that best describes your level of agreement with the following 
statements, with 1 being Strongly Disagree and 7 being Strongly Agree.   
Remember, there are no right or wrong answers.  I am only interested in your viewpoints 
about the television industry in general. 
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7. In your opinion, how often do advertisers pressure TV stations/journalists for favorable 
coverage?  
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
8. How often do stations/journalists decide not to run some stories because of advertiser 
pressures (pressures may include threats to pull ads)? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
9. How often do journalists/stations cover or emphasize particular stories because of 
influences from advertisers?   
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
10. How often do journalists/stations cover a story in a certain way because of influences 
from advertisers (e.g., the angle of a story or stance on an issue)? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
11. How often do journalists/stations not cover (avoid covering) stories or topics because of 
influences from advertisers?     
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
12. In your opinion, how often do advertisers try to influence which stories are covered or 
emphasized? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
13. How often do advertisers try to influence how a story is covered (e.g., the angle of a 
story or stance on an issue)? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
 
 
Please choose the one option that most closely corresponds to your viewpoint, 
with 1 being Almost Never and 7 being Very Often.   
Remember, there are no right or wrong answers.  I am only interested in your 
viewpoints about the television industry in general. 
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14. How often do advertisers try to influence journalists/stations not to cover (avoid 
covering) a particular story or topic?  
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
15. How often do stations/journalists decide not to run stories because they might offend 
owners or top-level executives? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
16. How often do journalists/stations cover or emphasize particular stories because of 
influences from owners or top-level executives?   
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
17. How often do journalists/stations cover a story in a certain way because of influences 
from owners or top-level executives (e.g., the angle of a story or stance on an issue)? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
18. How often do journalists/stations not cover (avoid covering) stories or topics because of 
influences from owners or top-level executives?     
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
19. In your opinion, how often do owners or top-level executives try to influence which 
stories are covered or emphasized? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
20. How often do owners or top-level executives try to influence how a story is covered 
(e.g., the angle of a story or stance on an issue)? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
21. How often do owners or top-level executives try to influence journalists/stations not to 
cover (avoid covering) a particular story or topic?  
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
22. In your opinion, how often do politicians or government officials try to pressure TV 
stations for favorable coverage?  
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
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23. How often do journalists/stations decide not to run some stories because they might 
offend politicians or government officials? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
24. How often do journalists/stations feel pressured to avoid controversial topics about 
politicians or government officials? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
25. How often do politicians or government officials provide leaks or off-the-record 
interviews to stations? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
26. How often do stations receive VNRs/prepackaged news produced by government 
agencies or other information on behalf government officials or political figures? (Note: 
This information can come directly from the officials, their offices or through another 
channel, such as information offices)   
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
27. How often do stations use this information as the basis/topic of a story? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
28. How often do stations/journalists take the angles stressed in the information received 
from these sources and use them as part of their own news stories? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
29. How often do journalists/stations cover or emphasize particular stories because of 
influences from politicians or government officials?   
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
30. How often do journalists/stations cover a story in a certain way because of influences 
from politicians or government officials (e.g., the angle of a story or stance on an issue)? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
31. How often do journalists/stations not cover (avoid covering) stories or topics because of 
influences from politicians or government officials?     
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
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32. In your opinion, how often do politicians or government officials try to influence which 
stories are covered or emphasized?  (Note:  Sources of influence may include 
people/offices working for the politicians/officials.) 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
33. How often do politicians or government officials try to influence how a story is covered 
(e.g., the angle of a story or stance on an issue)? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
34. How often do politicians or government officials try to influence journalists/stations not 
to cover (avoid covering) a particular story or topic?  
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
35. How often do stations use public relations materials (e.g., broadcast news releases, video 
news releases) as the basis for a news story, including just sparking a story idea? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
36. How often do journalists/stations cover or emphasize particular stories because of 
influences from public relations practitioners?   
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
37. How often do journalists/stations cover a story in a certain way because of influences 
from public relations practitioners (e.g., the angle of a story or stance on an issue)? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
38. How often do journalists/stations not cover (avoid covering) stories or topics because of 
influences from public relations practitioners?     
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
39. How often do stations receive video news releases (VNRs)?  (Note: This does not include 
those received from or produced by government agencies.) 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
  
40. How often do stations use VNRs (can include just sparking an idea for a story)? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
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41. How often do stations air VNRs with little to no editing? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
42. In your opinion, how often do public relations professionals try to influence which 
stories are covered or emphasized? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
43. How often do public relations professionals try to influence how a story is covered (e.g., 
the angle of a story or stance on an issue)? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
44. How often do public relations professionals try to influence journalists/stations not to 
cover (avoid covering) a particular story or topic?  
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
45. How often do you believe that television news content is compromised because of 
economic pressures?   
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
46. In your opinion, how often are journalists pressured to avoid covering certain stories (not 
cover them) because they might be damaging to the economic interests of the 
organization?  
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
47. How often are journalists pressured to specially handle stories involving companies or 
organizations with some economic clout over their station? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
48. How often do managers/superiors within TV stations (e.g., assignment editors, producers, 
news directors) directly suggest to reporters to cover a story that would normally not be 
covered?  
(Note:  These suggestions include a superior directly instructing a reporter to take the 
action or providing overt instructions about what kinds of stories to cover/avoid and 
perhaps how to cover them.) 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
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49. How often do journalists cover the topic/story as a result of this type of suggestion? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
50. How often do managers/superiors working within TV stations directly suggest how a 
story or topic should be covered (e.g., the angle of the story or stance on the issue)? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
51. How often do journalists cover the topic/story in the way the manager/superior directly 
suggested? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
52. How often do managers/superiors directly tell journalists to avoid (not cover) certain 
stories, topics or issues? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
53. How often do journalists purposely avoid (not cover) certain stories/topics because a 
manager/superior specifically tells them to take this action? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
54. How often do journalists purposely avoid (not cover) newsworthy stories because of how 
they believe their managers/superiors would respond? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
55. How often do journalists choose to cover or emphasize certain stories because of how 
they believe their managers/superiors would respond? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
56. How often do journalists take a particular angle on a story because of how they believe 
their managers/superiors would respond? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
57. How often do managers/superiors within TV stations give indirect signals/suggestions to 
reporters to cover a story that normally would not be covered?  
(Note:  Indirect signals might include purposely showing a reporter a similar type of story 
from another station, mentioning the topic/angle in passing, showing great interest in or 
airing this type of story, or positive reinforcement) 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
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58. How often do journalists cover the topic/story as a result of this type of suggestion? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
59. How often do managers/superiors working within TV stations indirectly signal/suggest 
how a story or topic should be covered (e.g., the angle of the story or stance on the 
issue)?   
 (Note:  Indirect signals here may include mentioning the angle in passing conversation, 
showing how a similar type of story was covered from another station, showing great 
interest in a particular side of the story.) 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
60. How often do journalists cover the topic/story in the way the manager/superior indirectly 
signaled/suggested? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
61. How often do journalists get indirect signals/suggestions (e.g., yawns/hemming/hawing, 
lack of interest in stories/don’t get aired, jokes) from their managers/superiors to avoid 
covering certain stories or topics?  
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
62. How often do journalists purposely avoid (not cover) certain stories or topics because of 
these indirect signals/suggestions from managers/superiors? 
Almost Never   Very Often 
              1               2               3               4               5             6                7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
63. How many years have you worked in the television industry?                            
_______years 
 
64. How many years have you worked at your current station?             
________years 
 
 
 
 
 
Now I would like to know a little about you and the station where you work.   
Please fill in the blank or choose the answer that best applies. 
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65. To the best of your knowledge, the ownership of your station is  
○ family/independent 
○ group—up to 4 stations total 
○ group—5 to 10 stations total 
○ group—more than 10 stations   
 
66. To the best of your knowledge, do the owners of your station also own other types of 
media (e.g., newspapers)? 
 
○ No 
○ Yes, up to 4 newspapers (or other type of media) 
○ Yes, 5 to 10 newspapers (or other type of media) 
○ Yes, more than 10 newspapers (or other type of media)   
○ Don’t know  
 
67. The company that owns your station is  
○ privately owned 
○ publicly owned—has publicly traded stock 
○ don’t know 
 
68. What category best describes the number of people who work in your station’s news 
department? 
○ 1-10 
○ 11-20 
○ 21-30 
○ 31-50 
○ 51+ 
 
69. Your gender is  
○ Male 
○ Female 
○ Decline to Answer 
 
70. What is your age? 
○ 18-24 years 
○ 25-34 years 
○ 35-44 years 
○ 45-54 years 
○ 55-64 years 
○ 65 years and over 
 
Thank you for your time and cooperation! 
If you have any additional comments, please type them in the box below, or  
contact me at colistra@email.unc.edu or (919) 260-2748. 
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Appendix 5.  First E-mail Reminder Message 
 
«First Name», 
 
A few days ago, I sent you a message with a link to a survey on reporters’ perceptions of issues facing 
news workers in the television industry.  If you have already completed it, thank you! 
 
If you were in the process of filling out the survey but were interrupted, you can return to it and finish 
by following this link to the survey:  «Respondent-Specific URL». 
 
If you haven’t had the chance to review the survey, I hope you will do so.  It should take 13 minutes 
or less to complete, and your opinions will speak for many television news reporters around the 
country.  It will also help me complete my dissertation! 
 
Thank you for participating in the study of reporters’ perceptions of issues facing news workers in 
the television industry.  Follow this link to the survey:  «Respondent-Specific URL». 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Rita F. Colistra 
Roy H. Park Doctoral Fellow and Ph.D. Candidate | University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 212 
 
 
 
Appendix 6. Second E-mail Reminder Message 
 
«First Name», 
Through my experience working with television reporters, I know there are some excellent reasons 
for not bothering to complete a Web survey: you’re on deadline, they look like “SPAM,” you get too 
many surveys already, you’ll get to it later… All good reasons! 
But, I am asking you to celebrate the end of February Sweeps by spending 13 minutes or less to share 
your viewpoints on important issues facing news workers. It’s for my dissertation research, and you 
were one of just a few reporters who were selected to represent the views of many television reporters 
around the country. So far, the answers and comments from other reporters have been informative, 
but I want to make sure I get as complete and accurate a picture as possible. That’s where you come 
in! 
Follow this link to the survey: {~SurveyLink~}.  
If you are willing to take the survey but would rather not take it online, you can still 
participate!  For example,  
…I will send you an attachment of the survey, and you can print, complete and return it by mail,  
OR 
…you can request that I send you a survey via postal mail, and I will send it and a self-addressed 
stamped envelope so you can return it to me at No Cost to You.  It’s that easy! 
What if you were in the process of taking the survey before, but were interrupted?  No problem!  You 
can pick up where you left off by  
following this link {~SurveyLink~}. 
All survey questions are unique, and your views will speak for many others in the industry.  I 
appreciate your time and recognize that asking for 13 minutes is a tall order. Still, I believe this 
unique project will provide some useful information for the industry. Thank you for being a part of it.  
I hope you will take a few minutes to participate.  
Sincerely, 
Rita F. Colistra 
Roy H. Park Doctoral Fellow and Ph.D. Candidate | University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
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Appendix 7: Third E-mail Reminder Message  
 
«First Name», 
I need about 100 more surveys completed, and I need your help!  
Do you have opinions about important issues facing news workers in the media industry?  If so, 
please take 13 minutes or less to complete a survey for my dissertation.  I sent you messages with a 
link to the survey several days ago.  If you would like to participate now but have disregarded or 
misplaced the previous messages, please follow this link to the survey: {~SurveyLink~} 
I am concluding the project at the end of this weekend and would really like to include your opinions 
in the final report. Your response is important to this study's success, as I need about 100 more survey 
completions to reach my required response goal.  Your time, opinions and expertise are highly 
valued, and you were one of only a few reporters chosen for this study.  As with the ratings books, the 
comments of a few speak for many others.  Plus, you'd really be helping me out with my project! 
A few notes... 
  
...If you have "finished" the survey but continue to get reminder messages, you likely need to 
officially close out your survey.  To do so, click on the link in this e-mail, and it should take you to 
the page with the "comments" box.  You need to click on the arrow in the lower right-hand corner, 
which will take you to the "Your data has been collected" page.  This closes out the survey and 
records your responses.  Or, if you prefer, send a reply to this message with the words "do it for me" 
in the subject line or body of the message, and I will close out the survey for you.  
  
...If you don't feel comfortable taking this survey via your work e-mail, you can forward this message 
to a personal e-mail account and take the survey from there. 
  
...If you have started the survey, you can finish it by clicking the link in this message.  
  
...If you requested/received/completed a survey by mail, please disregard this message. 
Again, you can access the survey by following this link:  {~SurveyLink~}  
If you have any questions or concerns about completing this survey, you can reach me by e-mail at 
colistra@email.unc.edu or by phone at (919) 260-2748.  
Thanks again, 
Rita F. Colistra                                                                                                                                             
Roy H. Park Doctoral Fellow and Ph.D. Candidate | University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
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male
female
decline to answer
50.65%46.77%
2.58%
Appendix 8.  Respondent Demographic Information 
 
 
Gender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DMA Category  
 
 
 
 
Note:  DMAs were not grouped into categories for the overall analysis.  They are only presented as such here   
 for clarity. 
Age Range f % Valid % 
18-24 57 9.2 9.3 
25-34 313 50.6 51 
35-44 131 21.2 21.3 
45-54 77 12.5 12.5 
55-64 32 5.2 5.2 
65 and over 4 .6 .7 
Didn’t answer/ 
Missing 
4 .6 -- 
Total 618 100 100 
DMA f % 
1-25 429 69.4 
26-50 67 10.8 
51-75 33 5.3 
76-100 45 7.3 
101 and over 44 7.1 
Total 618 100 
Age Range 
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Number of Years Working in the Television Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean=12.76; SD=9.04 
* Note:  The answer options were not presented as ordinal-level groups in the survey.  They are only presented 
     as such here for clarity. 
 
Number of Years at Current Station 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean=6.77; SD=6.79 
* Note:  The answer options were not presented as ordinal-level groups in the survey.  They are only presented 
     as such here for clarity. 
 
 
Number of People Working in Current Station’s News Department  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Range* f % Valid % 
1-5 years 131 21.2 21.4 
6-10 years 185 29.9 30.2 
11-15 years 114 18.4 18.6 
16-20 years 59 9.5 9.6 
21+ years 124 20.1 20.2 
Didn’t answer/ 
Missing 
5 .8 -- 
Total 618 100 100 
Range* f % Valid % 
1-5 years 400 64.7 65.4 
6-10 years 95 15.4 15.5 
11-15 years 48 7.8 7.8 
16-20 years 25 4.0 4.1 
21+ years 44 7.1 7.2 
Didn’t answer/ 
Missing 
6 1.0 -- 
Total 618 100 100 
News Staff 
Size Range 
f % Valid % 
1-10 17 2.8 2.8 
11-20 53 8.6 8.6 
21-30 97 15.7 15.8 
31-50 156 25.2 25.4 
51+ 292 47.2 47.5 
Didn’t answer/ 
Missing 
3 .5 -- 
Total 618 100 100 
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privately owned
publicly owned--has publicly traded stock
don't know
29.63%
60.55%
9.82%
Ownership of Station 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Private or Public Ownership 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ownership  f % Valid % 
Family/Independent 
 
68 11.0 11.0 
Group—up to 4 
stations total 
36  5.8 5.8 
Group—5 to 10 
stations total 
132 21.4 21.4 
Group—more than 
10 stations  
380 61.5 61.7 
Didn’t answer/ 
Missing 
2    .3 -- 
Total 618 100 100 
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Cross-Ownership Status 
(Survey Question:  To the best of your knowledge, do the owners of your station also own 
other types of media (e.g., newspapers)?) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Status f % Valid % 
No 
 
166 26.9 26.9 
Yes, up to 4 
newspapers (or 
other type of 
media) 
129 20.9 20.9 
Yes, 5 to 10 
newspapers (or 
other type of 
media) 
67 10.8 10.9 
Yes, more than 
10 newspapers 
(or other type of 
media) 
206 33.3 33.4 
Don’t Know 
 
48 7.8 7.8 
Didn’t answer/ 
Missing 
2 .3 -- 
Total 618 100 100 
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Correlation Matrix of Measured Variables
 
Mkt  
Size 
Adv PR Political Staff Econ Ownr/ 
Exec 
Direct 
Mgmt 
Indirct 
Mgmt 
Agnda 
Bldng 
Frame 
Bldng 
Agnda 
Cttng 
 
Mkt Size 
 
 
1 
 
-.233 
 
.022 
 
.100 
 
-.075 
 
-.027 
 
-.139 
 
-.100 
 
-.080 
 
-.117 
 
-.111 
 
-.136 
Adv 
 
 1 .303 .337 .131 .413 .502 .246 .324 .411 .389 .463 
PR 
 
  1 .539 .159 .216 .240 .213 .288 .291 .301 .236 
Political 
 
   1 .237 .187 .212 .175 .270 .259 .276 .175 
Staff 
 
    1 .331 .151 .127 .188 .149 .152 .116 
Econ 
 
     1 .531 .428 .452 .570 .551 .616 
Ownr/Exec 
 
      1 .408 .406 .570 .567 .675 
Direct Mgmt 
 
       1 .659 .688 .680 .634 
Indirct Mgmt 
 
        1 .690 .694 .618 
Agnda Bldng  
 
         1 .886 .764 
Frame Bldng 
 
          1 .791 
Agnda Cttng 
 
           1 
Mean 123.858 14.013 14.863 22.696 12.420 19.758 8.857 12.015 11.796 30.006 27.063 28.678 
Std. Deviation 53.595 5.771 4.250 6.643 1.837 6.206 4.564 4.532 5.042 9.434 8.385 10.194 
A
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 9.  C
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Appendix 10.  Unstandardized Maximum Likelihood Estimates versus Bootstrapped  
  Estimates using 2000 Samples with Replacement 
 
 
 
ML 
Estimate (S.E.) 
BS2000 
Estimate (S.E.) 
Estimate Bias 
(S.E. Bias) 
 
Market Size → Extramedia Infl. 
 
 
-.022 (.004) 
 
-.022 (.005)  
 
.000 (.000) 
Extramedia Infl. → Org. Infl. 
 
.471 (.059) .468 (.086) -.002 (.002) 
Org. Infl. → Within-Media Infl. 
 
.782 (.062) .783 (.070) .001 (.002) 
Within-Media Infl. → Content Infl./Out. 
 
1.301 (.104) 1.304 (.105) .002 (.002) 
Org. Infl. → Content Infl./Out. 
 
1.140 (.118) 1.144 (.126) .004 (.003) 
Extramedia Infl. → Adv. Press. meas. 
 
1.000  a 1.000 .000 
Extramedia Infl. → PR Press. meas. 
 
.303 (.046) .301 (.070) -.002 (.002) 
Extramedia Infl. → Political Press. meas. 
 
.494 (.073) .491 (.090) -.003 (.002) 
Content Infl./Out. → Agenda Cutting meas. 
 
1.000  a 1.000 .000 
Content Infl./Out. → Frame Building meas. 
 
.851 (.026) .852 (.030) .001 (.001) 
Content Infl./Out. → Agenda Building meas. 
 
.992 (.032) .994 (.033) .002 (.001) 
Org. Infl. → Owner/Exec. Press. meas. 
 
1.000  a 1.000 .000 
Org. Infl. → Economic Press. meas. 
 
1.251 (.075) 1.256 (.081) .005 (.002) 
Org. Infl. → Staff Size Press. meas. 
 
.097 (.023) .097 (.024) .000 (.001) 
Within-Media Infl. → Dir. Mgmt Press. meas. 
 
.905 (.042) .906 (.043) .001 (.001) 
Within-Media Infl. → Ind. Mgmt Press. meas. 
 
1.000  a 1.000 .000 
 
 
 
 
 
a
 These paths were fixed to one; therefore, no estimates or standard errors are reported. 
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Appendix 11.  Parameter Estimates and Standard Errors of the Actual Data Set versus the 
 Bootstrapped Data Set 
 
 Actual Data  BS2000 Data  
 
 B (Std. Error) B (Std. Error) Bias 
(RQ1)  Extramedia Measures &   
Content Influence/Outcome  
   
   Constant 13.683 13.665 -.018 
       Advertiser Pressure .503 (.055) .504 (.057)     .001 (.002) 
       Public Relations Pressure .312 (.083) .311 (.077) -.001 (-.006) 
       Political/Gov’t Pressure .079 (.054) .080 (.053) .001 (-.001) 
(RQ2)  Organizational Measures & 
Content Influence/Outcome 
   
   Constant 12.566 12.532 -.034 
       Owner/Executive Pressure .736 (.063) .739 (.064) .003 (.001) 
       Economic Pressure .510 (.048) .511 (.047) .001 (-.001) 
       Staff Size Pressure -.162 (.140)    -.161 (.126) .001 (.014) 
(RQ3)  Extramedia Measures & 
Level of Agenda Cutting 
   
   Constant 14.770 14.752 -.018 
       Advertiser Pressure .775 (.068) .776 (.068) .001 (.000) 
       Public Relations Pressure .300 (.103) .299 (.093) -.001 (-.010) 
       Political/Gov’t Pressure -.062 (.067) -.061 (.066) .001 (-.001) 
(RQ4)  Organizational Measures &     
Level of Agenda Cutting 
   
   Constant 12.391 12.426 .035 
       Owner/Executive Pressure 1.075 (.071) 1.073 (.072) -.002 (.001) 
       Economic Pressure .638 (.055) .640 (.052) .002 (-.003) 
       Staff Size Pressure -.470 (.159) -.474 (.145) -.004 (-.014) 
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